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Preface 
The subject o~ this dissertation is Jewish colonisation in, 
and the agricultural development of', the semi-arid zone which 
borders the Negev Desert . The region which I have delimited, 
on historical grounds, is not a 'natural ' region, nor has it any 
name which is consistently used today. Por the sake of' con-
venience, I have called it the Northern Negev, although the 
northern part of the region now falls in the Lachish Region of 
the settlement authority, the Agricultural Settlement Department 
of the Jewish Agency. I have referred to the Northern Negev 
throughout as the region, and this should not be confused with 
the Regions of' the Settlement Department. 
I chose the Northern Negev for two reasons. First of' all, 
because within I sr•ael it self it offers the clearest example of 
the successes, and the pitfalls, of the truly astonishing work 
of' agricultural settlement that has made Israel an object of 
admiration throughout the world. Israel is as much known today 
for the cooperative forms of' agricultural village that were 
developed in the long struggle for a J~wish Sta.te, as for the 
energy with which she has tackled economic and social problems 
which many would have judged insoluble. I have therefore 
endeavoured to describe the roles of the different village 
types, the kibbutz and the moshav, in both settlement and agri-
culture. Secondly , I feel that the Israeli experience in this 
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region is not without significance for other countries in the 
Miodle East and in Asia, wher•e the problems of inducing agri-
cultural development and of settling refugees and the surplus 
population of overpopulated areas are being solved, or will have 
to be solved, by irrigating the semi-arid or arid margins of 
those countries. In the final chapter I have drawn some 
parallels between the experience of Israel and other countries, 
and have given some conclusions that may have application else-
where. 
In order that the criticisms which I have made will raise 
no doubts in the reader's mind, I would state emphatically that 
my admiration for the work of agricultural settlement and general 
economic development in .Israel, for the Settlement Department of 
the Jewish Agency, and not least for the individual settlers, is 
unqualified. It is gratifying to see that the energy and 
enthusiasm of the people concerned is today rewarded in some 
measure by the interest of the emergent nations of Africa and 
Asia. 
My approach has been general, and I have used my training 
as a geographer as an instrument rather than as a rigid frame-
work. I feel that the analysis of planned development in any 
case limits the geographer's traditional role of explaining why 
things are where they are, so that the terms of reference are to 
a large extent linked to the purposes of development and the 
methods employed. For this reason the elucidation and an?lYsis 
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of policy bulks large at many points; I have cast my net fairly 
wide, but not, I hope, too far. 
I have assumed that the reader is conver'sant with the 
general characteristics of agriculture and settlement in Israel. 
Space does not permit the inclusion of much background material 
here, and the reader will find adequate descriptions in such 
generally available works as Professor Halpern.' s "Changing 
Patterns in Israel Agriculture", Alex Rubner' s "The Economy of 
Israel", and H.K. Infield's "Cooperative Living in Palestine". 
The dissertation is the result of a year's preparatory work 
at the Department of Geography, Cambridge, and of almost two 
years spent in Israel. I found, as others have done before me, 
that a knowledge of the Hebrew language is indispensable for the 
critical analysis of almost every aspect of Israeli life. Much 
is published in English in Israel, especially on the subject of 
agricultural settlement, but this material is remarkable for the 
absence of any critical content. I have therefore used to a 
great extent the Hebrew publications on the subject, and also 
the original material, which is of course in Hebrew. The Hebrew 
language is also essential if one is to make useful contact with 
officials and with the people who form the real subject of this 
work: the settlers themselves. 
Agricultural settlement is a much discussed subject in 
Israel; I have drawn material from a wide variety of sources, 
from the records of public institutions, from the records of 
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individual settlements, from published and unpublished research 
work in allied fields, from newspapers and journals, and, most important of all, from talking to officials of the Settlement 
Department, accompanying them in their work in the field, and from long hours spent in conversation and working with the 
settlers. 
The first chapter, which covers the physical geography of 
the Northern Negev, is in large part founded upon the work of 
others, as many aspects of the physical geography of the region have been explored already. In the second chapter, which des-
cribes the Arab and Beduin occupance of the region, and the beginnings of Jewish colonisation in the closing years of the Mandate, I have depended for material on descriptions written at 
the time. For the analysis of British and Jewish policy, I 
consulted the relevant British documents for the former, and for 
the second I used the evidence of individuals and the conclusions 
which may be drawn from the analysis of contemporary Jewish 
settlement. 
The third, fourth, and fifth chapters, which form the main body of the dissertation, are the subject of my general claim of 
originality. The basic material for the analysis of the progress 
of settlement and agricultural development has been drawn from two 
sources. The first is the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, from whose records I have taken data on population, cul-
tivation, village development, and so forth. This data was 
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obtained at the Regional headquarters of the Settlement Department 
in Beersheba and Kiryat Gat, and from the Department's Bureau of 
Statistics in Jerusalem. Most of the land use data prepared by 
the Settlement Department refer :: to crop planning, and is there-
fore of doubtful accuracy. For land use data I have therefore 
used the statistical records provided by the internal statistical 
bulletins of the '~rit Pikuach Lecooperatsia Hahaklait Ha'ovedet 
B.M." (The Audit Union f ·or Workers' Agricultural Cooperatives~. 
These bulletins have been compiled, for more than two decades, 
from the land use and population returns of the individual 
villages. Unfortunately, the bulletins for the moshavim were 
discontinued after 1955/6* and have not been sta~ted again yet. 
In the same year all records of population were omitted. For 
I 
population data throughout the period I have therefore relied on 
the Settlement Department's files: these betray considerable 
inconsistencies, on the village level, but the overall accuracy 
for the region as a whole is acceptable. For land use data for 
the moshavim in 1958/9, I had to rely on the Settlement Depart-
ment's records; all other land use data, unless stated otherwise, 
is taken from the Brit Pikuach. 
I have availed myself of relevant published material in 
Engl ish and in Hebrew, especially for the inter_pretation of 
*: The agricultural year, October to September; this also 
corresponds roughly to the Jewish calendar year. 
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policy towards the region. Especially important in this context 
are the memoranda of the American expert M.M. Clawson, written 
while he was working as an adviser to the Israeli Government. 
These memoranda I finally tracked down in the State Archives. In 
all cases I have acknowledged quotations and references in the 
bibliography at the end of each chapter; sources of material for 
maps and statistical tables are given at the foot of each. 
It is necessary to say that the wide interpretation given in 
Israel to the classification of material for security purposes is 
an obstacle to anyone attempting research in this or similar 
fields. The Northern Negev is particularly affected by security 
restrictions, and in consequence I was not able to use aerial 
photographic material. I was not given access to or allowed to 
use maps of post-Independence date that included information 
about vital installations, or recent general maps ona larger 
scale than 1 :100,000. These restrictions, and the suspicion 
with which I was greeted on one or two occasions, were difficul-
ties which perforce had to be accepted. Indeed, I am grateful 
to several people for allowing me to use material which is 
oft~t~ially classified, and to the Government Press Censor in 
Jerusalem for allowing me to take all of my material out of 
Israel. Neverth~less, I would say, with full awareness of the 
need for security precautions in Israel, ·that a great deal of 
unnecessarily wasted time has to be spent convincing officials 
that their interpretation of the needs of securit;y is over-
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careful and not that of their superiors. 
In a long list of people to whom my thanks are due, I give first place to my supervisor, Mr. B~H. Farmer. His advice and his constructive criticism have been invaluable in the last three years. His understanding, sympathy, and practical help during the time that I was in Jerusalem were all the more 
appreciated for the distance between us, and kept my spirits up in several moments of difficulty. Without his generous 
encouragement this dissertation would never have been completed. Also in the Department of Geography at Cambridge, Professor J.A. Steers and the Managers of the Philip Lake Fund were kind enough to give me financial help with my field work at a crucial point. 
In Israel I was given much-needed assistance by the Depart-ment of Geography at the Hebrew University. Professor D. H.K. Amiran asked Dr. Y. Karmen to look af'ter me, and also provided me with the very necessary letters of introduction which helped to smooth my _path. Dr. Karmon's advice and suggestions while I was in Cambridge led me to choose the Northern Negev for my I 
research, and in Jerusalem he provided considerable help - I hope that he will forgive the infrequency of my visits to him. Yehoshua Ben Arieh, whose work on Revel Lachish I have referred to in the followirtg pages, gave me useful advice on several 
occasions. Also in the Department of Geography I would like to thank Shalom Reichman, also in his capacity as a Government· 
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The Northern Negev 
Chapter I 
The area chosen for this study of recent land settlement 
forms the present southernmost extension of continuous 
agriculture in Israel. It is the semi-arid transition zone 
between the ' Mediterranean' climatic region of the central 
Coastal Plain to the north and the arid zone of the Central 
Negev desert to the south. It is the climate, and in part-
icular the amount and character of the rainfall, which 
distinguishes the region from the relatively densely settled 
Coastal Plain, in which, were it not for the climatic factor, 
the region might be included. It should be emphasised that 
the region, which will be called the Northern Negev in this 
context, is not of clear definition. In the early years of 
Jewish settlement in Palestine the Negev was treated as being 
the area south of the town of Gedera, and in 1937 Gottmann 
defined the semi-arid border as a line between Ashkelon and 
Hartuv (1). Today the Northern, or Northwestern, Negev is 
defined as the area south of a line Gaza-Ruhama-Devira, which 
is also the border of the Ga za-Beersheba Basin. It is clear 
that as settlement was extended southward in the Coastal Plain, 
so the frontier of the semi-arid zone appeared to recede. 
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Jewish settlement depended upon irrigation$ rather than upon 
rainf'all, for its agriculture, so that the climatic limits 
apparent from Arab settlement and cultivation tended to lose 
their importance. Furthermore, the definition of the border 
between the Mediterranean and the semi-arid zone is necessarily 
difficult, since long-term annual mean rainfall data fail to 
reflect the very wide annual variations. 
For these reasons the Northern Negev is here given an 
historical definition : it is the area south of\ : th:e Ashkelon-
Bei t Guvrin road, in which no permanent Jewish settlement had 
been established before 1940. Its boundaries are : to the 
north, the Ashkelon-Beit Guvrin road; to the west, the coast 
from Ashkelon to the Gaza Strip and thence southward along the 
international frontier between Israel and the Egyptian-held 
Gaza Strip; to the south, the inland Halutsa dune belt, whose 
northern edge is roughly co-ordinate 063 N, and which marks 
the beginning of the Negev desert; and to the east, the 
eastern limits of Jewish cultivation in the depression east 
of Beersheba, and further north, the international frontier 
between Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan. The total area of 
2 the reg ion amounts to about 2,500 km; 
The region thus defined corresponds as a whole to what 
was called, ···-ih .19.56-,.. the populated Negev (2), and also to 
the greater part of the present Negev Regional Water Project 
(3). After 1949 the whole of this region, with the exception of the northwest corner between Ashkelon and the Gaza Strip, formed one unit of the Jewish Agency's Agricultural Settlement Department, but in 1955 the region was divided and now falls partly into the Settlement Department's Negev Region, and partly into the Lachish Region. In terms of the present-day geography there is much justification for separating the Negev and Lachish Regions, as they are separated in the Settlement Department's operations. However, the analysis in the following pages is in large measure historical, and, if further justifi-cation be needed for the division made here, it is felt that the inclusion of that part of the present Lachish Region which lies between the Gaza-Beersheba Basin and the .Ashkelon-Beit Guvrin road is necessary for the analysis of post-1948 trends, both in Lachish and in the Negev. 
Structure, Geology and Relief 
The structure of the region is fairly straightforward. The major determining element is the Hebron (Judaean) anticline to the east·, which gives rise to the Hebron Mountains. The Shephela, or easte·rn upland border of the region, is formed by "a smooth syncline resting up against the steep declivity of' the Qenomanian-Turonian strata of' the Hebron anticline 11 (4). This hilly foreland, in its upper part a low but distinct range, is composed of Eocene and Eocene-Oligocene limestones 
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and chalk. The line of hills is broken at Beersheba by one 
of the characteristic Palestinian transverse fault lines. The 
resulting east-west depression breaks the Shephela north of 
the town of Beersheba, but the hills continue to the south 
towards the Central Negev. The limestone strata of the Shephela 
dip to the west beneath the f~uaternary deposits which cover 
the coastal lowlands. The main elements of the surface geology 
of the lowland section are the alluvial clays of the inland 
plain north of the Gaza-Beersheba Basin, the loess and sands of 
the Basin, and the PJ.eistocene sandstone and dunes near the 
coast. Generally speaking, the loess and sands of the Gaza-
Beersheba Basin are of aeolian origin, the kurkar sandstone 
is a marine and terrestrial formation, and the coastal dune 
belt is of marine and aeolian origin. 
With regard to relief, the region falls into three 
major zones: (i) the coastal belt, (ii) the inland plain and 
the Gaza-Beersheba Basin, and (iii) the hilly foreland - the 
Shephela. These three zones may again be subdivided into 
their smaller component parts. 
The coastal belt is here fully represented only in the 
section n or th of the Gaza Strip. It is composed of the 
coastal dunes along the shoreline, a series of three low ridges 
of kurkar sandstone running parallel to the shore, and shallow 
va lleys or 'tr oughs' between the ridges (5). The coastal 
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dunes a~e extensive and reach as much as 6 kilometres inland. 
They are broken a little to the north of the Gaza Strip by 
1 
the outlet of the Nahal Shiqma. The westernmost of the 
kurkar ridges runs through the dunes, but outcrops in low 
cliffs along the coast and on the edge of the floodplain of 
the Nahal Shiqma at kibbu tz Zikim. This ridge is the lowest 
of t he three, and its greatest elevation is 40-50 metres. The 
depression between this and the central ridge is not more than 
2 km wide, and is for the most part covered by dune sand. The 
central ridge, followed by the line of the old Gaz a-Ashkelon 
r oad, stands out well in some places, reaching heights of 
60-70 m near Yad Mor dechai and Mavqi'im, but elsewhere, as in 
the gap of the Nahal Shiqma, it disappears from view. The 
trough between the central and eastern ridges reaches a 
maximum width of 8-10 km in the north, but narrows to the 
south, t owards Nir Am, where the width of the easternmost 
ridge increases. The latter is the most pronounced of the 
three, but its outlines are the least clear. It extends into 
the Gaza-Beersheba Basin to the south, and may be traced along 
a line Kokhav-Ni r Am- Sa ad-Beeri, and possibly through Nirim 
on the other bank of the Nahal Besor (Wadi Gaza). However, 
sou th of Nir Am the 1curkar is covered with loess and the 
outline of the ridge may only be guessed at. In the north 
the kurk ar reache s a maximum height of 138 m near Hule i qa t , 
(1) Naha l may mean r iver or wadi 
exclusively to the latter. 
in this r egion it ref ers 
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and again 133 m near Nir Am. North of the latter the ridge 
reaches a width of three or four kilometres, and may more 
properly be termed a series of sub-ridges. The other two 
never achieve a width of this magnitude, and may be measured 
in hundreds of metres. 
The inland plain, as it is termed by Ben Arieh (5), is 
separated from the Gaza-Beersheba Basin to the south by the 
sand hills of the Dorot-Ruharra area. The inland plain reaches 
a width of 12-15 km between the eastern kurkar ridge and the 
Shephela. This broad undulating plain of alluvium, with some 
patches of loess (here at its northernmost point), rises 
gently from west to east and from north to south. The Gaza-
Beersheba Basin, which is the plain of the Nahal Besor and 
its tributaries, is much more extensive, with a width of 30-
35 km between the Gaza Strip and the Shephela. It is 
transversed by a well-developed system of wadis, often of 
considerable depth below the surrounding p lain and f'reg_uently 
exposing tmderlying Pliocene strata. In effect the Gaza-
Beersheba Basin extends in the west to the Gaza Strip, since, 
as was mentioned above, the loess cover obscures other 
formations, so as to give the impressio~ of a flat or rolling 
plain throughout its extent. Between the Lachish inland plain 
and the Basin, the sand hills around Ruhama present a section 
of dissected and even 'badland' topography, with maocimum 
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heights, greater than those of the plains to the north and 
south, of up to 200 m in the east. These sand hills are said 
by Picard and Solomonica (4) to be relic dunes. In the Gaza-
Beersheba Basin the loess cover merges into the Ruhama sandhilJ.s 
in the north, and into the .sand dunes of the Halutsa belt in 
the south. In the Beersheba depression the landscape is much 
the same as in the Basin: flat and gently rolling topography 
cut by wadis. 
The hilly foreland which forms the eastern border of this 
region, is divided by Ben A.rieh into the Lower and Upper 
Shepielas (5). It is at its widest in the north of the region, 
where the Lower Shephela rises gently from the inland plain, 
reaching a width of 10-12 km. Here is to be found a lightly 
dissected limestone topography, with well-developed valleys 
filled with alluvium, and rnaximmn heights of less than 300 m. 
Further south the Lower Shephela is much narrower, only 2-3 
km at Devira, and a covering of loess and alluvium makes it 
less distinctive to the eye. The Upper Shephela fornIB a 
range of rounded limestone hills, with an even summit-line 
which rises from 400 m in the north to 50e m near Lahav. 
A little to the north of Beersheba the .range is broken by the 
transverse fault or faults which gives that town its 
distinctive position. The limestone hills continue to the 
south, but at a lower level and with a covering of loess and 
sandy-loess. To the east of Beersheba the depression widens 
in two directions, along the lines of the Nahal Hebron and the 
Nahal Beersheba, two tributaries of the Nahal -Besor. 
Hydrology 
The greater part of the region is divided between two 
drainage basins, those of the Nahal Besor and the Nahal Shiqma. 
The watershed runs eastwards from Gaza through Beit Hagadi, 
Beit Kama, Devira and Lahav. (Wadi Hanun, in the section 
within Israel, east of Gaza, would seem to be a former 
tributary of the Nahal Besor that has been captured by the 
Nahal Shiqma.) In the northeast, the Naha1 Lachish, which 
reaches the sea outside the region a t Ashdod, drains the area 
ar ound Kiryat Gat. In none of these wadis is there perennial 
flow. Flow occurs only after storm rainfall; in winter and 
spring months disconnected ponds may be found in the wadi 
beds between falls of rain. The significance of the wadi 
system in the region is thus rather in the fact that the wadis 
constitute obstacles to cultivation and to movement. The 
wadis are not developed in the Gaza-Beersheba Basin to such an 
extent that they limit field sizes, however, and it is only 
in the inland plain to the north that this factor a~ises. On 
the other hand, the storm flow in the major wadis in winter, 
and especially in the Nahal Besor, does cut road cormnunications 
. - . - .... 
~
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for as much as several days. This is not surprising, when it 
is remembered that this catchment basin is the largest in 
Israel after that of the Jordan River. 
As there are no fresh springs of any consequence in the 
region, its water resources are therefore limited to groundwater'. 
There are two major and two minor aquifers (3). The most 
important is the Pleistocene, found in the kurkar sandstone 
of the coastal belt. This constitutes the primary local 
source of water. The aquifer is exploited by pumping in three 
adjacent areas : Gvar'am, Yad Mordechai, and Nir Am. The total 
output is about 40 million m3 per annum. South of Nir .Am the 
occurrence of water in the kurkar becomes sporadic and 
unreliable. The second aquifer, of his.torical but not of 
present importance, is found within the coastal dunes, where 
the danger of seawater infiltration severely restricts 
exploitation. The third is the Eocene aquifer, tapped in the 
past by means of shaft wells, but this has only of late been 
used to any extent. Its potential output has been estimated 
at not more than 60 million m3 (3), but this is probably 
exaggerated. The fourth aquifer is much deeper, at an average 
of 500 m below the surface, and is found in the Turonian-
Cenomanian strata at the edge of the Gaza-Beersheba Basin. 
Test-borings have been made with reasonable results, and water 
is pumped for local use at Beersheba. Test-borings in this 
JO 
' (J 
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and in the Eocene aquifer atrmny locations have revealed 
water too saline for use. Some water is to be found in the 
wadi beds at a depth of a few metres, and this was used by the 
Beduin in the past. But the quantities involved and the 
frequency of high salinity make their exploitation a totally 
uneconomic proposition today. Apart from the Pleistoc.ene and 
Eocene aquifers, the balance of the region's water supply is 
obtained from the Yarkon-Negev Project, which will be des-
cribed in a later chapter. 
Climate 
The distinctive character of the region, particularly for 
the purposes of agricultural settlement, is a product above 
all of its climate, and principally of temperature and rainfall. 
In general ·outline the main features of the climate are -: 
summers appreciably hotter than in the Coastal Plain, warmer 
winters, and a lower and more variable rainfall. 
A more detailed analysis may be made with the aid of the 
data below (Figs. 2,3,4,5; Table 1.). The month with the 
highest mean maximum temperature is August at both Gaza 
(31.5°c) and Beersheba (33.7°c), and with the lowest mean 
minimum, January (8.8 and 6.2°c respectively). From this it 
can be seen that a continental temperature effect is felt at 
Beersheba. Comparison with an inland Shephela station, Beit 
Jimal, to the north of the region, also indicates that away 
from the coast there are considerably lower minimum temperatures 
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in winter while on the other hand the mean maximum temperatures 
in summer increase progressively southwards. It should also be 
mentioned here that the diurnal range of temperature is 
considerable, as one might expect on a desert border. Frost 
does occur in the winter months in the region, but less 
frequently near the coast, and this offsets to some extent the 
agricultural advantages of the warmer winters. Another and 
important feature of the climate is the incidence of the hot, 
very dry sharav (khamsin) in May and October, which is 
potentially damaging not only to crops but also to the 
equanimity of the settler. The graph of monthly mean humidity 
clearly illustrates the effect of the shara~. 
Annual mean rainfall data are a very poor indication of 
the rainfall probable in any single year. It is in fact the 
variability of annual rainfall, with lower limits well below 
the critical lower va l ue for unirrigated cultivation, which 
distinguishes this region from the Coastal Plain, and which 
has made it in the past the fringe-zone of agricultural 
settlement in Palestine (6). The long-term, but incomplete, 
rainfall series for Beit Guvrin, Ashkelon and Beersheba 
indicate the range of annual rainfall amounts. Thus for example 
in the twelve years between 1949/50 and 1960/1, in only five 
was the ~ainfall equal to the average or above it, and the 
other years were years of drought or partial drought. The 
11 
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Table 1 
.1940/1 
1941/2 
1942/3 
:1943/4 
.1944/5 
1945/6 
1946/7 
1947/8 
1948/9 
1949/50 
1950/1 
1951/2 
1952/3 
1953/4 
1954/5 
:f 955/6 
1956/7 
.1957/8 
1958/9 
1959/60 
Average 
1921-1950 
Rainfall Series 
--- ·--
Ashkelon Beit Gouvrip 
396 mm 
480 
732 
378 332 mm 765 618 428 355 186 140 375 
694 
217 
551 537 335 461 411 
277 
361 483 459 498 304 353 366 242 178 
422 mm 398 mm 
12 
~sheba 
207 
273 
215 
189 
296 
237 
103 
185 
289 
272 
132 
243 
167 
214 
190 
139 
293 
102 
163 
85 
192 mm 
Source: Annual Rainf'all Data, Israel Meteorological 
SeI'vice. 
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sketch-map (Map 5) illustrates the percentage variability of 
annual rainfall. The whole of the region has a variability 
of more than 30%, and by far the larger part has a variability 
of over 35%. Another aspect of rainfall is the fact that it 
generally occurs in the form of heavy storms distributed 
unevenly over the winter months. Adequate rainfall for the 
germination of unirrigated winter crops is essential in late 
November and December, so that if the rains are late, even 
though the total rainfall for the season may reach adequate 
amounts, then the crops are damaged. Furthermore it will be 
seen (Fig. 5) that although the mean monthly distribution of 
rainfall is more even at Beersheba than at the coast, the 
inland and southern stations do not receive, on an average, 
50% of their annual rainfall until almost two weeks after 
coastal areas. The nature of the rainfall also tends to limit 
the absorption of water by the soil, although the soils of the 
region do have in general a hj_gh potential absorption rate. 
However, th~ utilisation of storm runoff water in the wadis is 
difficult, as flow is rapid and large in volume for a short 
period. Lastly, mention should be made of dew, the occurrence 
of which is frequent and heavy in the Northern Negev (7) • . While 
it has been suggested that dew is of such importance - it is 
almost equal in amount to the mean annual rainfall in the Gaza-
L i.. -
J u 
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Beersheba Basin - as to warrant the delimitation of a special 
climatic region here (B,9), it seems that the actual utility 
of dew to cultivated vegetation has not yet been determined. 
14 
It has been suggested elsewhere (10) that the definition 
of a clearly defined semi-arid zone between the Coastal Plain 
and the Central Negev may be achieved more easily with the aid 
of indices of natural vegetation than can be done by means of 
the highly variable annual isohyets. Although there are now 
but vestigial traces of the original natural vegetation, the 
demarcation of the boundary between Mediterranean vegetation 
and the Indo-Turanian of the Northern Negev has been made along 
the northern border of the Gaza-Beersheba Basin (11,12). The 
northern part of the Basin is thus in the Indo-Turanian zone, 
which merges southwards into the arid Saharo-Sindian (Map 6). 
Soils 
The soils of the region (Maps 7,8) may be divided into 
six main groups: the dune-sand soils, the alluvial soils of 
the inter-ridge troughs and the kurkar soils, all in the 
coastal belt; the aeolian loess and sandy soils of the Gaza-
Beersheba Basin; and the limestone soiis of the Shephela. 
The processes of aeolian and alluvial soil erosion and 
deposition have led to the development of a considerable 
degree of intermixture and intercalation between these main 
MAP 6 
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types. 
In the coastal belt, the dune soils are found in the 
western trough and where they have been mixed with alluvium 
they form a light loam. On the dunes themselves there is 
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little or no soil formation, due to their youth and constant 
movement. In places, however, the dune sand forms only a thin 
cover on the underlying kurkar ridge, and here f'ruit plantations 
have been developed (5,13). The sandy soils of the kurkar 
ridges are equally thin and relatively poor in quality, and the 
same can also be said of' the Ruhama-Dorot sand hills. Except 
in the minor valleys where there has been alluvial deposition, 
these soils are only suited to tree cultivation. In many 
places, especially around Ruhama, the inroads made by soil erosion 
make soil conservation (afforestation and terracing) a prime 
necessity. The heavy alluvial soils of the eastern inter-
ridge trough are of extremely high quality, and are not 
subject to soil erosion. 
The inland plain of' Lachish has alluvial soils, mixed 
in places with loess. The rolling topography and the elevations 
of up to 125 m, have led to the development of a large number 
of' small wadis and gullies, with a consequent tendency to soil 
erosion. 
In the Gaza~Beersheba Basin the normal sequence of 
aeolian deposition has produced loess s oils in the north, and 
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sandy soils in the south, the lighter particles travelling 
the greater distances. In the north loess is found above 
alluvial deposits, in the c entre loess is found alone, while 
towards the south are developed patches of sandy loess 
(loess-like) soil, of sandy soil superimposed on loess and 
loess-like deposits, and finally a belt of true sandy soils 
on the edge of the dunes. It should be noted that Ravikovitch (14) includes a l arge part of the area between· the Ruhama-Dorot 
Pelic dunes and the Nahal Gerar (Wadi esh Shariah) in the 
loess belt, against the opinion of Picard and Solomonica (4). 
It is the opinion of Ravikovitch that the intergradations 
between loess and dune sand in the Basin originally formed 
continuous latitudinal belts, but that subsequent aeolian 
action has obscured this pattern. These aeolian soils have 
a high infiltration capacity and this, togethe1" vvi th the low 
rainfall, has restricted the development of surface drainage 
in the Basin, especially on the southern bank of the Nahal 
Besor. In consequence fluvial erosion is limited to the banks 
of the wadis, where it is very striking to the eye. The most 
active form of erosion of general significance in the Basin 
is that produced by wind action, and it is the vulnerability 
of the soils of the Basin to wind erosion that has led to 
their being placed in the second class of the land use 
capability classification (Map 8) •. In all other respects the 
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loess and loess-mixed soils of the Basin are as suited to 
irrigated cultivation as any other soils in the country. 
They are fertile and easy to cultivate, being free from 
stones. In only one area, around kibbutz Hatserim, does the 
presence of salts reduce fertility. The loess and sandy 
loess are rich in the important minerals, though the content 
of nitrogen and organic matter is low. The principal problems 
of cultivation are the difficulty of eradicating the yablit 
plant (Asphodelus microcarpus), and the tendency, under 
irrigation, to crust formation on the loess. Yablit can 
only be controlled l)y deep ploughing and by soil drying on 
irrigated land. Surface crust formation, the compaction of 
soil particles under sprinkler irrigation, can be avoided by 
suitable methods of tillage and irrigation water application 
(15). 
In the Shephela the main soil type is a brown limestone 
soil developed in situ, which merges to the south into a 
grey-brown dese~t soil. The occurrence of bare limestone 
or of very thin soil is evident in the Upper Shephela, and 
t h is reduces very considerably the amount of cultivable land 
in these hills. In the Lower Shephela, on the other hand, 
the valleys in the northern part contain appreciable quantities 
of alluvium, and in the southern half, where the Lower Shephela 
is much nm:-rower and flatter, there is a cover of loess which 
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also permits cultivation. 
According to the land capability classification, the 
only land which can be cultivated with irrigation .that re~uires 
simple or no conservation measures is in the eastern trough 
of the coastal belt. For the rest, in the inland p lain of 
Lachish and in the Gaza-Beersheba Basin, simple to medium-
scale conservation practices are necessary. Except for t he 
Ruhama-Dorot area, more than 90% of the inland plain and the 
Basin is land well-suited t o cultivation, aDnost a million 
dunams. In the Shephela the proportion of cultivable land, 
with or without irrigation, falls considerably, to less than 
70% in the Lower, less than 2oro in the Upper Shephela. The 
cultivable land in the lowland section forms very extensive 
tracts, but in the uplands it is mostly to be found in 
winding valleys. 
With an estimated total of some 1.5 million dunams of 
cultivable l and, the region contains some 30% of Israel's 
resources of agr icultural land. 
Gaza-Beersheba Basin (095/086) - tree-lined road (Magen-Beeri) on horizon. 
i-
i 
Two views (101/080) of the eroded loess in and 
beside the Nahal Beser ( Wadi Gaza). 
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Kurkar outcrop at Kibbutz Zikim (105/113) 
On the kurkar r idge at Zikim, looking E - coastal 
dunes on right, plain of Nahal Shiqma in centre. 
. . . - -
- ·- . 
.iiiiiilaa 
On kurkar (110/105) to N of Nir Am. View to NW -
Kibbutz Erets in middle distance, and behind it 
Yad Mordechai. Coastal dunes to left; western 
kurkar ridge and dunes on horizon. 
l 
The kurkar "massif" (110/105) to E, Shderot in 
centre. 
I 
Cutting (120/101) in sand hills on Dorot-Ruhama 
road. 
Terracing at Ruhama (122/101). 
- .... - . . .. 
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Terraced afforestation (Eucalyptus). 
Afforestation (117/102) near Doroto 
Lower Shephela - arable land only in the valleys. 
r -
Sprinkler irrigationo 
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Chapter II 1941-1948 
Political Background 
The land problem in Mandatory Palestine was a central 
element in the friction between the Arab and Jewish corrnnunities, 
and between these two and the British authorities. Land was a 
means of livelihood for the Arab peasant and the Jewish farmer 
alike, but the acquisition of land had a much greater significance 
for the Zionist movement as a whole. Zionist aspirations, 
whether towards a National Home or a fully fledged Jewish 
State, depended upon a steady increase in the country's 
absorptive capacity for immigration and upon the establishment 
of a firm territorial base. A central tenet of Zionist policy 
in the years preceding Independence, and one which still has 
considerable force within the State of Israel, was that Zionist 
political as well as social aims were best served by co-operative 
or communal agricultural settlement. The Mandatory Power itself 
had been instructed by the 6th Article of the Mandate ''to 
encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency ••••• close 
settlement by Jews on the land", but this was to be done without 
prejudice to "the rights and position of other sections of the 
population" • . 
The increasing inter-communal unrest in Palestine which led 
to the appointment of the Royal (Peel) Commission in 1936, was 
. . 
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in good measure attributable, according to that body's Report, to the Arab comm.unity's fears regarding Jewish land purchase (16, pp .109-112). This is not the place to examine the justice of Arab and Jewish claims at that time, but it is from the Peel Commission Report, its successor the Palestine Partition Commission Report, and subsequent legislative measures, that the immediate impulse for Jewish settlement in Southern Palestine 
was drav,rn. 
The Peel Commission, in the face of Arab demands that Jewish land purchases should be restricted, and in view of the fact that a series of legislative measures ~elated to land 
tenure had failed to satisfy the Arab community which they were desi gned to protect (16,pp.218-222), found itself compelled to 
suggest that, at least in certain areas, Jewish land purchase 
should be prohibited (16,pp. 222-393) . Furthermore, the Commission considered that a permanent solution to the vexed question of the political future of Palestine should be sought through partition (16,p.375). And in making this pr oposal, the Commission noted that "the natura l principle for the Partition of Palestine is to separate the areas in which the Jews have 
acquired land and settled from those which are wholly or 
mainly occupied by Arabs" (16,p.382). 
Jewish colonization in 1936 centred on Easte~n Galilee 
and the northern Jordan Valley, the Emek (Vale of Esdraelon), 
"'· 
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the northern and central Coastal Plain, and the Jerusalem area. 
In all of these areas the land bought for Jewish agricultural 
settlement was usually in need of reclamation and improvement, 
but j_ t responded we ll to such measures and local water supplies 
were sufficient to form the basis of the Jewish pattern of 
mixed irrigated farming. There could not be much further 
extension of Jewish settlement in these areas, and the 
feasibility of colonization in the hill areas of Galilee and 
Samaria was problematic in the light of .i\rab hostility and the 
marginal nature of the land there. Eyes were turned, and not 
for the fiT.'st time, towards the dry, but lowland, South. 
Plans for settlement in Southern Palestine had been made 
on several occasions. Before the First World War Theodore 
Rerzl obtained a charter from the Fifth Zionist Congress to 
investigate and implement settlement in the El Arish area. But 
this, and an attempt by a group of ex-servicemen to foLLDd a 
settlement at Tel Arad after the War, came to nothing. A 
Jewish farm had been set up on the border of the Negev at 
Ruhama in 1911. It was evacuated during the Turlcish with-
drawal in 1917, resettled, abandoned during the disturbances of 
1929, resettled again, and finally abandoned in 1933. The 
settlement did not prove viable, and the isolated conditions 
did not encourage the settlers to stay. Thus little experience 
was available for assessing the Negev's agricultural and 
__ .,. 
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settlement potential. Nevertheless, it was generally considered 
that agricultural settlement was possible provided that the key 
problem of water could be overcome. Sir John Hope-Simpson had 
said in 1930 : "Given the possibility of irrigation, thepe is 
practically an inexhaustible supply of cultivable land. Without 
i1:>rigation the countPy [i. e. the Negev J cannot be developed. 
Up to the present there has been no organized attempt to 
ascertain whether there is or is not an artesian supply of 
waten° ( 17, p.20). 
The Peel Commission found that nothing further had been 
done to determine whether underground water was to be folllld 
in the Beersheba area. The Partition Commission was however 
able to report a year later that a hydrographic survey had been 
made in the Northern Negev in 1938, but that, of thirteen bores 
completed, only one near Gaza, where lUldergrolllld water was 
already kno\1V!l to exist, proved successful. "In eight, water 
has either not been found at all or f'olllld in such small q_uantities 
as to be useless for irrigation purposes'' (18, pp.54 & 55). On 
this evidence·, and bearing in mind the needs, present and 
future, of the Beduin inhabitants, the Commission found that 
"this does not entirely exclude all pros·pect of closer settlement 
in this area, but lllltil further investigation into the 
possibilities of dry farming has been carried out, it would be 
premature to assume that there is scope fbr settlement on any 
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considerable scale in the near. future" (18, p.83). 
In consequence the Commission recommended (Plan 'C') that 
the Hebron and Gaza Districts, as wholly Arab areas, should be 
included in the proposed Arab State, while the Beersheba Sub-
district should remain mandated territory until such time as 
its potential for development could be clarified. In the 
meanwhile, the northern part of the Beersheba Sub-district, 
where there was a considerable Beduin population (the Occupied 
Area), was to be closed to Jewish land purchase, and the 
southern part (the Unoccupied Area), south of a line El Auja-
-Asluj-Kurnub (" •• it is desert, and desert it is likely to 
remain, unless Jewish enterprise and capital can develop ittt) 
was open to Jewish experiments, subject to permission from the 
Government (18, pp.99-183). 
The outbreak of the Second World War indefinitely 
postponed implementation of the partition proposals, but 
legislative action was taken to limit Jewish land purchase. 
The MacDonald White Paper of 1939 was followed, early in 1940, 
by the Palestine Land Transfers Regulations (19), which 
prohibited the transfer of land to anyone, save a Palestine 
Arab, in the hill country and certain parts of the Gaza District 
and north-west Beersheba Sub-district, and made the written 
permission of the High Commissioner necessary for the transfer 
of land, save from one Palestine .Arab to another, in all other 
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areas of the country, including the southern part of the 
Beersheba Sub-district, with the exception only of those areas 
which were already entirely or almost entirely in Jewish 
ownership. 
vi/hile the Mandatory Government thus retreated from its 
obligations to encourage Jewish settlement and to avoid 
discrimination between the religious communities of Palestine, 
' (1 the Yishuv s need of land was increased by the rise of Nazism 
in Germany. And if the political futtme of Palestine was to 
lie in the direction of Partition, then it was necessary to 
establish a firm territorial claim, not merely by land 
o~mership but by land settlement as well, to as large an area 
as possible, in order to maximize the area and resources of 
the future Jewish State. The Land TransfersRegulations would 
appear to have closed all doors in this direction. Two avenues 
of advance did, however, remain open. Land that had already 
passed into private Jewish hands or that had been acquired by 
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the Keren Kayemet (the Jewish National Fund, set up in 1902 to 
raise funds for land purchase in the name of the Jewish 'nation'): 
this could still be settled. Since the futu~e of the Negev 
remained in doubt (the Beduin inhabitants are not recorded as 
having any political demands at this time), and since the 
Government was still unable to carry out a full survey of its 
development potential, there could be little objection to 
(1) Yishuv = the Jewish community in Palestine. 
. . . 
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Jewish efforts towards a clarification of the situation. Thus 
it was along these two paths that Jewish settlement was 
extended into the area south of the El Majdal (Ashkelon)-Beit 
Jibrin (Guvrin) road in the years between 1940 and 1948. 
Arab and Beduin Occupance 
Before turning to Jewish colonisation in the region, it 
26 
is instructive to examine the·settlement and agriculture of the 
Arab and Beduin inhabitants at this time. 
The administrative boundary between the Gaza and Beersheba 
Districts had been drawn so as to include the area of settled 
Arab (fellahin) occupation within the Gaza Dist~ict, and to 
include within the Beersheba Sub-district the area of nomadic 
and semi-nomadic Beduin occupation. The boundary therefore 
represented, more or less, the frontier of the zone of permanent 
Arab agricultural settlement at the beginning of the Mandate. 
The Hebron District, in which lay the north-east corner of the 
region, comprised the greater part of the Shephela and the 
Hebron Mts. 
The 1944 population map drawn up by the Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry, and upon which the Beduin are not 
represented, shows the distribution of the population in the 
northern part of the region: along the major coastal route 
from Palestine to Egypt, from El Majdal on the coast along the 
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road inland to Hebron, and in the coastal belt in the northwest 
of the region~ The only exception to this pattern was the 
town of Beersheba, founded by the Turkish .Administration in 
1900 in its efforts to extend its control into Beduin territory. 
Beersheba, located a few kilometres west of the Biblica l well-
site, has a lcey position on the routes which pass through it, 
from the coast, along the foot of the hills, and across the 
Hebron Mts. from Jerusalem, southwards to the A.rava and the 
Dead Sea. 
The key factor determining the distribution of permanent 
settlement and the pattern of agriculture was the location of 
water supplies. The towns and villages on the coast between 
Khan Yunis and El Majdal obtained their water from the local 
shallow wells of the coastal aquifer. In the Shephela use was 
also made of cisterns for collecting rainwater. The dependence 
upon wells, in the absence of perennial stream flow, and the 
difficult security conditions prevailing on the Beduin frontier, 
were presumably res ponsibl~ for the nuclea ted form of the 
villages. In the 1931 Census, the last to be taken in 
Palestine, the population of the northern part ' of the region 
(i.e. excl uding the towns and villages now wi thin the Gaza 
Strip ) was 27,771 , of wh i ch 22, 028 were in the Gaza District 
and 5,743 in three upland villages in the Hebron District; 
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the population of Beersheba was 2,~58, making it the second 
largest town after El Faluja. By 1944 the balance of 
population had changed slightly, according to the estimates 
of the Govt. Dept. of Statistics. El Majdal had become the 
largest tovm, followed by El Faluja and Beersheba. The 
population in 1931 was of course almost entirely Arab (20). 
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In the coastal belt the relatively dense population was 
based upon an agriculture consisting principally of unirrigated 
grains and vegetables with Mediterranean fruit (13). Irrigation 
was limited to small house-plots and small fields of vegetables 
and citrus-groves. Cereal cultivation was chiefly in the 
'troughs' between the kurkar ridges, and the latter were to 
a small extent planted to olives, vines, and fruit-trees. 
Where the dune sand lay thinly on the westernmost kurkar ridge, 
there were also citrus groves. The villages themselves were 
loc ated on the higher ground of the kurkar. In agricultural 
terms this was the most prosperous part of the region, for 
although there was necessarily a considerable dependence upon 
the vagaries of rainfall, this zone has the highest mean 
~ainfall in the region, and soil moisture conditions are good 
in the inter-ridge troughs. 
To the east, the lower rainfall and poorer water resources 
limited permanent settlement, so that except in the vicinity 
of the El Majdal-Beit Jibrin road, the inland plain, which 
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here is more elevated and dissected than to the north of the 
road, was for the most part in the control and cultivation of 
the Beduin. In the kurkar and sand hill zone further south 
were the frontier villages of Huj, Kaufakha and El Muhurraka, 
which had their own, though relatively saline, well-water 
supplies . The latter two villages were said to be of quite 
recent date, representing a small-scale movement of population 
inland from Gaza (21, p.359). Here and to the north agriculture 
was limited to unirrigated cereal crops, principally barley, 
with some olives and fruit. In the Lower and Upper Shephela 
similar crops were grmm, with some vineyards, but the 
cultivation, by reason of the broken terrain, was even more 
dispersed. 
In all of these areas the Mandate period saw a certain 
measure of advance upon the primitive cultivation methods and 
equipment of the fellahin. The j_ncreased demand for food in 
Pales tine, the presence of military camps in or near the 
region (Faluja, Gaza, Kastina), and the availability on a 
small but significant scale of tractors, all these had helped 
to stimulate the change from a subsistence to a market economy. 
Enumerati on of the Beduin population of the Beersheba 
Sub-district was never satisfactorily achieved during the 
British Mandate. The 1931 Census estimated that there were 
2 some 48,000 Bed~in in the district, whose area was 12,700 km 
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and which extended down to the Gulf of Akaba on the Red Sea. 
During the Second World War the authorities were compelled 
to distribute sugar and other necessities to the Beduin, and 
the so-called 'sugar lists' drawn up for this purpose arrived 
at a Beduin population of over 64,000 - generally considered, 
for obvious reasons, to be an over-estimate. Other estimates 
worth noting were those of Arif el Arif, an officer in the 
Administration, who made an estimate (21, p .246) of 47,500 
for the year 1934, and B.A.Lowe, the :3enior Agricultural 
Officer in Palestine, who gave a figure of 80,000 for 1944 (22). 
It seems likely, if the latter estimate may be regarded as 
exaggerated, that the Beduin population of the whole District 
was not much more than 55,000 in the years around 1940. The 
accuracy of an estimate for the population of the Northern 
Negev alone can thus be but poor. This is a small part of 
the . District, but it is the wettest in terms of rainfall and 
has the largest area of cultivable soils, so that it might be 
roughly assumed to have had a population of about 20,000 at 
that time. 
During the Mandate the Beduin tribes of the Northern 
Negev, of which there were seven major groups, tended 
increasingly towards a sedentary pattern of life. Cultivation 
in the Gaza-Beersheba b asin was in any event a long-established 
practice , evidenced by the fact that tribal lands were firmly, 
30 
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though not officially, demarcated. It is clear that the 
transition of the climate towards the arid Central Negev was 
accompanied by an equal transition from the fellah villages 
of the southern Coastal Plain, through the semi-nomadic or 
settled Beduin of the northern border• of the Negev, to the 
truly nomadic Beduin of the south who cultivated the soil 
~arely if at all. 
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Beduin cultivation was extensive and primitive. In the 
words of Lowe: "Over much of the area there is only one crop 
and one method of cultivation; the rotation is barley, and 
barley, and again barley, and as far as we know, this has been 
the sole crop for countless gene1,ations 11 (22). Ploughing vras 
done with a wooden nail-plough drawn by a camel. The sole 
concession to the paucity and variability of the annual rainfall 
was the practice of' a three-year rotation, in which the land 
was fallowed for one or two years out of three : more 
sophisticated dry farming measm."es were not employed. Other 
crops occupied a small fraction of the area cultivated - some 
wheat, summer millets and dura in the wetter northern part, 
melons in the southwest near the coast. Where a summer crop 
was grown the rotation was apparently : , winter cereal, summer 
fallow, winte l'.' fallow, summer crop ( .82). A feature of the 
landscape, clearly seen on contemporary maps, was the Beduin 
'vineyards' (karrri). These small p lots, h•rigated seldom if at 
all, rarely contained vines, and were generally composed of a 
few fruit trees of different varieties, surrounded by a mud 
wall as a protection against animals and sandstorms. According 
to Lowe, the northern part of the Beersheba sub-district, somewhat 
larger than the region of this context, had during the Second 
.rJorld War a cultivated area estimated at 750,000 dunams, with 
Beduin herds and flocks of 60,000 sheep and goats, 14,000 
camels, 25,000 horses and donkeys, and 10,000 cattle. 
The chief obstacle to the development of Beduin agriculture 
and the adoption of a sedentary life was of course the paucity 
of the rainfall and the underground water resources. r'The 
success or failure of the crop is entirely a matter of the 
amount and distribution of rainfall, pr ovided one has good seed 
and cultivates at the right time 11 (88 ). Local wells, many of 
them of gr ea t antiquity, were found chiefly in and around the 
major wadis. They provided small quantities of water, often 
saline, which su~ficed for no more than drinking purposes for 
the Beduin and their flocks. The incidence of drought frequently 
compelled the -Beduin to seek work and pasture further north in 
the summer. Lowe repeats the popular but perhaps dubiously 
accurate Beduin estimate of the frequency of drought 
11 crops run on a seven-year cycle, which contains about three ... 
good crops - according to the local modest standard - three 
partial successes, when one reaps little more than the seed sown, 
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and one total failure when the seed would have been more 
satisfactorily consumed as foodtt (82). He considered that a 
normal satisfactory yield of barley was 40-50 kg/dunam, a good 
yield 70 kg/dunam, and stated that he had heard of yields of 
300 kg/dunam, 11which shows the potential 11 • Braslavsky, on the 
basis of doubtful total production data, compares the yield of 
1,870,000 kg of barley in the Sub-district in the drought year 
1927 with t hat of the wet year 1920, when the total was 
53,119,000 kg : almost thirty times as much. His totals for 
crops in 1920 also give a measure of their relative importance, 
bearing in mind the fact that this was a wet year : 
Table I 
Total P-roduction in Beersheba Sub-district,1980 
Barley 
11/heat 
Dura 
Melons (1921) 
53,119,000 
16,570,000 
1,912,000 
5,934,000 
Source (21, p.152) 
kg 
II 
II 
II 
After a good harvest a large amount of grain left the 
~egion, which was reputed for the Quality of its barley, via 
Gaza and El Ma jdal, to the north and to o.ther Mediterranean 
countries. The towns of Gaza, El Majdal, and Beersheba were to 
a large extent dependent upon this trade and the .consequent 
economic activity engendered by it. 
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By the late 1930's, however, considerable changes were 
under way. Chief among these was the advent of the t ractor, 
and later, the opening of dry farming stations by the British 
authorities. The stations were intended to develop dry 
farming measures suited to the area, and to train the Beduin 
in their use, as part of an effort to induce fixed settlement 
among the Beduin. Tractor ploughing clearly raised yields of 
grain, and there was considerable demand among the sheikhs 
for tractors. These were hired from the Government stations, 
from merchants, from Arab landowners in the north, and from 
Jewish settlements. Contracts were made for their hire, in 
return for a share in the produce, a form of share-cropping. 
By the end of the Mandate the authorities had succeeded in 
establishing about ten small Beduin villages in the region. 
They had, in contrast to the fellah villages fur t her north, 
a dispersed pattern, with considerable distances between the 
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mud houses. But these villages were "very small-scale aff'airs which did not materia i ly change the overall picture of Beduin 
occupation. The decisive break came with the advent of 
Jewish settlement ••• " ( 6). 
Table II 
Jewish Settlements 1941-48, TyPe, Date of' Foundation 
Dorot Kibbutz Decembep 1941 
Gvar'am Kibbutz August 1942 
Nir Am Kibbutz January 1943 Beerot Yitshak Kibbutz It ,, Gevulot Kibbutz May 11 Beit Eshel Moshav August " Yad Mordechai Kibbutz December !I 
Ruhama Kibbutz March 1944 
Shoval Kibbutz October 1946 Mishmar Hanegev Kibbutz II It Hatserim Kibbutz II tl Beeri Kibbutz rt II Kf'ar Darom Kibbutz II II Nirim Kibbutz ,, II Urim Kibbutz !I It Nevatim Moshav II II Tekuma Moshav II II 
Mivtahim Kibbutz February 1947 Tseelim Kibbutz II ft Alumim Kibbutz II II Saad· Kibbutz June II Gevim Kibbutz August tl 
Beror Hayil Kibbutz April 1948 
Jewish Colonisation 
Between December 1941 and the end of .World War II eight 
Jewish settlements were established in the region. The first 
three - Dorot, Gvar'am, and Nir Am - were in the northwest of 
the region, in the coastal strip and the sand hill area; it 
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was not uhtil the foundation of Beerot Yitshak and the 
'watchtower' settlements, Gevulot and Beit Eshel, in 1943 
that Jewish colonisation advanced into the Gaza-Beersheba 
~asin proper. After the end of the War, when pressure for a 
solution to the Palestine problem was renewed from all sides, 
the largest settlement operation in the history of Zionist 
colonisation was carried out on the night of Yorn Kippur 1946, 
when eleven settlements were established, presenting the 
Arab inhabitants and the authorities with a fai~ accompli 
on the morrow. Nine of the eleven were in this region. In 
37 
the following year another five were added, bringing the total 
for the region at the close of the Mandate in May 1948 to 
twenty-two settlements, made up of nineteen kibb-1.itzim and 
three moshavim. 
Colonisation in this region, as in the rest of Palestin~ 
was directed and supported by a number of institutions. Most 
important of these was the Jewish Agency, the proto-Government 
of the Jewish community, which, through its Agricultural 
Settlement Department, planned the location of new settlement 
in co~operation with the Keren Kayemet which leased the land 
in its possession on long-term leases at nominal rent. Both 
the Jewish Agency and the Keren Kayemet were in their turn 
organs of the World ·Zionist Organisation. The Settlement 
Department provided from its budget a proportion of the cap ital 
-
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required, and the rest was earned by the members of the 
settling group prior to the establishment, and during the 
first years, of their settlement. The experience of the 
settlers did not begin when they set up their tents and huts. 
They had usually been together as a group for some time, at a 
kibbutz in the north where they had gained experience and 
earned wages, in farming or in industry, which were then 
contributed to the group's funds. Most of the groups were 
formed within the youth movements - Hashomer Hatsair, Hanoar 
1 Haoved, Hanoar Hadati, the Scouts, etc. - and were, after 
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settling, affiliated to the correspo~ding (political) kibbutz 
or moshav movement. Other institutions, whose roles will be 
indicated later, were the Histadrut, the Agricultural Research 
Station at Rehovot, and the Mekorot Water Company. Few of the 
settlers in these pre-Independence days were immigrants who 
had come directly from outside Palestine. Most of them were 
Palestine-born (sabra) or immigrant youth who had spent some 
time in the Jewish youth movements. 
It has been mentioned already that the majority of the 
new settlements were kibbutzim, (the three moshavim were in 
fact organised in the early years as kibbutzim also); the 
kibbutz had already shown itself well suited to the 
colonisation of 'difficult' areas, whether in terms of physical 
or security conditions. Its communal organisation was well 
(1) Hashomer Hatsair = The Young Guard; Hanoar Haoved = Working Youth; Hanoar Hadati = Religious Youth. 
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adapted to the demands of land reclamation, guard duty, and 
isolated positions, where a division of labour was necessary. 
It was therefore the obvious method of colonisation in this 
region, where physical conditions were hard, and where the 
isolated settlements were surrounded by Arab or Beduin 
neighbou.t>s. 
The first three ~ibbutzim may be seen as the southward 
extension of settlement in the Coastal Plain. It was the 
so-called experimental stations of Gevulot, Beit Eshel, and 
Revivim (in the Central Negev) which captured the imagination 
of the time as a jump forward into an entirely 'new' area. 
All these settlements were established on land which had been 
bought by the Keren Kayemet, or which had passed into its 
hands from private Jewish owners, prior to the Land Transfers 
Regulations. If the Government was slow, or unable, to 
determine the absorptive capacity for Jewish settlement, then 
it could hardly object to Jewish efforts, especially when the 
Jews had legal title to the land upon which they settled. 
The land available at this time ,was, however, almost all 
of poor quality. Poor not merely by virtue of the semi-arid 
climate and the lack of known underground water resources, 
but also because the blocks of land in Jewish possession were 
generally in the more marginal areas of the region itself. 
--·- - - -
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The lands of Ruhama and Dorot, for instance, lay in the 
sand-hill area, where steep slopes, a light soil, and 
dissection by wadis made cultivation difficult and soil 
erosion a major problem. The situation at Dorot was described 
as follows: "The vertical walls of empty wadis and gullies 
are broken and smashed like the devastated trenches of battle. 
The low banks or' the Wadi Majnune are sheer, and resemble the 
network of entrenched gullies of the 'Tongue' in the Dead Sea, 
or the upper heights of Mt . Sodom in the same area •••.• Year 
after year the floods attack the crumbling banks of the Wadi 
Majnune, year after year they erode slices and blocks of soil, 
removing them from the cultivable land on both sides of the 
adi and continually widening and extending the wadi and its 
tributary gullies" (21,p.364). At Gvar'am and Beerot Yitshak 
the situation was similar : a large proportion of the land 
available was too poor for cultivation. The latter, although 
some of its land was on the flat loess plain, had one block 
in the highly dissected drainage area of the Wadi Naukhabir 
to the south: of 5,200 dunams there, less than half were 
cultivable by tractor; erosion was so rapid that a topographical 
map of the area was completely useless three years later. 
Many of the settlements had a number of parcels of land of 
different sizes and at different distances away. This was the 
case at Gevulot, on the edge of the inland dune area, where 
-- - ... -;-----, -=-----;--~ 
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the distance between the easternmost parcel beside the Wadi 
0 Gaza at Bir Sheneq and the westernmost at Sdkat es Zofi was (\ 
30 km, with up to 7 km between individual blocks. Beerot 
Yitshak had a block beside the Gaza-Beersheba road at Sumara, 
14 km away. The kibbutzim in the north and west where there 
was permanent Arab cultivation - Kfar Darom, Gvar'am and Yad 
Mordechai - had to contend with small plots, interspersed with 
fellah holdings. 
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The later settlements of the post-1945 period were in some 
cases provided with part of the lands of the existing kibbutzim. 
The latter had found it necessary, when the holdings were too 
large or too scattered for . the resources of the young farm, 
to indulge in what was known as 'political ploughing': ploughing 
in order to demonstrate the right of ownership to the Arab and 
Beduin neighbours. Thus Nirim and Urim were established on 
Gevulot land, Beeri and Tekuma on the land of Beerot Yitshak. 
But it is probable that the question of providing adequate 
land ho1dings was not a prime consideration in the foundation 
of the nine settlements of 1946. Partition was again under 
discussion, and the Jewish Agency was clearly demonstrating 
the Jewish right to settle in the area and to develop the 
Northern Negev for Jewish colonisation. It is also possible 
that by 1946 the Jewish authorities had recognised that the 
frontiers of a Jewish State might be determined by war rather 
I 
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than negotiation. 
For it can hardly be said that the settlements established 
prior to 1946 had revealed the existence of resources hitherto 
unknown. The search for water, supposedly the sine qua non 
for the development of the Beersheba Sub-dist ric t, had proved, except 
in the coasta l belt, as disappointing as the pre-war Government 
Hydrological Survey. The Beduin wells were shallow, not very 
productive, and most of them saline. At Gevulot samples were 
taken from the local wells, and it was found that at some 
distance from the Wadi Gaza the salinity was as high as 3,500 
mg/cl/litre. Beside and in the Wadi, the water was sweeter, 
but even that of Bir Sheneq, much used by the Beduin and their 
flocks, had a salt content of 1,177 mg/litre. Mekorot, the 
Jewish water co~pany financed by the Jewish Agency, the 
His tadrut ( the Gen-er al Federation of Jewish Lab our, to which 
the settlements were affiliated), and the settlements 
themselves, made five test-bores at different points on 
Gevulot's land. The results in terms of the salinity of the 
water found are given below. For two years the settlers 
Table III 
Depth and Salinity of Water at Gevulot 
~ Depth Cl/Litre 
El Kadi 53.5 metres 8,650 mg 
Shokat es Zofi 87 4,600 
Dankur 62 7,800 
Rabiye 47 8,435 
Shenek 33 1,740 
. 
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were compelled to buy water at the Ruweibe well 6 km to the 
north, and bring it to the kibbutz by cart. An attempt to 
obtain a supply of water from a three dunam artificial rain-
water catchment basin also proved unsatisfactory. 
At Ruhama the well used by previous Jewish settlers had 
been blocked by the Beduin, and a new bore was made. This 
gave 58 m3/hr at first, but the water was mixed with sand; 
by the time a filter had been installed, the output fell to 
3 18 m /hr. The old well was cleaned, but it proved to depend 
on the same aquifer as the new bore, and no increase in output 
was obtained. The water was sweet, but not sufficient for 
the kibbutz's needs. At Beit Eshel a series of bores were 
drilled: the first found no water, the second gave 8-3 m3/hr, 
43 
and a third produced only 8-10 m3/hr, with about 600 mg/cl/ litre. 
A bore at Beerot Yitshak found water at a depth of 85 
metres, but with 1,100 mg/cl/litre. 45 metres deeper, water 
was found, but the salinity was even greater. A second bore 
was more successful, obtaining a flow of 35-40 m3/hr, but 
still with 824 mg/cl/ litre. 
1,'\Thile no new and l arge sources of :fresh underground 
rater were found in the Gaza-Beersheba Basin, the search in 
the northwest confirmed that the coastal aquifer was extensive. 
Nir Am had an Arab we ll on its land capable of producing 
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120 m3/hr, but its distance from the kibbutz led to fUrther 
drilling. At 120 metres a rich aquifer was found, giv ing 
200 m3/hr, with a salinity of 200 mg/litre. At Dorot a bore 
to a depth of 62 metres produced an output of 30 m3/hr.; a 
second was unsuccessful, but a third produced 90 m3/hr. This 
aquifer, at a depth of about 60 metres, was also exploited by 
the Arab village s in the area, but to the south the salinity 
increased - to 1,380 mg/litre at El Muhurraka •. t Gvar'am 
and Yad Mordechai in the coastal belt, water was also found 
in good quantity, but there its usefulness was restricted by 
the limited amount of land of irrigable quality available to 
the settlements. 
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Thus it had become clear by 1944 that if the Northern 
Negev were to be developed by irrigated f arming - the natural 
assumption, since Jewish settlement and agriculture in 
Palestine had been built, socially and agriculturally, on the 
basis of i~rigation - then the necessary water would have to 
be brought from outside the Gaza-Beersheba Basin. The nearest 
water resources vrnre in the coastal belt. Plans were also 
being made at this time by the Mekorot Company and others for 
harnessing the country's major water sources - the coastal 
aquifer, the Yarkon (Auja), Yarmuk, Jordan and Litani Rivers 
in a national water project designed to spread the available 
water over the potentially irrigabJ_e land in the country, 
. ~ . . ... . .. 
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in~luding the Northern Negev, where some 2 million dunams 
of such land were considered to exist (23)~ The fulfilment 
of such a project was not likely, however, without J)Oli tic al 
security, Govern.ment initiative and Government finance, 
prerequisites not available at that time. But the small-scale 
regional project for diverting water from the coastal belt 
to the Gaza-Beersheba Basin could be carried out on Jewish 
initiative, and j_t was this which alleviated to some extent 
the problems of the existing kibbutzim and provided a basis 
for the nine settlements established in 1946. 
A 6" pipelj_ne was started in 1946 from Nir Am, and ran 
from there through Dorot to Shoval and n ishmar Hanegev. A 
second pipeline was laid southwards from Nir Am through 
Beerot Yitshak and Beeri down to Urim, Gevulot, and Nirim. 
Ad.di tional bores were made at Nir Am, and storage 1"eservoirs 
were built there and at Dorot, and at a lat er stage along 
the pipelines in order to minimise the effects of interrupted 
flow. By 194~ the output of this regional project was 
5,000 m3 per day, and provided enough water to the set tlements 
along the pipelines for domestic and animal needs, and for a 
total of about one thousand dunams of irrigated l and. 
Agricul tural development up to 1949 was nec·essarily 
limited, both by the poor quality of the holdings and by the 
lack of water . 'rhis was from one point of view a minor 
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consideration, since the object of colonisation in the region 
at this time was political rathel'.' than agricultu1:>al. Indeed, 
since Jewish agricultural settlement in Pa lestine had had, at 
least since the beginning of the Manda te, a strong political 
motivation, its extension into the Negev was but an ext:e eme 
case of the general situation. This was concisely described 
in the economic sux•vey of Pales tine made in 1945 under the 
auspices of the American Palestine Institute : 11Soil 
amelioration by Jews in Palestine, like soil purchase, is not 
governed by ordinary considerations of business return on 
investment. It is governed by the determination to build a 
Jewish National Home and by the belief that a substantial 
number of Jewish farmers, working on the land, are necessary 
if the Jewish National Home is to be politically stable and 
psychologically healthy" (24, p.192) . But this is not to say 
that efforts in the direction of agricultural development were 
not made before 1949. 
A characteristic feature of the agricultural experience 
of these years was the development of soil conservation 
measul'.'es. At Dorot, Ruhama, Gvar'am, Yad Mordechai and Nir 
A.m, the soil conditions, which have been described already, 
necessitated an extensive soil conservation programme. With 
the help of the Keren Kayemet, the Agricultural Research 
Station at Rehovot, 1,un by the J ewish Agency, and the Soil I I 
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Conservation Council, the steeper slopes and sandier soils 
were planted with trees, terraces were constructed, and 
contour ploughing adopted. In all the settlements a wide 
varie ty of trees, fruit trees, and field crops were tested. 
The southe1 .. n kibbutzim and Bei t Eshel (which, al though a 
moshav, cultivated its land collectively, since the lack of 
water prevented the development of intensive family plots), 
where the problem was that of wind rather than fluvial erosion, 
sought to control the movement of the soil and the damage 
inflicted by sandstorms by establishing tree and earthwork 
windbreaks. On the light soils in this part, a further 
problem was the yablit weed : its eradication from the soil 
could most effectively be done by deep ploughing, but this 
simultaneously increased the soil's vulnerability to deflation • 
. Mechanised cultivation, in combination with an above-
average rainfall, as in 1944/5, was p1 .. oved to be capable of 
obtaining reasonable yields. At Gevulot in that year, 
yields of 166 kg/dunarn of wheat, 167 kg/dunam of barley, and 800 kg/dunam of potatoes were obtained from an experimental plot. In sum, the agricultural activity in these years was 
mainly in the sphere of test i ng crops and methods of dry-
farming. •DLere water was available, in the northwest and in 
the settlements along the pipelines, irrigation was mainly 
used for p a sture, in order to . develop the dairy and poultry 
branches, and for vegetables. It appears that at that time 
it was thought (21, p.176) that the moistur e retention 
capacity of the loess soils was sufficient to produce 
satisfactory crops with an irrigation input of only 500 m3/dunam 
per year : less than in more humid regions to the no1 ... th! 
It had become clear that agricultural development, based upon 
the traditional patterns of Jewish settlement organisation, 
would depend in this region upon expanding the water output 
of t he northwest. But the most important result of the 
activity of _the years before 1948 lay not so much in 
agriculture as in the outcome of the war which followed the 
end of the Mandate in May 1948. 
With the failure of Britain or the United Nations to 
organise par tition, or any other form of negotiated settlement 
to the Pa lestine problem, the State of Israel was declared 
on May 14t h 1948. Fighting between Arabs and Jews had already 
broken out, and the invasion of the Arab armies soon 
followed. ·The Egyptian army advanced along the coast through 
Gaza towards _Tel Aviv, and a lso through Beersheba to j oin 
forces with the Jordanian army in the Hebron Mountains. The 
story of the campaign for the Negev ca,.D be read elsewhere 
(25 ), and it suffices here to say that the kibbutzim in the 
region p layed a central role, obstructing and harassing the 
enemy and prov iding bases for Israeli forces. The resolution 
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with which the isolated, poorly armed settlements were 
defended against greatly superior forces was a major factor 
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in the Israeli success. When the armistice with Egypt was 
agreed to in February 1949, seventeen of the settlements still 
remained, though some of them had changed their sites during 
or after the fighting; five settlements had been destroyed, 
evacuated or abandoned. These were : Kfar Darom, whose site 
now lay within the Gaza Strip, Alumim, Beit Eshel, and Beerot 
Yitshak, whose settlers did not return to their villages 
after the War, and Mivtahim, which was resettled by others 
in 1950, as a moshav and not a kibbutz. Nirim and Urim were 
relocated on sites a few kilometres further north during the 
fighting, and Tekuma was moved nearer the western pipeline. 
One kibbutz, Beror Hayil, was established during the War on 
a site near the key inland road to the Negev. There were 
thus eighteen settlements in a ~egion whose Arab p opulation 
had fled en masse, and whose Beduin inhabitants were greatly 
reduced in numbers : in 1949 there were not more than 
13 ,000 Beduin j_n the whole of the Negev, as f ar south as the 
Gulf of _6.J:caba. 
The most important result of the Jew-ish colonisation in 
t h is r egion before the War of Independence was very obviously 
the politica l one. The whole of the southern Coastal Plain 
and the whole of the Beer shelJa Sub-district were now within 
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the State of Israel, and this success must in large measure 
be attributed to the foothold obtained by colonisation and to 
its successful defence. 
As agricultural settlement was consciously used as a 
politico-military instrument, it is not surprising that 
agricultural development did not proceed very far; the 
destruction that occurred during the fight ing was a f'urther 
setback. It is •vorth emphasising, however, that the :pattern 
of agriculture that was attempted, and the means to this end, 
were ty-pical of Jewish agricultural enterprise throughout 
Palestine. No attempt was made to adapt the cultivation 
system of the local Arab and Beduin cultivators to Jewish 
needs. The kibbutzim and moshavim were planned on the basis 
of irrigation, and the fact that irrigation wat er could only 
be ootained at consideraole cost was no deterrent. The 
significance of this situation will "be seen later, for in 
the years after Independence political, ideological, and 
military factors continued to dominate agrinultural policy fCll'.' 
this region, at a time when economic profitability could less 
easily be dismissed from consideration. 
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Chapter III 1949-1954. 
The War of Independence gave territoria l being to the 
State of Israel, but it did not greatly change the hostile 
environment to which the Yishuv had by then become accustomed. 
Before 1948 Jewish settlements had existed side by side with 
Arab villages and towns; relations between the two had covered 
the full range from friendly cooperation to active enmi ty. t 
the end of the War the State of Israel had acg_uired de f:acto 
title to the greater part of Palestine, a state-area which now 
contained an Arab community so depleted in numbers as to 
provide no obstacle to the exercise of that title. But the 
State was, and still is, surrounded on all its land frontiers 
by hostile Arab States. In their eyes the armistice agreements 
signed in 1949 were no more than temporary truces; thus the 
Arab States, in particular Egypt, Jordan and Syria, maintain 
their right to attack Israel, and deny the international 
legali ty of t he State's creation. The belligerent attitude 
of the Arab States, expressed in the economic blockade and in 
overt acts of aggression, together with the revanchism of tbe 
many thousand Arab refugees, have made Israel's right to 
develop its resources conditional upon the establishment of 
effe c tive territorial defence and control. The frontiers are 
extremely long, re lative to the state-area, and offer in most 
I 
cases little obstacle to open attack or to infiltration by groups or individuals. 
A second and equally important basic condition of the first years was the mass immigration which followed the 
removal of the Mandatory restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Jewish refugees interned in Cyprus and those waiting in European camps were at last able to enter Israel. The Jewish communities of many of the .Arab States, 
with the outbreak of Ai_-..ab-Jewish hostilities, were also 
compelled to migrate, and almost all chose to come to Israel. This mass im.migration in the first three and a half years of the State was of unparalleled propo00 tions. In May 1948 the Jewish population of Palestine was 650,000, and in the following three and a half years the net total of immigr"ants 
vras 666, OOO. Th!e \1~ ~anomic problem of absorbing this number of im.~igrants into a small and relatively poor country that had 
no great natural r•esources was compounded with the further problem t 1at for the first time a large and steadily increasing proportion of the immig11 ants was not of E,'uropean origin. The Yishuv before 1948 vras almost entirely European in origin 
after Independence most of the immigrants have been of the Sephardic rather than the (European) Ashkenazi b1~anch of Jewry, and are culturally more akin to the North African and 
~Uddle Eastern societies from which they came than to the 
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culture of the Yishuv (Table I). 
These t vrn problems, the establishment o:E' territorial 
control and defence, and the absorption of mass im.migration 
into the na tional society and economy, were the two most 
pressing issues that confronted the Israel Government in its 
first years. The NortliePn Negev, ex tensive and largely 
uninhabited, exemplified the problem of security and played an important r ole in the efforts to solve the problems of economic development and irmnigrant absorption. 
I 
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Table I 
15.V.48 -
31.XII.48 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
Immig~ation 1948-1954 
Gross Total 
Jewish Immigrants 
101,819 
239,076 
169,405 
173,901 
23,375 
10,347 
17,471 
Imm . nts' Continent of 
Total Innni 
America & 
Net Jewish 
Migration Balance 
+ 104,480 
+ 234,922 
+ 160,160 
+ 166,859 
+ 10,686 
1,528 
+ 11,052 
Birth 2 
rants 
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Oceania Europe Africa Asia 
1919 
-
14.V.48 
15.V.48 
-
31. XII. 48 
1949 
1950 
1951 
19 52 
1953 
1954 
--·-
1.8 ?~ 87.8 % 0.9 1~ 9.5 
0.5 85.1 9.1 5.3 
0.6 52.1 16. 7 30.6 
0.6 49.8 15.7 34.4 
0.4 88. 5 11.6 59 .5 
2 •. 2 26.2 42.9 28.7 
5.3 19.6 47.3 27.8 
3.7 ~; 7.6·% 69.8 % 18. 9 
Jewish Population at 15. V. 48 : 649,633 
Jewish Population at 31.XII.54 : 1,526,009 
Source Statistical Abstract of Israel, No.13. 
1961. 
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(a) Settlement. During the Mandate, Jevfish agricultural 
settlement had been executed pr imarily for poli tical reasons : 
1
'The basic aim of our agricultural policy during the Mandate 
was not the production of foods·tuffs but colonisation 11 ( 26, 
p.99). It has been seen that this was much the case in the 
Northern Negev. After Independence the incentives to 
agricultural settlement were several in number and their 
relative we i ght was more equal. Thus, while political or 
military motives continued to play a considerable part, food 
production and the absorption of immigrants on the land came 
to be crucial policy goals. 
The Northern Negev presented a particularly difficult 
problem of' secuI•i ty, while at the same time its largely 
uninh.abi ted area offered considerable scope for settlement. 
The frontiers, especially that with the Gaza Strip, of' 
themselves afford little protection against attack and no 
obstacle to infiltration. The Egyptian Government actively 
encouraged infiltration into Israel among the Palestinian 
refugees encamped within the Strip, and this created a danger 
for many years to life and property in Israel almost as far 
north as Tel Aviv. In the V1est, pressure from Jordan was less 
marked. The Shephela and the Hebron Mountains are areas of 
thin population and poor communications, so that although 
. - - .. . - . 
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control against infiltration is difficult, mili tm•y attack 
seems less likely from that g_uarter. It would also appear 
that the Jordanian Government was and is less enthusiastic 
about petty aggression at the level of armed infiltration 
than the Egyptian. The south of the region, the inland dune 
area, was also difficult to control and open to infiltration 
from across the Sinai frontier. The weakness of security in the 
Northern Negev also endangered communications between the 
north of the country and the uninhaoited Central and Southern 
Negev. A further element in the situation was the fact that 
the road system within the region had been partially disrupted 
by Egyptian control of the Gaza Strip. The coast road through 
·A.shkelon (Majdal) and the inland road through Beror Hayil 
(Bureir) no longer joined the main Gaza-Beersheba road, so 
that the only road linking Beersheba with the north was that 
through Pelugot (Faluja). 
Effective control of the frontiers by military forces 
was difficult, since the inadequate road system would have 
necessitated the presence of large, dispersed, forces throughout 
the region. It was theref ore decided that the task of closing 
the frontiers could be carried out most efficiently by 
kibbutzim located along the borders. The kibbutzim had already 
proved their utility in defence and agricultural settlement in 
marginal areas, so that their post-Independence function as 
I I 
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agricultural defence posts was a lqgical extension of their 
former role. The presence of armed and trained settlers 
along the frontiers also freed military units for more essential 
tasks. In this way, in the Northern Negev and throughout Israel, 
the political function of the kibbutzim in agricultural 
settlement during the Mandate was transformed af'ter 1948 into 
a more precisely para-military function. 
The central role accorded to agricultu~al settlement by 
the Zionist movement has already been referred to. Evidence 
of its continuing importance in national objectives after 
Independence is provided by the fact that one of the chief 
policy goals in 1949-50 was that the proportion of the 
population employed in agriculture was to increase from 13.1% in 
1949 to 21.6% in 1953 (27). This represented an enormous 
absolute increase in the agricultural population, since it was 
thought at that time that immigration would continue at a 
rate of 200,000 persons a year. The reasons behind the choice 
of the goal of one-fifth of the working population in 
agriculture were social rather than economic: it was thought, 
indeed, it was an article of Zionist faith, . that a socially 
'healthy ' nation depended unon the establishment of a large 
rural population. 
While the justification for planning that a certain 
in this case relatively large - proportion of the population 
I I 
should be agricultural was ideological rather than logical, 
the concentration of the Jewish population in the Tel Aviv 
area and the central Coastal Plain, and the largely empty 
extremities of the country, made some degree of population 
dispersal necessary in the prevailing security conditions and 
desirable in order to avoid congestion. The Central and 
Southern Negev, for lack of water and cultivable soils, 
obviously could not absorb agricultural settlement in any 
significant degree, but the Northern Negev could, provided that 
adequate water supplies were made available. The settlement of 
the frontiers by the kibbutzim was imperative, and the 
settlement of the hinterland was also desirable for greater 
security. The Beduin population of the region had been greatly 
reduced, and the No~thern Negev in fact constituted the one 
area of the country which offered extensive and easily cultivable 
expanses of lowland. When it is recalled that in 1949, and for 
several years thereafter, the water resources of the country 
were greatly over-estimated (28), to such an extent that it 
then seemed feas ible to irrigate the greater part of the 
cultivable soils of the country, it is natural that the 
Northern Negev appeared to represent on~ of the few readily 
exploitable resources for development. 
The economic situation of Israel was then .extremely 
precarious, and mass immigration, to say nothing of the prospect 
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of its continuation, made rapid economic development a first 
priority. It was necessary to provide employment for the new 
immigrants housed in ma'abarot (transition camps), and to 
expand the production of food and other agricultural products 
with all speed. In the Northern Negev there was of course 
little place in agricultural development for private enterprise 
as it is known in other countries. The lack of water, and 
above all the traditional Zionist policy, which now formed 
the basis of Government policy, did not encourage it, so that 
development in this region followed the pattern of agricultural 
settlement in Palestine: cormnunal and cooperative 'labour' 
villages, the kibbutz and the moshav, supported by the Jewish 
.Agency and other central and governmental bodies. There was, 
for a time, as wi.11 be seen later, considerable development 
in the form of agriculture without settlement of the land, 
but this was regarded as a temporary measure. 
The settlement of the new orienta1 · 1 · immigrants in 
kibbutzim was not possible. Their traditional culture and 
social organisation could not be adjusted to the advanced 
structure of kibbutz social and economic life, and it was 
therefore decided to use for their settlement the moshav type 
of village. The situation was summarised by Weingrod as 
(1) Oriental, in this context, refers to imrnigrants of non-European cultur e. 
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follows: "the villagers [i.e. in the moshavim] were non-
selected immigrants, and in most instances they had no previous 
experience of agriculture. Unlike the pre-State period when 
many immigrants were self-selected and of a 'pioneering type', 
the post-1948 immigration was primarily a population transfer, 
including broad sections of European and Middle Eastern Jewish 
cornmunities •••• in order to minimise the immigrants' crises of 
.tat ion the settlement authorities directed them to the 
rnoshav '' ( 29). 
(b) .Agriculture. During the Mandate it had been possible 
for the Jewish farm sector to concentrate on mixed farming, 
and to a lesser degree, on citrus production. The final 
responsibility for the supply of foodstuffs had lain with the 
Mandatory Government, and under these conditions, with the 
Arab sector producing much of the domestic supply of bread-
and feed-grains, the development of the Jewish sector depended 
only on the capacity of the market. In planning the nature 
of the agriculture to be developed in the Northern Negev there 
was a marlced adherence to the pre-1948 pat tern, even though 
the region did not have the same physical conditions as the 
main areas of Jewish settlement before 1948 - the Coastal 
Plain, the Emek, and Eastern Galilee. The 1950 Agricultural 
Settlement Plan made few regional distinctions and generally 
assumed that mixed farming would be adopted throughout the 
country. Mention was made of the development of industrial 
crops, but little was known of t h is branch at the time and the 
weight given to it was slight. The expansion of mixed farming 
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was the long-term goal, but this depended on the provision of 1/ 
irrigation water to the new settlerrents. Irrigation could not 
be expanded overnight, and the Q-overnment was not willing to 
phase settlement with the expansion of water supplies. Thus 
while every effort was made to exploit regional water resources 
to the full, agriculture had initially to consist principally 
of unirrigated cultivation. In the Northern Negev vast 
expanses of land were ploughed and sown to wheat and bar>ley, 
so t hat the overall land use pattern which developed immediately 
after Independence was rather similar to that of the former 
Beduin inhabitants. Nevertheless, this was seen as a temporary 
measure, and planning centred on the expansion of irrigation 
water supplies and the development of mixed farming. 
In this context it is interesting to review the conclusions 
of the French geographer, Jean Gottmann, on the agricultural 
aptitudes of' the Northern Negev. Wr iting in 193'7, he noted 
"There are advocates of cereal or industrial crops - sugar 
beets, cotton - which presupposes large-scale exploitation 
and a protective tariff, for they are expensive crops to raise 
under irrigation. It would seem better to leave such products 
to regions where irrigation is unnecessary or at least can be 
carried out by gravity. On the other hand, the Negeb could 
capitalize on the warmth of its climate and its proximity 
to ports by turning towards high-priced crops for exportation 
and for supplying the cities of the coastal plain ••• early 
vegetables and dairy produce would find a ready market in 
the interior of the country •••• Thus we envisage for the Negeb 
a varied polyculture by a population of small farmers,, (1). 
ii/hen the changed circumstances are taken into account, 
Gottmann's conclusions are very similar to the first 
agricultural plans for the Northern Negev. Both in the moshavim 
and in the kibbutzim development was planned in the direction 
of a varied ' tpo.;Lye11lture', and the settlement of the centre 
of the re gion by new-immigrant moshavim is · equivalent to his 
proposal of a population of small farmers. 
Mixed, irr i gated, f ar ming was to be based upon the full 
development of the water resources of the reg ion, which were 
loca ted in the coastal belt, and also up on the transfer of 
water from the no1"th. Jewish agricultural experience had b een 
tha t the physical conditions of the country and the social 
"ishes of the population compelled the choice of this pattern -
n.o p l ace was seen for a gr iculture without settlement, for 
' capi talist' farming using wage- l abour, or for the t ype of 
farm and l a nd use associ a ted with the Arab fellah holding. 
It must be emphasised tha t the a gricultur e without settlement 
that is described at a later point in this chapter was not in 
conflict with this policy, since it was regarded as temporary, 
and in fact it was often referred to as 'the preparation of 
the soil for settlement'. 
The Institutions. 
The public institutions which had organised Jewish 
settlement during the Mandate did not wither away when the 
Yishuv gained its o,m Government. 'rhe Jewish Agency, the 
proto-Government of the Yishuv, retained its power after 1948, 
nominally as the agent of the international Zionist movement, 
in all sectors except the strictly political and economic. 
It continued to organise and finance immigration to Israel 
and remained responsible for the planning and execution of 
new agricultural settlement, even though a Ministry of 
Agriculture now existed. The relations between the Jewish 
Agency and the Government Mi.nistries were not competitive 
for all this, because an identity of purpose naturally existed 
in a situation where the Ministers and senior politicians had 
formerly held office in the Jewish Agency. Between the Jewish 
Agency and the Government, questions of policy and method 
were decided in a Joint Planning Council for Agriculture and 
Settlement, upon which Ministers, senior civil servants, and 
Jewish Agency officials sat or were represented. 
' I 
Indeed the responsibilities of the Jewish Agency's 
Settlement Department were now greatly increased since, for 
reasons already mentioned, the initiative, particularly in 
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the moshav sector, passed from the settler to the settlement 
authority. The role of the Settlement Department, which 
previously had consisted of supplying financial aid and 
technical advice to volunteer settlers, was now enlarged to 
include the selection of immigrants for the villages, the 
planning and construction of housing, farm buildings, and 
service facilities, the training and education of the settlers 
in. agriculture, cooperative organisation, village administration, 
and so forth. 
The Jewish National Fund remained the legal owner of land 
which had been bought for the nation, and continued to 
undertake soil reclamation and conservation works for new 
settlementij, together with a major afforestation prograrmne. 
In the ownership .of land it was now joined by the Custodian 
of Abandoned Property, into whose hands passed the land of 
Arab refugees. who had left the country. These two bodies 
provided the land, at nominal rents, for agricultural settlement. 
As was the case before 1948, land was leased to new settlers 
on a long-term (usually 49 years) basis, but remained the 
inalienable property of the na tion. The conditions of tenure 
were few. Land could not be sold, nor rented without permission, 
and the tenant was bound to maintain its quality. In fact, 
for reasons that will be given later, sanctions are rarely, 
if ever, applied for non-cultivation. 
1/Vhile land was virtually nationalised, Israel's water 
resources were not treated in the same fashion. Local wells 
and pumping installations were left in the hands of their 
owners. The development of new projects was entrusted to the 
Mekorot Company, a non-profit public corporation jointly 
controlled by the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut (representing 
the water users), and the Government. A new body, Tahal 
(Water Planning for Israel), was set up to plan the overall 
pattern of the national and regional exploitation and use of 
water. Tahal is jointly controlled by the Government (the 
majority shareholder), the Jewish Agency, and the Jewish 
National Fund. Thus although the water resources were not 
nationalised, the projects planned by Tahal and executed by 
Mekorot amount to State enterprises in all but name. In the 
Northern Negev, where the only users of water not supplied by 
Mekorot were t~e older kibbutzim of the coastal belt, the 
water supply system that was built after 1948 was controlled 
through Mekorot by the State and the settlement authorities. 
The Ministry of Agriculture was given responsibility for 
the 'established' agricultural settlement sector,· that is to 
say those villages whose development was sufficient to permit 
the withdrawal of Jewish Agency financial aid. In the Northern 
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Negev these were limited to :five : Yad Mordechai, Ruhama, Dorot, 
Gvar'am and Nir Am. The last-named was later included once 
more in the Settlement Department's budgets, but the others 
have remained independent. Through the Joint Planning Council 
(not to be confused with the later Joint Planning Centre) the 
Settlement Department was charged with the preparation of 
detailed plans for agricultural settlement on the regional and 
village levels. In order to provide national planning criteria 
and to coordinate the policies of the Settlement Department 
and the Ministry of Agriculture, the Joint Planning Centre was 
set up in 1952. This body has since defined norms for inputs 
and outputs, produced farm-organisation models, and carried 
out research in various fields of agricultural settlement. 
The Joint Planning Council set out in the 1950 Plan tJ:::e 
numbers of new settlements that were to be built, the 
population that was to be absorbed, and the volume of production 
that was to be generated. These policy goals, in the case of 
the Norther n Negev, were then passed to the regional settlement 
authority, Mifal Hanegev. The settlement operation in this 
region was administered jointly for the first five years by 
the Settlement Department and the Jewish National Fund. The 
headquarters of Mifal Hanegev were in Beersheba. 
The initial planning of a new settlement - the ch oice of 
site, the t ype of social organi s ation, etc. - was made in 
consultation betwe en Mifal Hanegev and other i nterested bod i es, 
I . 
such as the Ministry of Defence,. Mekorot, the Custodian of 
Abandoned Property, the Ministry of Antiquities, and the 
settlers' organisations. Soil preparation and conservation 
measures were carried out by the Jewish National Fund, and the 
physical planning by the Settlement Department. The Jewish 
Agency, through its Immigration and Abs orption Departments, 
in cooperation with the moshav and kibbutz movements, selected 
and directed settlers to the chosen sites. For the moshavim, 
selection was made in the temporary camps. At first it was 
thought desirable to mix settlers of different ethnic origins 
within one moshav. This proved unsuccessful, so that the 
main criterion for selection soon became the wi llingness of an 
immigrant group of common origin to undertake settlement on 
the land. Such groups, among the immigrants from 'oriental' 
areas, were the traditional hierarchies characteristic of 
the 1'v1iddle East. These 'hamulot' (clans) or extended families 
provided an initial element of security and stability for the 
inu~igrants who found themselves in a totally novel situation: 
the vast majority had never before undertaken agricultural 
vrork. To obtain the consent of the group to settle on the 
land, it was therefore necessary to accept ' members who were 
not suited to agricultural settlement because of poor health, 
physical weakness, o~ similar factors. 
The cost of the settlement operation was borne by the 
Government, through the Development Budgets, and by the 
Jewish Agency, whose funds Vlere in large measure provided by 
donations from Diaspora Jewry. From the limited data available, 
only a partial idea of the investments made in agricultural 
settlement in this region can be obtained. Investments 
made by or through other bodies, such as the kibbutz and 
rnoshav movements, the Jewish National Fund, the Mekorot Company, 
and so forth, cannot be measured. 
In the first years much of the total investment in the 
Northern Negev was in housing, in the new villages and in the 
ma'abarot. For 1950/1 expenditure on building reached I£2.l 
nullion, of which over half was contributed by the Government 
Housing Department, and a little less than a third by the 
Settlement Department (See Table II~ The budgets of the 
settlement authority, Mifal Hanegev, for 1952/53 and 1953./54 
Table II 
Building Investment in Northern Hegev: 1950/51 
Mifal Hanegev (J.A.Sett.Dept.) Govt. Housing Dept. 
Defence Works 
Regional Offices for Mifal Hanegev Ha' abarot (J. • Absorption Dept.) 
600,000 
1,200,000 
?0,000 
30,000 
200,000 
I£2,100,000 
Source:. Mifal Hanegev Report, 1950,,1.( 30) 
reveal that the largest slice of the capital investment in 
those years went to the development of the region's water 
supplies and the installation of irrigation . facilities (Table 
III). In the latter year there was a decline in the amount 
invested in water installation by about one half, as the 
regional water project neared completion. The major pa~t of 
farm building construction was completed by this time, and as 
the villages developed, investments in machinery, fruit 
plantations, and livestock all increased. 
The Settlement Operation 
Jewish plans for settlement in the Northern Negev had 
from since before the Second World War been made on the basis 
of irrigated farming. The exploratory drillings made by the 
British authorrLties and by the Mekorot Co. between 1938 and 
made it clear that no large resources of sweet water were 
likely to be found in the Gaza-Beersheba Basin, and it thus 
was necessary to provide for the transfer of water from other 
areas, if sett·lement was to expand. Plans for the transfer 
of water f rom the coastal belt to the Basin, and from sources 
further north, had been drawn up during the Second World War, 
but in the prevailing political conditions little more than 
a start could then be made with the use of the water from the 
Hir Am area. After 1948 the control of the greater part of the 
. ' .. 
' 
Table III 
Budgets of Mifal Hanegev :for 1952/3 and 1953/4. 
Water 
Farm Buildings 
Working Capital 
Machinery and Tools 
Livestock 
Fruit Planting 
Electricity 
Miscellaneous 
Total 1952/53 
Water 
Farm Buildings 
·.vorking Capita l 
Machinery and ~ools 
Livestock 
Fruit Planting 
Electricity 
Deep Ploughing 
Planning, Surveying, Et c. Employment 
Miscellaneous 
Total 1953/54 
2,779,160 
1,273 ,574 
538,777 
326,699 
165,011 
183,284 
35,439 
235,335 
I£5, 537, 279 
1,466,750 
599,450 
322,200 
498,050 
648,350 
486,450 
34,000 
95,300 
226 ,000 
60,000 
463,450 
I£4,900,000 
Sources: Rep oI'ts of Mif'al Hanegev, 195.3/3 and 1953/4 ( 3,~ , 33). 
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water resources of Palestine lay with Israe l, and these 
included the coastal aquifer and the surface flow of the 
Yarlrnn and Jo1"dan Rivers . Therefore no political obstacle 
remained to the transfer of water from the north, where the 
water resources are richest, to the extensive but waterless 
lands of the south. 
Ideally the development of water resources, as Braslavsky 
pointed out, would take place in three stages. 11FiI•st of all 
it is necessary to expand local water projects, as in the 
construction of storage dams and reservoirs in wadi and river 
beds to collect floodwater, and secondly to drill for water 
in the coastal dune area and to transfer the water to the Negev. 
As a second stage of development the flow of the Yarkon must 
be harnessed, and the third stage will be the inclusion of the 
Negev in the National 'Nater Project'' ( 21, p.181). 
The sequence of development was in most points that Nhich 
BPaslavsky advocated. The use of floodwater for i~rigation 
had not been extensive in Palestine. The utility of its 
direct use for irrigation in the Northern Negev is doubtful, 
since the wadis are not filled more tha..~ three or four times 
a year; storage dams would have to be large and costly, and the 
supply of water would be var i.able. The two storage dams built 
i!l the region - in 1952 - near Shoval and Mishmar Hanegev are 
used by the el Huzaiyl Beduin of that area rather than by 
Jewish farmers, and the amounts of water thus trapped have 
proved inadequate for the Beduin in drought years. The only 
other case of use being made of storm runoff water in the 
region is the Nahal . Shig_ma Project, which y17j_ll be described 
in the next chapter. 
After the end of the War, the Mekorot Co. began drilling 
operations in the coastal strip of the northwest in order to 
expand the output of the krnm ag_uifers of that area. Water 
supply from this source was organised in the Negev Regional 
•Project, whose northern boundary was the Ashke lon-Beit Guvrin 
road. Drilling took place on a considerable scale in the 
vicinity of the kibbutzim Nir .Am, Gvar 1 a.m, and Yad Mordechai. 
By late 1951 Mekorot had sunk 26 bores, built 14 storage 
3 reservoirs of 26,250 m capacity, and laid 360 km of pipe 
var;ying in size from 3" to 24 "· The original pre-Independence 
::Jipelines were replaced with larger ones, and a major central 
pipe was laid between the northwest and Beersheba. 
The first steps in settlement were designed to meet the 
need for frontier security, in particular along the Gaza Strip. 
Several of the kibbutzim established before 1948 were close to 
the new frontier - Yad Mordechai, Nir Aln, Saad, Beeri, and 
Nirim. The new frontier settlements were kibbutzim in all 
cases, for 11the organization and ground-plan of the collective 
1 I 
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village make it much more suited to serve as a defence-point 
than a village based on family farms' (34). In 1949 seven 
new kibbutzim were founded, of which six were sited near the 
Gaza Strip : Erets, Mefalsim, Reim, Magen, Nir Yitshak, and 
Zi kim. Of the three founded in 1950 and the four in 1951, 
five were near the Strip : Karmiya, Kfar zza, Nahal Oz, 
Kissufim, and Ein Hashelosha. 
The distribution of the kibbutzim within the region 
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(Map 11 ) clearly illustrates their dual function as agricultural 
settlements and frontier defence posts. This is most obvious 
in the west. Here the settlements are not more than three or 
four kilometres apart, and form a line close to the Strip, 
their sites being on the protected side of the eastern kurkar 
T'idge in many cases. In the east the lcibbutzim are also on 
the fringe of the settled area, but here they are farther 
away from the frontier. The Upper and Lower Shephela offer 
little scope for agriculture : \"ells are few, stretches of 
cultivable land suitable for mechanised cultivation are rare, 
and the higher elevation adds to the cost of water. 'rhe main 
line of kibbutzim on this flanlc, therefore, is to be found 
on the edge of the Gaza-Beersheba Basin; on the Pelugot-
Beersheba road. Two kibbutzim, Shoval and Mishmar Hanegev, 
already existed in 1949, and to these was added Beit Kama. 
Later, when the water :pipelines could be extended, settlement 
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vas initiated in the Lower Shephela with the foundation of 
Devira in 1951, :and in the Upper Shephela with that of Lahav 
in 1952. Lahav, like many kibbutzim in isolated positions 
that were founded before and after 1948, was supplied with 
water for several months by tanker, until the branch pipe 
reached the settlement. On the southern edge of the region 
the danger of infiltration was as great as in the east and 
west, since the Halutsa dunes provided good cover for 
infiltrato~s crossing the Sinai frontier. Here a line of 
pre-Inde9endence kibbutzim already stood: Hatserim, Gevulot, 
~nd Tseelim. Between 1949 and the present day only one 
kibbutz (Talmei Yafe) was founded in the region that was not 
near the political frontier or at the fringe of settlement. 
The location of the kibbutzim was chosen for reasons 
other than the purely agricultural. In consequence some of 
them were not sited in the most favourable agricultural areas. 
~his is the case in the south, the southwest, and in the 
Upper Shephela. The difficulties of cultivation and 
communication in the southwest had been indicated by tbe 
removal of Nirim and Urim from their initial sites to new 
points further north. Alumim was never resettled after the 
rar, and Mi vtahim was not resettled as a kibbutz. The older 
settlements in the south, and the new one , Nir Yi tsha.."k, had 
considerable difficulty in cultivating the sandy soils of the 
area for many years. Furthermore, it was not always possible 
to locate kibbutzim near existing or planned main pipelines, 
so that lengthy branch pipes were required, as for Devira 
and Lahav, Kissufim, and Nir Yitshak. 
1
,'Vhereas the location of the kibbutzim, and their number, 
was a product of strategic necessity, the location of the 
moshavim was generally determined by the lines of the water 
supply system. Since the moshav, because of its less cohesive 
social organisation, is less suited to the demands of frontier 
security, and in the case of new-immigrant moshavim, totally 
unprepared for paramilitary duties, the moshav could not be 
used to settle the f~ontiers. The pattern of settlement that 
developed was therefore based upon an outer ring of kibbutzim in the west, south, and east, which enclosed the main block 
1 of moshavim in the centre and north of the region. The 
exceptions to this, the few kibbutzim in the centre of the 
region (e.g. Dorot and Ruhama) and the two moshavim on the 
periphery, Omer and Nevatim, were usually villages that had 
been founded before 1948 or by European settlers. 
The moshavim were located near the r~gional pipelines. 
Tne dependence of a rnoshav upon water supply is closer than 
that of a kibbutz. While both generally develop via the 
extension of irrigation, a kibbutz may, by virtue of its 
collective labour organisation and financial resources, (1) This pattern is in some ways similar to that of the castles and strongpoints which held the frontiers of conquest, and protected their hinterlands, in the European marchlands. 
Table IV 
Moshavim and Kibbutzim 1949-1954 & Date of' Foundation 
Uoshavim Kibbutzim 
Sharsheret May 1949 Zikim Feb. 1949 Tifrah Oct. 1949 Beit Kama Apr. 1949 Geia Oct. 1949 Mefalsim Jun. 1949 Beit Haga1i Nov. 1949 Mag en Aug. 1949 Tsur Maon Nov. 1949 Erets Oct. 1949 Gilat Dec. 1949 Reim Oct. 1949 Nir Yitshak Dec. 1949 Beit Shiqma Feb. 1950 Maslul Mar . 1950 Talmei Yafe Feb. 1950 Pattish Mar. 1950 Karmiya Apr . 1950 Peduyim Mar. 1950 Ein Hashelosha Jun. 1950 Shuva Apr. 1950 Rannen Jun. 1950 Kissufim May 1951 Bitha Jun. 1950 Nahal Oz Jul. 1951 Mashen Jun. 1950 Kfar Azza Aug. 1951 Yoshivya Jul. 1950 Devira Se:pt.1951 Yakini Jul. 1950 Telamim :ug. 1950 Lahav Aug. 195 2 Helets Sept.1950 Kokhav Oct. 1950 Moshavim Shitufiim Ahuzzam Oct. 1950 Uza Nov. 1950 Mavqi 'im Jan. 1949 Mivtahim Dec. 1950 Omer2 May 1949 
Shibbolim Feb. 1952 Givolim Sept. 1952 Shalva Dec. 1952 
Helilot May 1953 Nir Akiva Jun. 1953 Nir Moshe Jun. 1953 Sede Tsvi Jun. 1953 Pa' amei Tashaz Jun. 1953 Berosh Jun. 1953 Talmei Bi lu Jun. 1953 Tidhar Jul. 1953 Teashur Aug. 1953 Zerua Aug. 1953 
Qelahim Aug. 1954 
(1) Tsur Maon became a kibbutz, but was disbanded in 1953. ( 2) Omer was reorganised as a moshav in 1953. 
substitute extensive unirrigated cultivation when the lack 
of water restricts irrigation. A moshav, on the other hand, 
since it is divided into small family holdings, cannot 
substitute in this way, unless the dry cultivation is sponsored 
or organised by some external body; in fact, where water was 
not available for some time, several moshavim were organised 
by the Settlement Department or the moshav movement concerned 
(the ' Metach ' system) as ' administrative farms', in which the 
settlers under the direction of experienced officers worked 
the village lands in one block, in return for a wage or a 
share in the returns. Even within this system the moshavim 
did not engage in unirrigated cultivation on anything like the 
scale of the kibbutzim. The administrative farms set up in 
the moshavim were in any case regarded as temporary, serving 
to instruct the villagers in farming and to assure them of an 
income until the development of irrigation made possible the 
division of the village lands into family holdings. 
For maintenance and security purposes it was advantageous 
to lay water pipelines alongside the roads, and the first 
moshavim were sited along the former Gaza-Beersheba road, 
beside which ran the new pipeline from the ~ir Am pumping area 
to Beersheba. The first five moshavim, in 1949, were Gilat, 
Tifrah, Beit Hagadi, Sharsheret, and Geia. All but Geia were 
on the main 24 11 Nir . .\In-Beersheba p ipe. Geia was sited in the 
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eastern 'trough', southeast of Ashkelon. The rate of moshav 
settlement increased in the following year, when immigration 
was at its peak, and from then on these villages were generally 
established in groups. The first group was located in the 
angle between the Nir Am-Beersheba pipeline and the branch 
line to Urim and Gevulot. Known as the Imara group, after a 
local Beduin placename, it included Pattish, Peduyim, Rannen, 
Bitha, and Maslul. The other main group established at this 
time was situated further north on the Gaza-Beersheba road, 
and comprised Tekuma - which had moved from the site now 
occupied by Sharsheret - Yoshivya, Yakini, and Shuva. A few 
moshavim were established at points outside the existing water 
pipe system, on sites where local wells were able to provide 
the minirrnim of water needed for domestic purposes. Such were 
Helets, Telamim, and Kolillav, supplied from a well on the land 
of kibbutz Beror Hayil. Ahuzzam, Uza, and, later, Shalva, 
were established near the northern border of the region in the 
Pelugot (Faluja) -area. These three took water from an Arab 
well, Bir Abu Jeber. In the northwest the local aquifer 
permitted settlement in a more piecemeal fashion. In the 
trough between the central and eastern kurkar ridges, or on 
the central ridge, Geia, Mashen, Beit Shiqma, and a moshav 
shitufi, Mavq_i'im, were founded at this time. The last moshav 
to be settled in 1950 was on the former site of the kibbutz 
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Mivtahim, from which it took its name. While many of' the 
moshavim were located in areas where water was not immediately 
available in large quantities, they were at least on the 
loess or alluvial soils. Mivtahim alone was placed on the 
sandy soil of the southwest corner, and, as wil l be seen later, 
these marginal soil conditions did not enhance the success of 
the settlement. Two other moshavim, Omer and Nevatim, were 
also in the marginal southeast, but Omer was originally 
founded in 1949 as a moshav shitufi, with European settlers, 
and only became a moshav, with oriental settlers, in 1952/3, 
while Nevatim was a pre-War European moshav. Both, with 
oriental settlers, were to suffer the same vicissitudes as 
Mivtahim. 
After 1951 the impact of mass immigration declined, and 
the work of' building and land preparation in the moshavim 
overtook the intake of prospective settlers. Only two 
moshavim we~e fou_nded in 1951/8, filling in the area around 
Sharsheret, and by the following year it was possible to have 
another group of moshavim, the 'Shovalim', in the area to the 
west of the kibbutzim Shoval and Beit Kama, prepared before 
the arrival of the settlers. It had originally been intended 
to settle 100 families in each village, but the lack of 
prospective settlers led the Settlement Department to reduce 
the number of houses built to 50 per village, at least for 
i' 
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the time being. The Shoval group was built around a 36" 
pipeline, the largest in the region to that time, which was 
designed to serve in the future as one of the main latitudinal 
branches of the Yarkon-Negev pipe network. For this reason 
the Shoval group might equally be considered to belong to the 
second stage of the region's development, which centred around 
the Yarkon-Negev Project. Five moshavim were founded on the 
Shoval pipeline in 1952/3, three were founded to the north of 
the Imara group - Tidhar, Teashur, and Berosh - on the main 
Nir .Am-Beersheba pipe. Another moshav was added to the dry-
farming pair in the Faluja area, making a total of nine 
moshavim in this year, as compared to two in 1951/2 , and only 
one in 1953/4 ( Qelahim). 
During this first stage in the settlement of the region 
a total of 52 new settlements were built and populated. It 
is clear from the foregoing that towards the end of the period 
the establishment of new settlements, particularly of kibbutzim, 
had fallen off considerably. This was primarily because the 
flow of immigr~nts declined: if it had not, it is probable 
that many more settlements would have been founded. However 
by the end of the period there was no longer a strong reason 
for more settlement south of a line Nir·· Am-Lahav on security 
grounds, and moreover the stage had been reached·at which it 
was advisable to turn all efforts to the consolidation of 
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previous development, and especially to the expansion of the 
irrigated area. The existing settlements were more than 
enough to absorb the water resources of the region. Further 
settlement depended on the completion of the second stage of 
the water supply facilities - the Yarkon-Negev pipeline - and 
on an increase in the number of potential settlers. These two 
conditions were satisfied in the second period, after 1953/4, 
and will be described in the next chapter. 
The size of the rnoshavim and kibbutzim, in terms of land 
and population,was measured for planning purposes in 
' agricultural units'. This refers in the moshav to the amount 
of land, at the full development of i rr i gation, allotted to 
one family, and the size of an agr icultural land unit is 
determined as the area, generally irrigated, that will afford, 
with a given system of cultivation, the agricultural family a 
net income equal to that of a skilled industrial worker. In 
the kibbutz, the unit is determined in the same way·, but 
refers in this case not to a family but to two adult members 
of the settlement. Thus a moshav is planned as a village of 
from 50 to 100 or more units of land and population. In fact 
in the moshavim and kibbutzim the number of population units 
'~!as in nearly all cases considerably less than the number of 
planned units of population. Thus the relation between the 
actual amount of land in cultivation and the number of 
population units was extremely variable. Land units were 
based upon economic and agronomic calculati6ns for the final 
stage of farm development, i.e. when the farmer is experienced 
and cultivates all or nearly all of his allocation with full 
irrigation. Furthermore the supply of land in the Northern 
Negev was at this time virtually unlimited: many kibbutzim 
were able, and were encouraged, to cultivate vast areas on 
temporary lease (see Table XIII). Until 1953 the official 
land allocation was a unit of 28 dunams, but after that date 
it was increased to 38 dunams, to be fully irrigated at full 
development. 
The layout of the villages generally followed previouslu 
tried patterns. The kibbutzim maintained the traditionally 
close but separate grouping of residential, service, and farm 
buildings. The layout of the moshavim varied much 
more. In some cases the houses were grouped together 
around a central service road, the Y pattern being a 
characteristic form, while in a few cases a more extended, 
linear, village was built with each house on a single service 
road and adjacent to the whole of the family plot. The latter 
pattern was generally limited to areas where defence needs 
were minimal, as at Mashen and Beit Shiqma. Throughout the 
region all moshavim and kibbutzim in areas where infiltration 
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was a chronic problem were surrounded by barbed-wire fences, 
and as electricity was extended these were floodlit at night. 
Population 
At the close of the War of Independence the Jewish civilian 
population in the region was not more than 3,000, and it was 
entirely rural. The Arab population had fled a1 masse, and 
of some 60,000 Beduin who had lived between Ashkelon and the 
Gulf of Akaba on the Red Sea, only 13,000 remained on Israeli 
soil. In 1949 and 1950 some hundreds of new immigrants were 
housed in temporary ma'abarot and in the empty houses of the 
Arab towns, but these were soon cleared as new building 
started. 
After 1949 the population of the region, both.rural and 
urban, grew rapidly. Urban development took place on the 
sites of two former Arab towns, Majdal (now Migdal Ashkelon) 
and Beersheba. At the end of 1954 Ashkelon had a population 
estimated at 14,400, and Beersheba 16,300 (35). The growth 
of these towns is to be seen in the context of the Government's 
policy of dispersing the national population by directing new 
inunigrants to 'development' areas, and thus checking the 
natural tendency of immigrants to gravitate towards the 
ui~ban centres where housing and employment are usually easier 
to find. At the same time this policy cre a ted in the marginal 
are as earmarked for development, a labour force to carry it 
out. The role of Beersheba was defined as the 'capital of 
the Negev', a 'frontier' town for operations not only in the Gaza-Beersheba basin, but also in the Central and Southern Negev, from the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Akaba. 
Expressed in numbers, the growth of the agt:>icultural population of the region does not appear so striking. But 
when the labours of planning and construction are taken into 
account, the achievement must be considered at least equal. Towards the end of 1954 the rural population amounted to more than 17,000, and had more than doubled in the four years 
since 1950. In Table V below it will also be seen that the 
expansion was much greater, in terms of population and of the 
number of villages, in the moshavim than in the kibbutzim. 
Table V 
Ag1 .. icultural Population of the Region, 1950 & 
30.IX.50 
Moshavim fl9~j 3,7:?A: Moshavim ~38~ Kibbutzim 28 4,374 E:ibbutzim 32") 
Total 8,098 Total 
(1) includes Omer, then a moshav shitufi. , (2) includes Mavqi'im, moshav shitufi. 
1954 
30.IX.54 
10,561 
6,648 
17,209 
Source: Settlement Department records, Brit. 
Pikuach. 
Most striking in the composition of the population is 
the division in ethnic origin between the moshav and kibbutz 
settlers. A sample of moshavim and kibbutzim illustrates the 
Western origins of the kibbutz settlers and the ' oriental' 
origins of the post-1948 moshav settlers. 
Table VI. 
Country of Origin of Moshav and Kibbutz Settlers (30.IX.53) 
Kibbutzim, & Date of Foundation 
Gevulot (1943 Rumania, Turkey, Bulgaria 
Beeri 1946 Israel 
Shoval 1946 Israel, Lat in .Arner i ea 
Saad 1947 Israel, E. Europe 
Magen 1949 Israel, Rumania 
Erets 1949 Israel 
Nir Yitshak 1949 Israel 
Kissufim 1951 . Latin .America . 
Devira 1951 : Hungary 
Moshavim, & Date of Foundation 
Nevatim !1946) Hungary, TransY"lvania Tekuma 1946) Poland, Hungary 
Gila.t 1949~ Tunis 
Pattish 1950 Persia, Azerbaijan 
Shuva 1950) Tripoli 
Bitha 
!19501 
Yemen 
Yakini 1950 Persia, Kurdistan 
Kokhav ·_  Iraq_ 
Ahuzzam 1950 Tripoli, Iraq_ 
Telamim 1950 Tunis 
The first ijloshavim - Tekuma, Nevatim, Tsur Maon, Omer, Beit 
Ragadi - were settled by 'Western' immigrants and Israelis. 
In almost all such villages there was a considerable wastage 
of settlers, and all but Tekuma now have an oriental population, 
I I 
I 
..... -
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at least in part. It seems that it was only in kibbutzim 
that Western settlers took firm roots in the region. The 
reasons for this are not hard to guess. The Western immigrant 
and the Israeli, because of their superior education and skills, 
are mobile: in face of the hardships and privations of life in 
the Northern Negev, the Western settlers' determination to 
persevere requires the 'moral' support of kibbutz social 
organisation, idealism and ideology. In the moshav, the 
potential satisfactions are more closely tied to the farm 
holding, and the attraction of other occupations is corres-
pondingly greater than in the kibbutz during the first years 
of settlement. 
Details of the movement of populati on in the kibbutzim 
are not available. However, the annual population data of 
the Settlement Department and the Brit Pikuach reveal that the 
members in the kibbutzim were considerably assisted in these 
years by groups of temporary residents. These were of two 
kinds: the Nahal army units, formed by conscripts who wish to 
devote their lives to agricultural settlement, and gToups of 
young Israelis and immigrants who intend to form -· their own 
kibbutzim or join existing ones. The Nahal units were, and 
still are, sent to border kibbutzim to bolster their military 
str ength, and at the same time the young men and .women take 
part in the normal agricultural life of the settlement in order 
to acquire experience. Similarly, the groups of prospectiye 
kibbutz settlers in training spend one year or more on 
kibbutzim to gain experience. Thus in the kibbutzim the 
labour force is swelled by the presence in many cases of these 
temporary groups. Since the kibbutzim universally suffered 
from the lack of labour (on ideological grounds they are 
unwilling to use hired labour, but this in practice differs 
from kibbutz to kibbutz), the utility of this arrangement is 
obvious. 
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The Reports of Mifal Hanegev give some indication of the 
situation in the moshavim (32,33). The planned capacity of the 
33 moshavim administered by Mifal Hanegev in 1952/3 was 2,829 
families. A total of 2,391 family housing units had been built, 
i.e. the actual capacity of the villages was 84.5% of the 
planned capacity. At the end of the year there were in the 
villages 1,795 famili es, leaving almost 25% of the houses 
empty. From this it is clear that the planners greatly over-
estimated the supply of settlers. The number of families 
resident at the end of 1952/3 was only 63% of the number 
planned for in the villages built at that time. The situation 
in the kibbutzim was similar, if not worse. Their planned 
size was in all cases 120 units (:240 adult members) each, 
while the actual m.1mber of units averaged less than 70 per 
kibbutz, even with the inclusion of temporary residents (see 
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Table VII, where the average number of units per kibbutz is 
obtained by dividing the number of adults of working age by 
the number of settlements multiplied by two). In 1952/3 the 
number of families that joined moshavim was 629, and the 
Table VII 
30.IX.50 
Moshavim 
Kibbutzim 
Adults of Working Age (15-60) 
2,112 
: 3,041 
30. IX. 54 
Moshavim 
Kibbutzim 
5,035 
4,259 
Source: Settlement Department records and Brit Pikuach. 
number that left, 269, or 15~i of the total resident at the 
end of the year. The number of newcomers exceeded the number 
of families leaving. In the following year, 1953/4, 512 
families were added to the moshavim, and 306 left, or almost 
1470 of the total number of families resident at the end of 
the year. Thus up to the end of 1953/4 the supply of 
prospective settlers was greater than the number of departures, 
but the latter was considerable, and it seems likely that 
throughout this period the rate of loss was not less than 10% 
of the total nurnber of famili es settled, per year. 
Another demographic feature worthy of mention concerns 
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the potential labour force 1 in the moshavim and the kibbutzim. 
There was a marked tendency f'or the number of adults to 
decline as a proportion of the total population during this 
period, both in the moshavim and the kibbutzim (Table VII and 
VIII). This may be ascribed to the immigrant character of 
much of the population, and to the youth of kibbutz settlers. 
At the same time it is noticeable that the decline was more 
mm•ked in the moshavim, from 56. 7~:c in 1950 to 47. 7% in 1954, 
than in the kibbutzim, where the proportions were 69. 51~ and 
64. li; respectively. The reasons for this difference are 
Table VIII 
Adults of' Working Ag,e as a % of Total Population 
30.IX.50 
1oshavim 56. 7fo Kibbutzim: 69.5% 
30. IX. 54 
Moshavim 47. 7% Kibbutzim : 64. 1 o 
cultural: there was a deliberate attempt in the kibbutzim to 
limit the birth-rate in the early years of development, and 
the settlers were nearly all young. Furthermore, the number 
(1) Because of differences of social organisation, the numbers of adults in each settlement cannot be treated equally as the actual labour force. In the kibbutzim, women are part of the labour force, while in the moshavim the use of female labour in 'productive' branches varies very grea tly. However about half the kibbutz labour force is used in the communal services, while in the moshavim the women may be described as being engaged in services in the house. On this basis there is a measure, rather x•ough, of comparison. 
of unmarried men usually exce.eds that of unmarried women in 
the k ibbutzim. In the moshav, in addition to cultural 
factors conducive to a higher birth-rate, there was also a 
much wider age-range. The result was that the number of 
dependents per adult was greater in the moshavim, and the 
difference increased during this period. Also significant 
was the rate of increase in the number of adults of working 
age per settlement during this time (Tab le I X). The 
difference between kibbutz and moshav was not great. But 
when this is taken in conjunction with the fact that the 
kibbutzim developed agriculturally much mo1"e rapidl y than 
the moshavim, the reason for the shortage of labour in the 
kibbutzim will be understood. And the kibbutzim were not 
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only active in agriculture: in most cases consider able demands 
were made on the labour force by defence duties on the 
frontier, and by the development of kibbutz workshops and 
industries. 
Table IX 
Average Number of. 1 dults of Workin~e .Jler _Set~tlement 
30.IX.50 
i,foshavim 
Kibbutzim 
111 
109 
30.IX.54 
Jioshavim 
Kibbutzim 
132 
133 
•·\Tater and Irrigation 
The output of the pre-Independence vrater supply system 
at its full development had been 250 m3jhr, and when the 
local wells of the Jewish settlements in the coastal belt 
are included, the total water output j_n Jewish use in the 
region cannot have been more than about 350 m3 /hr. By the 
end of 1951 the output of the regional project had been 
increased to 2,000 m3/hr, or 10 million m3 a year . Outside 
the ~egional network, water was supplied from local wells to 
the moshavim in the inland plain - Telamim, Helets, Kokhav, 
Uza, and Ahuzzam. Other local wells were developed for a 
few settlements, and also at Beersheba, but as can be seen 
from Table XI, their importance was minor compared to the 
output of the coastal wells . 
By 1954 the Regional Water Project had achieved a total 
output of 1 9 million m3 a yea1" (not including water supplied 
to settlements outside the authority of Mifal Hanegev, such 
as the older• kibbutzim Yad Mordechai, Gvar .Arn, and the new 
settlements in the vicinity of Ashkelon), an incpease of 
3 · 11· 3 mi ion m more than in the previous year. But there was 
a constant cry in the reports of r..Iifal Ranegev that the 
demand for water was continually outstripping the supply. 
Very little vras done to implement the pre-1948 proposals that 
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Table X 
Negev Regional ¥at er Pl"'oject: Out:Qut 
1948/9 
1949/50 
1950/1 
1951/2 
:}.952/3 
1953/4 
1. 25 million m3 
... 
10.0 II II 
10.75 II !I 
13.5 II !I 
19.0 million m3 
Source Mifal Hanegev Reports, 1950/1 - 1953/4. 
Table XI 
Vvater Sources in 1954 
Nir 4m 111/ells 
Yad Uordechai & Gvar' am South r.Vells Gvar' A~.n North Wells 
Beersheba 1Vells 
Beror Hayil ,rell 
Bir Abu Jeber 
Nirim 1~/e 11 
Nevatim ·well 
TOT • .\L 
20,000 m3/day 
98,000 11 
57,000 11 
175,000 m3/day 
7,000 
500 
600 
300 
600 
9,000 
m
3/day 
ff 
II 
II 
11 
184,000 m3/day 
Source Mifal Hanegev Report, 1953/4. 
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the saline water beneath the Gaza-Beersheba Basin should be 
used for irrigation after mixing with sweet water from other 
sources. This was done on a small scale at Nirim, but nowher e 
else, as far as can be ascertained. 
The use of \rnter naturally varied considePablY' over the 
seasons of t1e year. It will be seen in Table XII that the 
peak months in 1951/8 were May and June, when 12.5 and 14.2% 
of the annual total supply were consumed, while the lowest 
demand was in Jc1.nuary and FebI•uary, v'li th 1. 9 and J. 5~-- of 
the total. The reasons for this seasonal variation are 
obvious, but it should be noted that the Settlement Department 
was soon taking steps to explox•e ways of cutting the peak 
consumption of the swm:1er months, in order to economise on 
overhead costs. 
Keeping pace with the expansion in water output, the 
installation of field irrigation pipes progressed rapidly. 
Before 1948 some kibbutzim had experimented with floodwater 
irrigation by plan.ting vines in the vmdis, but o.fter 1948 
irrigation was almost entirely by means of field irrigation 
sprinklers and piped water under pressure, in spite of the 
fact that the flat terrain of the Northern Negev would 
permit open ditch irrigation. The permanent irrigated fields 
have main pipes underground, and irrigation is effected by 
means of movable field pipes which are attached to the main 
hydrants. The area of permanent irrigation field 
installations increased from 2,095 dunams in 1949/50 to a 
total of 48,111 dunams in 1953/4. The incidence of drought 
in 1950/51 and again in 1952/3 indicated the need for some 
form of iLrr i gation for the unirrigated grain crops in case 
of emergency. The solution was auxiliary irrigation, using 
not more than 200-250 m3 per dunam, given in the latff1· 
winter and early spring. In 1952/3 auxiliary irrigation 
was applied to 5,925 dunams of crops. 
Table XII 
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Physical Irrigated Area (Permanent Field Instal)ation~1 
1949/50 
1950/1 
1951/2 
i952/3 
1953/4 
2,095 dunams 
7,900 
11,036 
27,217 
48,111 dunams 
Source: Mifal Hanegev Reports, 1950/1 - 1953/4. 
The installation of field pipes proceeded more rapidly 
in the kibbutzim than in the moshavim. This was because 
the kibbutz members were generally qualified to enter all 
branches of cultivation, whereas the Settlement Department 
saw that the moshav settlers were not ready to undertake the 
responsibilities of cultivating more than a few dunams. The 
situation in 1951/2 was that the old, i.e. pre-State, 
kibbutzim had _300-400 irrigated dunams each, the new 
kibbutzim had from 200-300, while only in a few moshavim 
did a family have more than 5 dunams of i •rigated land. At 
that time it i.r,ras planned to inst al 1, OOO dunams of irrigated 
land per l<:ibbutz and in the moshavim 25 dunams per family. 
The comparison was therefore between 25 dunams per unit in 
the moshav, and 13.5 - 17 dunams in a 1-cibbutz with 80-60 
units. Here it should be borne in mind that the lciboutzim 
had much larger areas of unirrigated land at their disposal 
than the moshavim. 
Agricultural Development 
The land use data for the first five years of post-
Independence cultivation in the Northern Negev give .clear 
evidence of· the one major diver gence from the traditional 
pattern of .Jewish farming in Palestine. This was in the 
activity of settlements outside the region, and of puolic 
and private enterprise, in the unirrigated cultivation of 
grains ( 'falha' cultivation). The responsibili .ty for grain 
production was now in .Jewish hands, as it had not been 
during the Mandate, and the need for bread and feed grains 
was acute during these years. Thus in the interim period 
before close settlement could be carried out and before 
the irrigation facilities could be expanded to make that 
possible, kibbutzim of the region and from outside, compani es 
organised by the supply co-operatives of the Histadrut and 
the settlement movements, and private individuals together 
ploughed up vast areas and sowed them to barley and wheat. 
Tenure for falha cultivation b y companies, outside kibbutzim, 
and Negev kibbutzim cultivating land that was not part of 
--~~--.-,-----.~ 
• 
• -•• ' - > 
....... 
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their permanent land allocation, was on an annual basis. 
These bodies had, or could acquire, their own machinery. 
The moshavim were not planned to have the tractors and 
combines necessary for extensive falha, so the Settlement 
Department established tractor stations, at Imara and Beit 
Hagadi, and organised falha cultivation itself or hired 
machinery to the moshavim organised as 'Metach ' farms by 
the central moshav settlers' movement. 
Table ~III 
Falha Cultivation 1 
By Negev 2 By Northern By Public By Settle- Settlements & Pl"ivate Beduin 
97 
ments Cos. Total 
1950/1 102,690 d 100,000 d ... 202,690 
1951/2 24-4, 039 400,000 ... 644,039 
1952/3 281,000 240,000 170,000 800,000 891,000 
(1) Refers to sown, not harvested, areas. 
(2) Includes a few Central Negev kibbutzim which cultivated in the Northern Negev. 
Source: Mifal I-Ianegev Reports, 1950/1 - 1958/3. 
The Mifal Hanegev planners had dravm up in 1951 · four 
regions of favourability for falha cultivation. They were : 
(i) the area north of a line Beeri-Shoval, where -rainfall 
averages are between 300 and #oo mm a yeai", where it was 
d 
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thought that falha yields were dependable; (ii) the area 
bet,rreen ( i) and a line Uirim-Tifrah, where the rainfall is 
between 200 and 300 rrun a year, in which falha yields were 
considered uncertain and the need :for auxiliary irrigation 
likely in some years, (iii) the area between (ii) and a line 
Nir Yitshak-Nevatim, where the rainfall averages are about 
150 mm a year, and in which it was thought that the prospects 
for falha were poor, so that there would be a permanent need 
for auxiliary irrigation; and (iv) the a-eea south of a line 
Nir Yitshak-Nevatim, where unirrigated cultivation was not 
feasible. 
By 1954 nearly all the cultivable land west of the Lower 
Shephela within zones (i) and (ii), and much of zone (iii), 
that was not earmarked for permanent irrigation installations 
in the immediate future, was put unde1, the plough (Table XIII). 
The vast apeas sovm to wheat and ba1,1ey were in general 
temporary land allocations : when the full development of 
settlement and irrigation in the region had been achieved, 
these areas would be absorbed into the land allocations of 
the villages within the region. In a sense this largely 
'absentee' cultivation was within the Jewish experience, 
since the difficulties of land purchase during the Mandate 
had often compelled settlements to cultivate separate parcels 
of land rather than one block around the settlement itself. 
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But this was the first time that such a practice had developed 
on so large a scale. Not only were the areas cultivated 
very large, but some of the kibbutzim engaged in Negev falha 
cultivation were located as far north as the Emek and the 
shores of the Sea of Galilee! 
Table XIV 
Urim 
Nir Am 
I'.:iavq_i' im 
Annual Rainfall Amounts, 1950/1 - 1~~3/4 
1950/1 
136 mm 
226 
224 
1951/2 
200 mm 
510 
642 
1952/3 
121 mm 
359 
431 
1953/4 
176 mm 
432 
507 
Source Hydrological Yearbook of Israel, 1957/8. 
The success of falha cultivation in these years was 
mixed. The droughts of 1950/1 and 1952/3 were severe : in 
the latter year more than 100,000 dunams were not considered 
worth harvesting, and where yields were slightly better, 
harvesting was actually done by hand in order to save some 
of the grain and to provide much-needed employment to moshav 
settlers! Yields in 1951/2, when the rainfall was adeq_ua te, 
averaged 86 kg/dunam of barley in the southern half of the 
region, and 97 kg/dunam in the northern half, with some 
isolated fields yielding as much as 200 kg/dunam~ Wheat 
yields averaged 80 kg/dunam, and reached up to 150 kg. On 
the other hand in the drought years 1950/1 and 1958/3 the 
yields in the fields that were harvested averaged 60 and 52 
kg of barley per dunam, and about 60 kg of wheat. These 
averages were somewhat above those estimated by Lowe for 
the Beduin. 
Many settlements entered deeply into debt in order to 
finance this falha cultivation (money at this time was in 
short supply, and interest rates extremely high), in the 
hope of above-average rainfall and a rich return. In 1951/2, 
.which was fortunately a good season for ~ain, several 
kibbutzim in the Negev cultivated more than 10,000 dunams 
each of winter and summer grains, and one (Shoval) sowed 
100 
more than 20,000 dunams. Such areas were obviously larger 
than could be undertaken by the financial, labour and nachine 
resources of the settlements, and so the Settlement Department 
encouraged them to reduce their falha areas. However, since 
the kibbutzim l acked opportunities at this stage for 
development in other directions, there was a considerable 
attraction in the risky but potentially rewarding gamble of 
extensive falha. In 1952/3 there was some reduction in the 
area per settlement: four kibbutzim cultivated between 10,000 
and 11,000 dunams, three between 7,000 and 10,000 and the 
r est less than 7,000 dunams. But the duought of that year 
) 
was a serious financial disaster, and drought compensation 
had to be introduced. A Drought Com...m.ittee, sponsored by 
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the Settlement Department and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
distributed I£1,350,000 among the Negev settlements in 
compensation and in sowing loans for the following year. 
Clearly falha in the Northern Negev, especially in the 
southern part, was as risky as it had been for the Beduin. 
Since auxiliary irrigation in 1952/3 covered only 6,000 dunams 
of the total 891,000 dunams, it is not surprising that the 
clamour for more water was intensified. 
As regards the irrigated area, it will be seen in Table 
XV that for the kibbutzim and the moshavim in which a start 
had been made with irrigation installation, the average 
allocation of irrigated land per active unit was approximately 
the same. The range was from one to eleven dunams per unit, 
generally depending upon the age of the settlement. But the 
falha area per unit was very dif:f':e ·rent in the two types of 
settlement. In the 11 moshavim the average physical 
unirrigated area cultivated was less than 57 dunams per unit, 
compared to more than 150 dunarns in the kibbutzim. And it 
is to be remembered that these figures represent direct 
participation only in the k ibbutzim: in the moshavim falha 
cultivation was organised by the Settlement Department or by 
experienced moshav settlers on loan from older villages in 
the north. 
1 1 
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TabJ..e XV 
The Cultivated Area: Sam~le of Moshavim* and Kibbutzim in 1952L2 Planned Active Total Total PCA Per PCA Per PIA Per PIA Per Ul 
Units Units Physical Physical Planned Active Planned Active 0 s::: 
Cultivated Irrigated Unit Unit Unit Unit 1--;l Q 
Area Area 
(1) 
.. 
Moshavim 
Dunams 
tp 
'-:l 
~ 
Bitha 90 89 3,323 723 37 37 8 8 c+ 
Gilat 124 81 2,480 480 20 31 4 6 11:J 
I-'• 
Mivtahim 100 58 3,800 347 38 66 3 6 :,;, 
Pattish 106 92 5,836 985 55 63 9 11 s::: Pi 
Tekuma 78 62 12,650 450 162 204 6 7 Q 
Yoshivya 94 77 1,390 90 15 18 1 1 ::t 
Givolim 58 42 660 60 38 16 1 1. 5 p, !J 
Omer 80 27 1,075 175 13 40 2 6.5 OJ 
Telamim 84 57 6,872 
- 82 121 
-
- Ul 
.Ahuzzam 89 72 4,406 40 50 61 (o. 5) 2 CD 
c+ 
Mashen 84 79 2,830 605_ 34 36 7 8 c+ 
I-' 
Total 987 736 45,322 3,955 
CD 
s 
Average 
46 62 4.0 5.4 (D ~ 
c+ 
Kibbut zi_II! 
d 
CD 
'O 
Nir Yitshak 120 39 4,652 197 39 11 9 2 5 p) 1-:i 
Beit Kama 120 66 14,189 187 118 215 2 3 c+ 
Reim 120 42 12,790 300 107 302 2.5 7 s CD 
Erets 120 71 7,226 130 60 102 1 2 !J 
c+ 
Gevim 120 68 7,230 350 60 106 3 5 
Gevulot 120 46 5,600 509 47 122 4 11 '-:l CD 
Mish. Han egev 120 l~ 11,200 428 !~ 149 4 6 Q 
Beeri 120 
~~:~16 ~00 1~1 2.5 1i 0 '-:l 
Saad 120 
50 
5 p, 
Shoval 120 82 1 !±2 949 282 122 168 . _ ----- 2 ---~- 3 O} . 
Total 1 2 200 632 1011202 
.2!.233 Average 
8l.t. 1 t>O 2.8 2•.2 
*= includes only moshavim in which land allocations had been made & cultivation had commenced. 
Table XVI 
Moshav and Kibbutz La nd Use* in the Northern Negev; 1949.i.2.Q filld 1 952/,2 
KIBBUTZIM MOSHAVIM ALL 1949/50 1952/53 1949/50 1952/53 1949/50---:P952/53 
Field Crops 
Unirrigated 
Aux. Irrig. 
Ful.l Irrigt€3~ 
TOTAL 
Vegetables*** 
Unirrigat ed 
Awe. Irrig. 
Full Irrig. 
TOTAL 
Fruit 
Un irrigated 
Full Irri-
gation 
TOTAL 
Gross Unir-
rigated 
Cron Area 
Gross Auxil-
iary Irrig. 
Crop Ar ea 
115,445 
2,182 
117,627 
132 
1,098 
1,230 
4,423 
1,426 
5,849 
120,000 
175,085 
4,954 
5,986 
186,025 
180 
3,160 
3,340 
L~, 231 
2,999 
7,230 
179,316 
5,134 
Gross Fully 
Irrig. Crop ~ 4,706 12,145 
Total Gross 
Crop Area 124,706 196,59~ 
8,065 
16 
8,081 
145 
30 
175 
280 
...£7. 
305 
8,490 
69,132 
270 
1,965 
71,367 
820 
50 
5,377 
6,247 
70 
1 '265 
1,335 
70,022 
123, 51 O 
2,198 
125, 708 
277 
1,128 
1,405 
4,703 
1,451 
6,154 
128,490 
244,217 
5,224 
7,951 
257,392 
820 
230 
8,537 
9,587 
4,301 
4,264 
8,565 
249,338 
5,454 
Ii 8,607 4,777 20,752 
* : Includes only cultivation by local settlements (for culti-vation by others see Table XIII) and does not include deep pilioughing, green manure, and fallow, which totalled 94 ,143 dunams in 1952/3. 
~* : Mainly fodder crops 
3£Q : Includes potatoes . Sour•ce : Brit Pikuach. 
•. 
Comparison of the land use data for the region in 1949/50 
and 1952/3 reveals that while the total cultivated aI·ea 
expanded greatly, in the latter year over 90% of the cropped 
area (deep ploughing and green manure are not included here) 
was still unirrigated. The use made of the irrigated area 
by the two types of settlement is interesting. The kibbutzim 
maintained almost half of their irrigated area under field 
crops - mainly fodder - while the moshavim devoted only a 
quarter of their (much smaller) irrigated area to this branch 
(Table XVI). This is explained by the greater development of 
the livestock branches in the kibbutzim: the initial 
experience in the moshavim with livestock was not encouraging, 
so that although it was at the time planned that the moshavim 
should become mixed farms, investment by the Sett lement 
Department was held back. The other significant difference 
is the higher proportion of the irrigated area under 
· vegetables in the moshavirn, which increased considerably 
between 1949/50 and 1952/3. Vegetables, in this classification, 
include potatoes, but these were then grown in the kibbutzim 
rather than the moshavim. The first steps in cultivation 
of irrigated land in the moshavim were generally with 
vegetables, whi ch had obvious advantages in the circumstances. 
They required a high input of labour, which was then freely 
available, and little or no input of capital or machinery, 
which were in short supply. In the kibbutzim, on the other 
hand, labour was scarce, as was water, and potatoes occupied 
much of the area under this heading. Lastly, one may note 
(Tabl e XVI) the slower expansion of fruit in the moshavim 
and the greater use of auxiliary irrigation in the kibbutzim. 
Table JC\TII 
Use of (Fully) Irrigated Area 
KIBBUTZIM MOSHAVIM 
1949L'.5o 1952L'.3 194 9L'.5o 1952/3 
Field Crops 47 % 49 % 23 % 23 % Vegetables 23 26 42 62 Fruit 30 25 35 15 
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 70 
By the end of 1952/3 there were almost 3,000 cattle, 
5,000 sheep, and 120,000 poultry in the region. With the 
exception.of sheep, the livestock branches were more 
developed in the kibbutzim. Milk production was more than 
5 million litres, egg production nearly 10 million units, 
per year. The European cattle strains ~cclimatised during 
the Mandate were well able to withstand the hot but healthy 
conditions of the Negev, so that success in this branch was 
gener~lly swift and free from difficulties. Some kibbutzim 
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soon reached outputs of 6,000 litres of milk per cow per 
year; the cost per litre, when cows have to be fed in their 
stalls from irrigated and imported fodder, was probably 
equally large! Sheep - which a1"e kept for mill{: rather than 
for meat or wool in Israel - were allocated to the moshavim 
for two reasons : firstly because it was thought that the 
flocks would use natural pastur·e for most of the year, and 
would therefore need little irrigated fodder, and secondly 
because milking was then generally perf'ormed by hand, and 
was therefore more suited to the moshav. Sheep flocks were 
given to the falha moshavim - Helets, Telaip.im, etc. - and to 
a few others. 
The agricultural problems that arose during this period 
were principally to do with nIBthods of cultivation, irrigation, 
crop t~-pes and varietie~ and so forth. The wider economic 
and agronomic problems whi eh began to make themselves felt 
towards the end of the period, and which induced major 
changes, will be discussed in the next chapter. Early 
estimates that the loess soils would require less water 
under irrigation were difficult to verify, both because of 
lack of information about crop water needs and irrigation 
schedules, and because of the waste of water due to the lack 
of meters . To solve this and other problems, an agricultural 
-
I I 
-- . lllllllliiiill 
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research station was set up at Gilat in 1951 by the Ministry 
of Agriculture. The lack of water was in any case the main 
brake upon development, but only time could solve that 
problem. In the meantime it was realised that ways of 
cutting the swmner peak consumption of water would have to 
be found. Other problems were the yabli t weed ( "Yabli t, is 
Enemy Number One on all the irrigated land in the Negev" (28)), 
the lack of organic manure, and the difficulty of cultivating 
the sandy soils in the ·southwest and the saline soils at 
Hatserim and, to a lesser extent, at Nevatim. Yablit was 
attacked by means of periodic deep ploughing, and the 
cultivation of winter crops to dry the soil out. Green 
manure crops were grovm. to substitute for organic manure. 
For the sandy soils, it was known that soil blowing and 
damage effected by sandstorms could be limited on small areas 
by windbreaks, but the problem of low natural fertility was 
not overcome until some years later, as in the case of the 
saline soils. 
An example of the way in which experience affected plans 
for crop and fruit varieties is provided by the fruit planting 
schedules of Mifal Hanegev (Table XVIII'). At first olive 
plantations appeared to have clear advantages in this region, 
since it was thought that they could be grown \'Vi thout 
irrigation, or with very little. Unfortunately the earliest 
.... ..,,_ 
---
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Table XVIII 
Fruit Planting Schedules 
For 1951/2 For 1952/3 For 1953/4 
Dunams Dunams Dunams Table grapes 200 360 275 Wine grapes 290 910 1,460 Olives 268 140 65 Plums 100 150 130 Peaches 82 Apples 5 Other 6 15 170 
Total 891 1,575 2 ,095 
80Ul"Ce: Mifal Hanegev Reports, 1950/1, 
1951/2, and 1952/3. 
trees, planted before 1948, gave fruit in erratic fashion, 
and it was found that the trees did need appreciable inputs 
of water. Furthermore, the prof'itability of olive-growing 
was always low, and thus it has remained in Israel almost 
entirely within the Arab sector. Another feature is the 
increasing weight given to wine grapes. Table grapes are 
more profitable .. in returns per dunam but the higher summer 
temperatures of the Negev make them difficult to gTow. A 
large part of the 1952/3 plam1ed p lanting of wine grapes 
was to be in the moshavim (1,545 dunams of the total of 
2, 095 dunams of fruit in that year vrere to be planted in the 
moshavim). Wine grapes require less car e and experience in 
growing and picking than table grapes, and so they were 
planned to be the principal element in moshav fruit production. 
Experiments were made at this time with citrus in the Gaza-
Beersheba Basin, but although the unsatisfactory results 
were due, according to the 1952/3 Repor•t of Mifal Hanegev, 
to inexperience rather than to physical conditions, little 
development of citrus occurred outside the coastal belt for 
some years to come. Experiments were also made with tobacco 
production at Uza, Helets and Shalva. 332 dunams were 
planted in 1951/2 : as with olives, it was thought that good 
yields could be achieved without irrigation! The first 
crop was unsuccessful, and the area was cut in the next year 
instead of being expanded to a plam1ed 1, OOO dunaJ!l!ls; .: after 
that tobacco, a traditional Arab crop in the north of the 
country, was not grown again in the region. 
Apart from the isolated instances cited, and the r•isky 
nature of falha cultivation, agricultural development was 
generally successful in terms of yields. The problems of 
irrigation norms, the expansion of water supplies, and so 
forth, could be solved, given time. There were critical 
difficulties for a few settlements on the borders of the 
region; such as Nir Yi tshak, · Mivtahim, Gevulot, Hatserim, 
Omer, Nevatim and Lahav, but elsewhere the strictly 
. - . 
~
agricultural difficulties had been, or were in the process 
of being, overcome. 
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Only passing reference has ·been made so far to the third 
element in the organisational pattern of farming in the 
region : cultivation by companies or institutions that were 
not associated with settlement. Besides the kibbutzim from 
the north and such companies as 'Assif' and 'Amir' (set up 
and financed by the national cooperative institutions), 
there were also a small number of more or less monocultural 
farms which may be differentiated from the former group by 
their permanent or semi-permanent land leases and by the 
allocation of irrigation water. In the northwest, on the 
kurkar ridges south of Ashkelon, there was a southward 
extension of private commercial citrus plantations on the 
lighter sandy soils. But more significant in the light of 
the arguments that were to arise over the question of farm 
organisation in the region were the farms set up by public 
companies or institutions, such as the Ibbim, Goldberg, 
Hazera, Tal Or, and Or Hanner Farms, For the Goldberg Farm, 
to the west of Dorot, capital was provided by foreign 
investors, and production centred on sheep raising, and at 
a later stage, on sugar beet cultivation. Ibbim and Hazera 
were set up by public companies, and both had a semi-
experimental role. Ibbim, near Beror Hayil, had for 
instance a holding of 10,000 dunams, of which a fifth was 
irrigated in 1953/4. Principal crops were : 800 dunams of 
citrus, 170 d of potatoes, 300 d of groundnuts, 240 d of 
vegetables and 100 d of lucerne. Trials of cotton production 
were also in progress. At the Hazera Farm, which was devoted I 
I to seed production, eA'J)eriments were made with the 
acclimatisation and development of strains suited to the 
region. The farm at Or Hanner, set up at a later date (1956) 
was a training farm for an immigrant group, organised by the 
Ichud kibbutz movement, and became a kibbutz in 1957. But 
these farms were of minor importance compared to the emphasis 
given in policy and execution to the cooperative sector. 
There was no intention in the minds of the planners to allow 
the large~scale development of farms using hired labour. 
To sum up, the objectives in agricultural settlement in 
this period were the same as those of Jewish colonisation in 
Palestine : the control of the land by close settlement, the 
most intensive use of the land that was possible, and the 
production of high-value produce through mixed farming. 
The fact that the Northern Negev, with its relatively poor 
resources of irrigation water and rich resources of land, 
might not be well suited to this pattern of development 
received little consideration. The difference in physical 
conditions between the Northern Negev and the other regions 
of the country was acknowledged, but the approach to the 
problem thus posed was via the intensification of irrigation 
in the region, obviously entailing higher real costs of 
production, rather than a radical reappraisal of the 
technique of agricultural settlement. The ideas and 
principles which had been developed during forty years of 
colonisation were almost articles of faith by 1949, and some 
rude shocks were necessary before they could be critically 
appraised. 
Economic and Social Development 
The success of the policy of settling the Northern 
Negev is not only to be determined in terms of th·e development 
of agriculture. It has been seen that there were many 
different purposes behind the agricultural settlement policy, 
such as the need for security, the expansion of production, 
and the economic and social absorption of irnrnigrants iri.to 
the State. In some cases, such as the number of settlements 
built and the volume of production, the results can be 
measured, but in most of the others a q_ualititative estimate 
is all that can be offered. 
The oriental ethnic origins of the settlers directed to 
the moshavim in the Northern Negev suggests that it was the 
conscious policy of the Jewish Agency to people the villages 
of this least developed region with immigrants who had come 
from similar physical environments. At the same time, this 
section of the immigrants was the least able to select for 
itself the role it could play in the Israeli economy and 
society. Like almost all the immigrants, those from North 
Africa and the Middle East brought wi tn them no capital, and 
their skills were usually those of' the petty merchant and 
craftsman - tailoring, metal working - which there was little 
demand for in Israel and which were not encouraged by the 
Government. The settlement of these immigrants, generally 
the most backward in social and educational terms, in the 
Northern Negev was in direct contrast to the progressive~ 
pioneering image and function of the kibbutzim. The kibbutz 
settlers chose the difficult environment of the Northern 
Negev, the moshav settlers were directed to it, and for this 
reason it is understandable that the difficulties of adjustment 
and social development were more severe in the moshavim. 
The moshav settlers lacked the initiative, education and 
agricultural .experience, to say nothing of the financial 
resources (or perhaps more correctly, borrowing ability!) 
to be found in the kibbutz. For all these the moshav settlers 
depended entirely upon the resources of the Settlement 
Department. 
The great speed with which the settlement operation 
was carried out was understandably not matched by the speed 
with which the settlements were provided with their own means 
of support. While the kibbutzim on their own initiative 
developed falha cultivation and, in many cases, small-scale 
industries, to the extent that a shortage of labour was soon 
felt, the moshavim depended upon the Settlement Department 
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for their incomes until such time as their experience was 
greater and their land holdings were installed with irrigation 
facilities. It is apparent that the speed with which the 
settlers ac quired agricultural expertise was a disappointment 
to the authorities : "It is clear that they [the moshav 
settlers J do not learn very q_uickJ.y. Both agricultural 
education and the training of people for public office in 
the villages are longterm tasks" (33). In most cases not 
more than three to five dunams of i rrigated land could be 
provided in the first three or four years, and this was 
inadequate to support a family, however low its standard 
of living. Unfortunately the shortage of labour in the 
kibbutzim and its over-supply in the moshavim were not 
mutually soluble problems , since the kibbutzim, at least 
theoretically, are opposed to the use of hired labour. The 
burden fell upon the Settlement Department of providing 
part- or full-time employment until the moshavim could be 
The great speed with which the settlement operation 
was carried out was understandably not matched by the speed 
with which the settlements were pr ovided with their own means 
of support. While the kibbutzim on their o1Ji1Tl initiative 
developed falha cultivation and, in many cases, small-scale 
industries, to the extent that a shortage of labour was soon 
felt, the moshavim depended upon the Settlement Department 
for their incomes until such time as their experience was 
greater and their land holdings were installed with irrigation 
facilities. It is apparent that the speed with which the 
settlers acquired agricultural expertise was a disappointment 
to the authorities : 11It is clear that they [the moshav 
settlers] do not learn very quickly. Both agricultural 
education and the training of people for public office in 
the villages are longterm tasks" (33). In most cases not 
more than three to five dunams of irrigated land could be 
provided in the first three or four years, and this was 
inadequate to support a family, however low its standard 
of living. Unfortunately the shortage of labour in the 
kibbutzim and its over-supply in the moshavim were not 
mutually soluble problems, since the kibbutzim, at least 
theoretically, are opposed to the use of hired labour. The 
burden fell upon the Settlement Department of providing 
part- or full-time employment until the moshavim could be 
=-
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given adequate means of production. The efforts of the 
Settlement Department in finding and distributing work among 
the settlers were not at first very efficient. The Report of 
Hifal Hanegev for 1952/3 noted that it was not extraordinary 
that there should have been considerable disturbances in the 
moshavim, since many of the settlers were unable to support 
their families vdth the limited outside work that they could 
find. In some villages the problem was overcome by the 
organisation of cultivation by outside bodies or by the 
Settlement Department. It was concluded that the Settlement 
DepaI·tment should take on the taslc of organising outside work, 
and maintaining liaison with such employers as the Jewish 
National Fund (afforestation), Solel Boneh (road construction 
and building), Mekorot, and so forth. It was found advisable 
that the source of work should be near the village, so that 
the villager could continue to worl<:: his own land when 
necessary, and also that the Settlement Department should 
take care that villagers would not be allowed to divert 
their attention away from their holdings in favour of the 
relatively easier and quicker returns of paid employment. 
The incomes of the settlers were in consequence during 
this period not very high, ro~d outside work made up a 
considerable proportion. Data :for the lcibbutzim are notoriously 
diffj_cult to assess, owing to the manner in which they are 
computed ( :36). However the results of a small sample taken 
in 1951/2 are available (Table XIX) . The authors of the 
work in which they were published (37) added t~e rider that 
"with such small numbers, too much significance cannot be 
attached to small differences. However, it would seem that 
the kibbutzim in the Negev have a more difficult time than 
those elsewhere, on the average." 1The average daily income 
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in the 7 older Negev kibbutzim was I£ 3.620, while in kibbutzim 
Table XIX 
12 Negev Kibbutzim: Average Net Income Per Member 's Productive Working Day, 1951/8 
I£ 1.800-2.299 
8.300-2.799 
2. 800-3.299 
3 . 300-3 .799 
3.800-4.299 
4.300-4.799 
Total 
Kibbutzim 
Founded 
1941-47. 
1 
3 
3 
7 
Kibbutzim 
Founded 
1948-58. 
1 
2 
2 
-
5 
Sou~ce: Israel Agriculture 1953/4. 
of the same age elsewhe1.,.e in the country it was I£ 4.60; . 
similarly in the 5 younger Negev kibbutzim the figure was 
I£ 8.650, and in kibbut zim of. the same age elsewhere, 
I£ 3.985. More complete data for five moshavim are to be 
found in the Reports of iufal Hanegev (Table XX). Between 
'I 
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1952/3 and 1953/4 it is noticeable that the importance of 
non-farm income in the income per family declined somewhat, 
but in the fourth year of sett lement the farm income for 
most of these families was still less than two-thirds of the 
total. However, the increas~ in the size of the fa1"'m income 
was, except at .Uvtahim, @ite appreciable. t Bitha, 
average net farm incomes per family increased by 174 %,. while 
non-farm income remained at much the same level. Of course 
a large part of the difference :.n income in these two years 
must be ascribed to the 1952/3 drought. Furthermore Bitha 
is cited in the 1953/4 Report as an example of the benefits 
of the· effic ient and regular provisi on of outside work by the 
settlement author ity, so this moshav cannot be taken as being 
representative. 
Table XX 
Annual Net Income Per Family in 5 Negev Moshav im, 1952/3 
& 195374' 
Farm Income Outside Work Inc. 'lbtal Annual Inc. 195273 1953L4 195273 195374 1952/3 1953/4 
Bitha l I£614 I£1,681 I£880 I£929 I£1,494 I£2,610 !ii vtahim . 221 176 1,221 1,489 1,441 1,665 Peduy:i.m2 480 1,023 386 691 866 1,714 Pattish 500 571 380 1,092 880 1,663 Maslul 730 1,125 500 200 1,230 1,325 
(1) The l a ck of water at Mivtahim prevented farm development. (2) There was a dispute at Pattish at the beginning of 1953/4, between the settlers and the Settlement Department, and as a result there -was no cultivation for one season. 
Source: Reports of Mifa l Hanegev, 1952/3 & 1953/4. 
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If, on the basis of an average of 25 working days per 
month, the average daily income per family is calculated, it 
may be compared with the prevailing wage rates in other 
economic sectors =€Table XXI). In only one case, in 1953/4, 
was the average daily income per family lower than the average 
daily wage of a temporary unskilled agricultural worker (in 
non-cooperative agriculture). But in the non-agricultural 
sector, the average daily wage of an unskilled building labourer 
was greater than the daily income of the average family in four 
Table XXI 
Bitha 
Mivtahim 
Peduyim 
Pattish 
Maslul 
Famil in Five Moshavim 1953 4, in Other Sectors in October 195 
I£ 8.70 
5.55 
5.71 
5.55 
4.L~2 
Temporary unskilled 
agricultural labourer 5.435 
Unskilled building 
labourer 7.141 
. Sources; Moshavim as for Table XX. Other s - Statistical Abstract. 1961. 
out of fi ve ,.o:f these villages. The moshav ·settler s had not come 
within any distance, after four years, of the policJ'· criterion 
that incomes in agricultural settlement should be equal to those 
of skilled urban workers. In fact the moshav family, in which 
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roore than one member was employed in many cases, had a lower 
income, even with the inclusion of wages from outside work, than 
the head of the family could have brought home as an unskilled 
building worker. 
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The number of families leaving the moshavim is another useful, 
but dangerous, index of the success of the settlement process. 
(Data on population losses are not available for the kibbutzim). 
Whether the previously quoted figures of 269 and 306 families 
leaving the moshavim in 1952/3 and 1953/4 are regarded as normal 
or serious losses is purely a matter of subjective judgement. 
But greater significance may be given to the relative losses of 
different villages. But first of all it must be pointed out that 
l oss of population was not entirely a beneficial process in which 
t he chaff was sifted from the g~ain, and the better settlers 
r emained in the villages. Because of their poor mobility in 
a country which was for them an almost totally strange environment, 
t he less resourceful settlers were often left in the moshavim 
while their more enterprising neighbours sought opportunities 
elsewhere. A cas·e in point was t he training of tractor drivers 
and mechanics, of which there was a serious shortage for some time. 
New immigrants, once trained in these trades, tended to seek work 
in other r1 egions, where living c.onditions and other amenities 
were better. 
The already extensive sociological literature relating to the 
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new-immigrant moshavim g ives ample evidence of the complexity 
of the reasons why the immig rant settlers found difficulty in 
adjusting, or failed to adjust to life in the villages (29,38,39). 
One or two cases of Negev moshavim will be described later, and 
it is sufficient here to say that the factors in successful 
social adjustment ranged f r om the initial attitude of the 
settlers, the ways j_n which the Settlement Department administered 
and de'Vel.oped the village and its farms, the emergence or non-
emergence of leaders in the village whose aims were similar to 
those of the Settlement Department, to the natural cohesion of 
the moshav society. Analysis of the numbe r of families leaving 
the moshavim immediately reveals a pattern that can only be 
ascribed to differences in social adjustment in different 
villages (Table XXII). Certainly it cannot have been the 
result of different physical conditions that led two neighbouring 
moshavim, such as Peduyim and Bitha, or Givolim and Shibbolim, 
to lose widely different numbe r s of families. Nor can it be 
said that the rate at which the Settlement Department installed 
irrigation faci~ities in a villag e was i n all cases a primary 
factor in the stability of its population. The falha moshavim 
in the north of the reg ion, which were not -joined to the 
regional water system until 1954/ 5, and had to subsist on 
falha cultivation and outside work for their livelihood, also 
show wide varia tions in population stab ility in 1952/3 and 1953/4. 
Table XXII 
Number of Families Leaving the Moshavim in 1952/3 and 1953/4 
Nevatim 
Tifrah 
Peduyim 
Helets 
Shuva 
Omer . 
Givolim 
Ahuzzam 
Rannen 
Talmei Bilu 
Yakini 
Pa'amei Tashaz 
Yoshivya 
Telamim 
Mivtahim 
Sede Tsui 
Pattish 
Maslul 
Gilat 
Nir Akiva 
Beit Hagadi 
Nir Moshe 
Zerua 
Teashur 
Berosh 
Tekuma 
Shalva · 
Sharsheret 
Bitha 
Melilot 
Shibbolim 
Kokhav 
Uza 
Number of 
Families L_~§_v:i;_:qg 
52 
39 
38 
33 
30 
27 
23 
22 
22 
21 
21 
20 
18 
18 
17 
17 
17 
16 
16 
14 
13 
12 
10 
10 
9 
9 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
3 
Families Resmdent 
At 30. IX. 54. 
83 
51 
38 
33 
56 
27 
36 
70 
69 
39 
69 
42 
69 
75 
87 
57 
96 
75 
81 
38 
87 
41 
49 
18 
49 
62 
55 
61 
86 
44 
58 
56 
73 
Source ; Reports of Mifal Hanegev, 1952/3 and 1953/4. 
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Table XXIII 
Value of Agricultural Produce Marketed by Kibbutzim: 1952/3 & 
1953/4 
120 
1952/3 (Thousand 
I£) 
1953/4 (Thousand 
I£ ) 
% Increase 
Founded before 1948 
Saad 
Gevim 
Nirim 
Tseelim 
Beeri 
Gevulot 
Mi shmar Han eg ev Hatserim 
Founded after 1948 
Magen 
Mefalsim 
Nir Yitshak 
Reim 
Ein Hashelosha Nahal Oz 
Beror Hayil 
Devi1•a 
Kissufim 
TOTAL 
Average for Kibbutzim Founded before 1948: 
Average for Kibbutzim Founde o after 1948: 
139.0 
72.5 
116. O 
79.0 
93.5 
65.0 
74.0 
81. 0 
55.0 
82. 5 
57.0 
70.0 
55.0 
38.0 
34.0 
12.0 
9.0 
1132.5 
90.0 
45.8 
220.0 
186.0 
144.0 
128. 0 
127. O 
115.5 
114. 5 
111. 0 
110.5 
106.0 
97.0 
88.5 
83.0 
59.0 
47.0 
33.0 
18.5 
1788. 5 
143.3 
71.4 
Source: Report of Mifal Hanegev, 1953/~. 
58% 
14~ 
24% 
62% 
25% 
77% 547& 
37fo 
10CP~ 
28% 
71 % 
26% 
50;i 
55% 
38% 
1 7 c:;;;6 
105% 
59% 
I I 
In the western group - Helets, Telamim, and Kokhav - the 
number of families leaving in these two years were 33, 18, 
and 3~ in the similarly placed eastern group - Uza, Ahuzzam 
and Shalva - they were O, 22, and 6, respectively. Here is 
clear evidence, if that were needed, of the opinion of many 
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in the Settlement Department that the success and agricultural 
development of new immigrant moshavim are almost entirely 
dependent upon social factors within the villages and in the re-
lations between the villages and the Settlement Department. 
However, bearing in mind the small nu~ber of moshavim involved 
and the variations among them, it is possible to say that the 
moshavim in the more marginal areas - Omer, Nevatim, Mivtahim 
- and some of those in which irrigation had not been developed 
Helets, Ahuzzam, and Telamim - had relative rates of loss 
varying from average to high, so that for these few a degree 
of correlation between the difficulties of the physical 
environment and settlement stability may be assumed. 
While the population data for the kibbutzim do not permit 
a similar analysis, a picture of the variations in the scale 
and expansion of agricultural developnmt,.tibtained from data 
on the marketing of agricultural produce in 1952/3 and 1953/4 (Table XXIII) would appear to indicate that the age of the 
settlement and social, or at least non-environmental,' factors 
were dominant. Although the table does not include all the 
I 
I 
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kibbutzim of' the region, there· is clear evidence that the 
older ones led the rest in the value of agricultural production 
by a wide margin. Since most settlements in the southern part 
of the region wefe cultivating land in the north, in the Faluja 
and Bureir areas, no correlation can saf'ely be made with 
location. However t h is situation, which enabled the kibbutzim 
to balance the relative disadvantages, if' any, of their 
location by expanding falha cultivation elsewhere, permits the 
conclusion that the differences between settlements of the same 
age are to be ascribed to differences in initiative, and similar 
social factors. For instance, Saad and Beeri, founded in 1947 
and 1946 less than ten kilometres apart, marketed produce in 
1953/4 to a value of' I£220,000 and I£127,000, respectively. 
Among the younger kibbutzim, Devira and Nahal Oz, both founded 
in 1951, marketed produce valued at I£59,000 and I£33,000, 
respectively. 
From oral evidence too, it is clear that the stability 
in the population of the kibbutzim was highly variable. This, 
and the rate .of economic development in the kibbutzim, are 
popularly equated with the different political-ideological 
kibbutz movements, which stretch from the Marxist left wing 
of the Rashomer Ratzair/Kibbutz Artzi, through the centre 
group of Kibbutz Hameuchad, to the right wing, .formed by the 
Ichud Hakibbutzim Vehakvutzot. Here it is difficult and 
' . , 
J 
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dangerous to generalise. Further evidence on this point will 
be given in the following chapter. 
Conclusions 
It will be remarked that estimates of the total costs 
and expected returns of the settlement operation have not 
been offered here, and moreover, they were not ma0e, in the 
strict sense of profit and loss, by the settlement authorities. 
Agricultural settlement had been carried out during the Mandate, 
at the behest of Zionist policy, with little or no regard to 
economic profitability. This state of affairs also characterised 
national economic and particularly agricultural settlement 
planning after 1948. The usual answer of the Israeli 
authorities to criticisms on this score, and in itself it is 
a valid answer, is that agricult1real settlement, for instance, 
performs other functions than the production of goods, functions 
whose value cannot be measured in monetary terms. Thus the 
kibbutzim patrol and defend the frontiers; the moshavim and 
the kibbutzim, by settling the land, redeem Eretz Israel (the 
Land of Israel) for her people and create a 'healthy' population. 
An outside observer cannot but accept these aims, for without 
them the birth and existence of the State of Israel are 
incomprehensible. But he can ask, as several critics have done, 
whether the means employed to reach them are the most effective 
and efficient, under the existing conditions of a particular 
12L~ 
period. Strict economic appraisal of costs and benefits is 
also hampered by the fact that economic life in Israel is 
characterised by a full, if not excessive, ran ge of open and 
concealed subsidies, fixed and guaranteed prices, export 
premiums and import quotas, which make the cone ept of 
profitability, as it is known in a more or less open market, 
very hard to apply. However, some rough estimates of the 
relative profitability of the agricultural settlement programme ? 
in this region can be made with the help of evidence provided 
by critics more qua lified than the present writer, and they 
are given in the :ta.:st, chapter. 
The expansion of settlement and agriculture between 1949 
and 1954 in the Northern Negev might not inaccurately be 
described as a crash programme. Between the general national 
goals to be achieved over a period of years, outlined in the 
1950 Settlement Plan, and the execution of s ettlement there 
was a wide gap not bridg ed by precise regional planning . 
Time was short - the immigrants had to be removed from the 
inactivity and undesirable conditions of the ma 'abarot and 
settled · on the land or in the towns. The strategic weakness 
of the r egion had to be eliminated. It is therefore easy to 
understand that energies were turne d to the t a sk of constr uct i on 
rather than to more long-term consider ations. It has been 
seen that settlement was expanded in piecemea l f a shion: the 
. . . . . . . . ~-~ ~ ~~v" 
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kibbutzim along the frontiers, the moshavim along the pipelines 
of the regional water network. Little was achieved in the way 
of creating links between the villages and the towns~ or of 
integrating facilities for those villages that were not in 
isolation. The kibbutzim provided. services as they required 
them within each settlement, and this made possible their 
existence in isolated locations but separated them from their 
neighbours when they were not isolated. The moshavim at this 
stage, although they were established in groups,were planned 
to have nec~sary services - a village store, health clinic, 
synagogue, dairy etc. - within each village. Thus little 
physical expression of interchange between individual villages 
1
.i as planned at this time, and each village was to carry the 
full bur•den of amenities and services. 
After 1951 the construction of new settlements declined 
greatly as the rate of immigration fell. In the light of the 
fact that many settlements, especially the kibbutzim, could 
have productively absorbed a higher input of investment in 
irrigation, i~ might be argued that settlement should have been 
phased so as to ensure fuller development in a smaller number 
of villages. Reinforcement for this argument would appear to 
h·ave been provided by the gap between the planned capacity of 
the villages and the actual population at the end of this period. 
But this is argument from hindsight. It was assumed after 
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Independence that im.rnigration would continue for several years 
on a much greater scale than proved to be the case. In fact 
by the end of the period the Government started to urge 
Israelis living in the towns to migrate to the areas of new 
settlement, to add a necessary leaven to the population of 
oriental immigrants, and also, one might guess, to fill the 
gaps left by declining immig ration. Two of' the 'Shoval' group 
of moshavim were in fact settled by participants in the "Town 
to Village" movement. 
Development in this period was most rapid in the kibbutzim. 
They were able to take advantage of the limited range of opport-
unities available in the region, principally falha cultivation. 
The moshavim, because of the limitations of their social 
organ isation and lack of experience were only able to en gage 
in falha cultivation with outside help. The difficulties of 
introducing oriental immigr ants to the life and work of the 
moshav were legion throughout Israel, but the further problem 
of the lack of other opportunities in the Northern Negev made 
the situation .critical there. The vast majority of the 
settlers depended for the greater part of their income on 
outside work , and this was not alv:ra;ys forthcoming. 
By 1954 the region was more than ready for the second 
stage in the development fun its water supply, which remained 
the key to agricultural development. Few settlements had 
more than a token of the allocation of irrigated land needed 
for their agricultural . development, and this factor was not 
insignificant in creating instability in the villages. The 
second stage was the diversion of the waters of the Yarkon, 
sixty kilometres to the north, for the use of the settlements 
of the Southern Coastal Plain and the Northern Negev. 
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1955- 196J 
Chapter IV 
The tremendous elan with which the problems of mass immigration, national defence, land settlement, and general economic development were attacked in the yearsafter Indepen-dence, admirable as it was, gave rise within a short time to serious economic problems. A rapid rate of inflation was induced, little reduction in the extremely large trade deficit was eff'ected , and most pertinent here, in some branches of the agricultural sector signs of actual or incipient over-production were visible. There also occurred a great decline in the number or immigrants entering the country annually, and although there was a rise from the low of 1953 to a new peak in 1957, immigration did not achieve the massive pro-portions reached in the years 1948-1951. There was, there~ fore, an opportunity for reflection upon the nature and scale of agricultural settlement, and powerful reasons for making a reappraisa~ of economic policy. The course of settlement and agricultural development in Israel after 1954 is charac-terised by the readjustments made necessary on the one hand by external economic circumstances and on the other by the experience obtained so far and the results of the development of the preceding years. In the changes of policy which took 
, 30 
place, a major part was played by the region here examined, 
for within it lay "some of the major policy decisions in 
agriculture in Israel" ( 40). 
Agricultural and Settlement Policy 
There is little question that the ideal type of agricul-
ture for the Jewish settlements before ,948 was that based 
upon mixed farming. Production centred around livestock was 
well suited to the needs of the co-operative and communal 
villages which, under the influence of social ideology, eco-
nomic and political necessity, and physical conditions, became 
characteristic of Jewish agr i culture in Palestine. The live-
stock branches provided a more or less steady source of in-
come and employment through the seasons of the year, which 
is as desirable for the family farm as for the kibbutz, both 
of which have fixed labour forces to the extent that they 
adhere to the principle of self-labour. Mixed farming, with 
the aid of irrigation is also one of the few possible solu-
tions to the problem of obtaining a high standard of living 
from agriculture under Israel's physical conditions. The 
alternative to the extensive (though not necessarily large) 
Arab fellah farm is irrigated cultivati'on of an intensive 
tyPe and it must be a high-cost method of production when 
water is scarce and generally below the level of the irrigable 
;t . 
o · 
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1 land, and when the heavy costs of land clearing, reclama-
tion, and conservation have to be met. In consequence the 
value of farm produce must be high. During the Second World 
war economic conditions in Palestine gave much support to 
such production, ·to say nothing of a Jewish population which 
could be coerced, if need beJ into buying Jewish farm 
produce (26,p.99). 
But after 1948 the economic context of agricultural 
production changed radically. Deprived of the economic sup-port of the British Mandatory Government, Israel had to 
achieve economic development by her own resources, and these 
were by no means great. One of the most critical symptoms of 
economic imbalance was the national trade deficit, which, 
although it improved slightly after devaluation in 1952, was 
almost as large in 1955 as it had been in 1950. The value of 
2 imports in the farmer year was in fact greater than in 1950 (Table I). The agricultural sector, in its demand for im-ported animal fodder, and by virtue of the fact that it 
( 1) The average height of land suitable for irrigated culti-vation is 100m; the. distribution of Israel's water resour-ces, at the surface, is as follows: , 7% below sea level, 70% at sea level, and only 23~{; above ~ea level, but not above 55 m (41 ). (2) It had been estimated by the Economic Research Section of the Prime Minister's Office in 1950 that the value of exports in 1953 would be equal to 47% of the value of imports (42). 
' I 
supplied 70% of the food consumed nationally by value, but 
only 30% of the calories consumetil.. (42), was obviously a 
first target for reform. Whether mixed farming was theore-
tically ideal or not, it was clearly providing little assis-
tance in the solution of the nation's economic difficulties. 
It was not until the Spring of 1952 that much attention 
was diverted from the execution of agricultural settlement 
and development to these problems of policyo The situation 
was well analysed at the time by A.G. Black, the F.A.O. repre-
sentative in Israel: "Despite the tremendous changes in the 
needs of the country [after Independence] and in the kinds 
of problems to be solved, agricultural development proceeded 
as though nothing had happened. The speed of development was 
increased and efforts were made to expand irrigation more ra-
pidly. New settlements were founded by the score. But these 
all represented a multiplication of efforts directed along 
the same prewar lines. It was not realised •••• that the begin-
ning of the State changed the nature of the agricultural 
problems. Agriculture, to fulfil its responsibilities, had 
to be redirected toward meeting the new requirements. Set-
tlement, while urgent, was no longer a need in itself, but a 
means to an end, namely the production of foodstuffs in quan-
tity and of a kind needed in the new economy; produced under 
methods that used local resources to a maximum and demanded 
foreign imports . to a minimum •••• No thought was given, until 
recently, to the question [of] what kind and system of farming 
' 
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Table I. 
Israel's Balance of Trade, 1950-1960 ('I£ thousand) 
Exports as % Imports Exports Deficit of Imports 
1950 540,584 63,264 477,320 11. 7% 
1952 580,070 78,281 501, 789 13. 5% 
1954 517,046 155,340 361,706 30,0% 
1956 676,068 191, 702 484,366 28.4% 
1958 757,675 250,383 507,292 33.0% 
1960 892,290 377,599 514,691 42.3% 
Source; Statistical Abstract No.12, 1961. 
was necessary to produce efficiently those products now most 
needed. Formerly the problem of farm organisation had been 
to establish types of farming that would.yield a minimum 
standard of living to a family up~n the smallest area of land. 
Now the problem has become what is the type of farm organisa-
tion that will most efficiently produce those things most 
needed by the nation" (42). The relevance of this to the 
activities of Mifal Hanegev, and particularly to the esta-
blishment of small family farms in a region wher e the resources 
of cultivable land were almost large enough to be an em-
barrassment, is clear. 
By 1952/3 the results of unrestricted expansion in 
mixed farming were already apparent. In that year there was 
serious over-production of vegetables, and the production of 
milk and eggs had reached the capacity of the domestic market. 
Since the ppospects of exporting these products were almost 
non-existent, and in the light of the national agricultural 
policy of guaranteeing the income of the agricultural set-
tlement sector, the Government was compelled to introduce 
subsidies and to try to restrict production in these branches. 
This situation had greater relevance for the kibbutzim 
of the Northern Negev than the moshavim, as investment in the 
latter had not been of more than token proportions in the 
livestock branches. But the authorities were compelled to seek 
alternative avenues of development for the new settlements, 
13:5 
before these added to the pr.oblem of production surpluses. 
Alternative channels were not numerous. The relative profi-
tability of grain production, for bread and feedstuffs, was 
low compared to irrigated crops, and the national consump-
tion of wheat, for example, was far greater than could be 
supplied from Israel's limited resources of land. In fact 
the planners turned to the so-called industrial crops and, 
later, to citrus fruit. Trials of sugar beet and grounanuts had been made since 1950, and trials of cotton production were 
started in 1953-4, and these met with some success. These 
crops, together with flax, sunflower, safflower, potatoes, 
and others, had the advantages of substituting for imported 
raw materials for industry, animal feedstuffs, and some 
foods, thus cutting foreign currency expenditure while in-
creasing domestic processing activity. Citrus, in contrast, is a net fureign currency earner. 
In January 1953 the Joint Planning Centre prepared a new Agricultural Development Plan, incorporating the desired 
changes in the pattern of production and in the foreign trade balance. Three versions of the Plan were drawn up in 1953, 
as considerable alterations to the earlier plans had to be 
made because of sharp criticism (43). The final version (known as Plan 'C'), as was customary in national planning, 
took the form of physical goals to be attained at a given 
stage of population growth. In this case the production 
.J 
targets were set for the time when the Israel population 
would number two million, estimated to be in, or near, 1960. 
The production goals were expressed in the form of the crop 
areas to be achieved in the final year of the Plan: a se-
lection of these is given in Table II. 
The American agronomist M. M. Clawson. who was a member 
of the Economic Advisory Staff attached to the Prime Minister's 
Office at this time, pointed out in a devastating critique 
of Israeli agricultural planning methods that "these Plans do 
not contain details by regions". Re was told by the planners 
that regional adaptability - climate, soils, etc. - were 
considered in planning, but Clawson found that "there is 
little or none of this in the plans as written. The planners 
feel it is just a matter of breaking down the national totals 
into regional totals" (43). Nevertheless, when the plans 
were broken down regionally, there did emerge for the first 
time a. planned pattern of regional crop differentiation. 
This differentiation was expressed in the form of new farm 
tyPes for existing and future moshavim in certain regions, 
farm tyPes which embodied the changes necessitated by the 
national economic situation. Althou~h the distribution of the 
new farm types was in some degree effected in accordance 
with the different physical conditions of the regions, it is 
a matter for conjecture, as the following lines will show, 
whether this was deliberate. 
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Table II. 
Some National Irri ated Cro Achieved At the End of Plan 
Sugar Beet 
Groundnuts 
Cotton 
Sovm Pasture 
Green Fodder 
Veg. & Potatoes 
Total Irrigated Field Crops & Vegetables 
Crop Area in 1952/3 
4,400 dunams 
21,500 
14,400 
65,045 
230,000 
373,000 dunams 
Areas To Be 
C c.1 0 
Planned at End of Plan 'c' (c.1960) 
95,000 dunams 
290,000 dunams 
70,000 
72,000 
21$2,000 
2.30, OOO 
2,182,000 dunams 
Sources: 1952/3 crop areas - Statistical Abstract No.12. targets of Plan 'C' - M.M. Clawson (43) 
Just as the policy of changing the population distri-
bution of the country was carried out, and still is, by 
channelling new immigrants directly to the development areas, 
rather than by transferring sections of the 'veteran' urban 
population, so the new agricultural policy was carried out 
by changes in the 'new', post-1948, farm sector rather than 
in the older settlements. The latter were almost all well 
established in mixed farming, and it was not considered ad-
visable to create a major upheaval, with a resultant waste 
of resources and investments, by altering the structure of 
these farms . It was much easier to alter the farm structure 
of the new villages, where investment so far had not been 
large, and chiefly confined to irrigation facilities . The 
kibbutzim, being composed of ideologically-oriented European 
settlers for the most part, were less easily diverted from 
mixed farming, and the attempt was not made. In any case, 
with their large land holdings, the kfbbutzim could alter 
their cropping plans to include the new crops without major 
alterations in farm organisation. The new plans therefore 
affected the new immigrant moshavim more than any other sector; 
the southern Coastal Plain and the Nor~hern Negev were the 
principal areas of new moshav settlement f or which agricul-
tural replanning could be carried out on a large scale, as 
there were no pockets of establ ished moshavim to take into 
account. Thus it was the new moshavim in Southern Israel 
which bore the brunt of the changes in agricultural policy. 
Plans for new farm types were proposed in 1953 by 
R. Weitz, the Director of the Settlement Department (44, 45). 
Replanning the moshav farm unit was not easy, because the 
limited land resources of a holding designed to be worked by, 
and to support, a single family could not accommodate a 
compromise between mixed farming and industrial field crops. 
If major emphasis was to be given to field crops, then the 
livestock branches dependent upon irrigated fodder had to be 
excluded. The new farm type for the moshav described by 
eitz in his articles was called the 'meshek hasadeh': the 
field-crop farm. Dispensing with milk production, and to a 
large extent with poultry, the field-crop farm was to produce, 
on 30-33 dunams of irrigated land at full development, crops 
of sugar beet~groundnuts, cotton, secondary 'cash' crops of 
vegetables and potatoes, with 5 dunams of irrigated fruit. 
This farm type, which became the characteristic unit of the 
moshavim of the Northern Negev, and of further new settlement 
in the area, was also to be the subject of fierce dispute. 
But before considering the field-crop farm controversy, it is 
necessary to describe the developments in settlement policy, 
as these were intimately r~lated to the changes in agricul-
tural policy. 
Settlement in the region up to 1954 had centred on the 
Gaza-Beersheba Basin and the coastal belt south of Ashkelon. 
The reasons for this stemmed partly from the need, for se-
curity reasons, to settle the Basin and the frontiers as 
rapidly as possible, and partly from the fact that the plans 
for the transfer inland of the regional water resources lo-
cated in the coastal belt had centred,for historical reasons 
outlined in Chapter II, on the Basin rather than on the area 
irmnediately to the east of the coastal belt . The little 
settlement that had taken place in this inland plain was 
mostly of pre-1948 date, and this was entirely north of the 
Ashkelon- Beit Guvrin road. Such villages - Gat, Gal On , Beer 
Tuvia, etc. - had their own water supplies from local wells. 
To the south of the road only the handful of 1falha' moshavim 
had been established since Independence, under the auspices 
of Mifal Hanegev. The inadequate facilities for development 
here, noted in the previous chapter, that resulted from the 
non-inclusion of this part of the region in the Negev Regional 
Water Project, were a brake upon the foundation of additional 
villages in the inland coastal plain, and,in greater degree, 
in the Shephela. 
The Yarkon-Negev pipeline, long planned, was nearing 
completion in 1954. By means of two 6611 pipes along the 
eastern and western sides of the 6oastal Plain it was planned 
to bring, in the final stage, some 100 million m3 per year 
from the perennial flow of the Yarkon springs to irrigate land 
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between the Yarkon and the Negev. This represented in the 
first stage, scheduled for 1956, an increase in the water 
supply of the area south of the Ashkelon-Beit Guvrin road of 35 million m3 per year (3). Such an increase permitted, 
though it did not require, the establishment of new villages. 
There was also between 1954 and 1~57 a steady increase in 
immigration, at first mainly from North Africa and latterly 
from Poland and other r~astern European countries (Table III). 
The scale of this immigration at no point reached that of 
the immediate post-Independence years, ·but it. did provide 
human material for further agricultural settlement, especially 
as regards the North Africans , who could be directed on 
arrival to agricultural settlement more easily than the Eu-
ropeans. The third justification for new settlement was once 
more security, combined with the policy of population disper-
sal and development areas. Infiltration still continued in 
the Northern Negev, until the Sinai Campaign in 1956, on a 
serious scale. The inland plain to the north, where the 
distance between the Gaza Strip and the Jordanian frontier 
was no greater, was thinly populated and vulnerable. This 
part of the inland plain, which is nearer to the Yarkon sources 
than the Gaza-Beersheba Basin, gave scope for settlement 
expansion, and was considered a strategic weakness in its 
existing state (46). In the event of a military attack, the 
Table III 
1955 
1956 
1957 
·1958 
1959 
1960 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
Immigration 1955-1960 
Gross Total 
Jewish Immigrants 
36,303 
54,925 
69,733 
25,919 
22,987 
23,487 
Net Jewish 
MigrB.'tion Balance 
+ 31,164 
+i.43,801 
+ 61,113 
+ 14,553 
+ 14,700 
+ · 17,283 
Immigrants' Continent of Birth,% of Gross Total Immigrants. 
America & 
Oceania 
1. 7% 
1 .1 
1.3 
3.1 
66.8% 
71.0 
Eurppe 
5.4% 
12. 2% 
56.2 
52.6 
Africa 
. 89.3% 3.6% 81.7 5.0 
34.9 7.6 
15.0 29.3 
33.2% 
29.0 
Jewish Population at 31.XII.54 : 1,526,009 Jewish Population at 31~XII.60 1,911,189 
Sources: Statistical Abstract No.12. 1961. 
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capture of this area by Arab forces, from the east or the 
west, might cut communications between the Gaza-Beersheba 
Basin and the rest of the country. And in the Basin the most 
favourable soils, the loess and loess-like, had largely been 
settled. lviajor expansion of settlement in this part of the 
region would therefore have to have been in the southern and 
less favourable marginal areas: marginal with regard to 
rainfall as well as soils . It.was therefore decided that the 
assumed future water surplus from the Yarkon Project should 
be devoted to the expansion of settlement to the north of 
the Basin. 
A settlement plan was drawn up :for the area bounded in 
the south by the Basin, in the east by the Jordanian frontier, 
in the west by the sea, and in the north by the Nahal Hala. 
This region, which was given the name Revel} Lachish, thus 
included part of the area formerly in the control of Mifal 
Hanegev, i. e. the inland plain and Shephela between the 
Ashkelon-Beit Guvrin road and the northern edge of the Gaza-
Beersheba Basin. At this time the Settlement Department 
assumed complete responsibility for the Negev region, and this 
was thereafter known as Hevel Hanegev. 
By 1954, when the plans f or the settlement of Hevel 
Lachish were on the drawing board, the pressure on the 
(1) hevel = region. 
' 
· . ~
..J& 
settlement authorities had greatly eased. No longer was 
immigration so large that new settlers had to be housed in 
temporary camps or live in tents while their villages were 
under construction. Complete housing units could be built, 
and thorough farm planning carried out, before the new 
settlers arrived. This, and the need to include the new 
agricultural policy provisions, enabled the Settlement Depart-
ment to plan on a more comprehensive scale, with the help 
of the experience obtained previously. For the first time 
there emerged a settlement plan that embodied regional prin-
ciples and which took into account the creation of integrated 
rural and urban settlement. The ideas and principles which 
went into the making of Hevel Lachish have been fully des-
cribed elsewhere, and there is no need for more than a short 
sunnnary here ( 46,47,48). 
It had been found that a single isolated moshav was 
economically unable to maintain an adequate range of essential 
services - primary school, health clinic, etc. - in the early 
stages of development, at the least, and that the policy of 
populating a village with settlers of common ethnic origins, 
although it provided a measure of social stability, did not 
help to promote cultural exchange with 'the rest of the popu-
lation. It was eminently desirable to promote such exchange 
in order to integrate new immigrants into the social, cultu-
ral, and economic life of the country, and to prevent the 
moshavim from becoming backwaters which would facilitate 
11 the transplantation to Israel soil at'diaspora ways and cus-
toms, of family rivalries and struggles for communal supremacy" 
(49, p.117). The solution to this problem was sought in the 
Lachish plan by grouping five or six moshavim around a runal 
centre, which would contain such services as a primary school, 
a health clinic, cooperative packing and marketing facilities, 
and also housing for the 'veteran' Israeli officials employed 
by the Government and the Settlement Department in the villages 
and in the centre. In this way the burden of providing for 
essential services was to be shared between several vj.llages, 
and economies of scale could be introduced. 
The Lachish Region, and subsequently the Negev H.egion, 
were planned to produce the new industrial crops, and the 
majority of the moshavim in both became, or were established 
as, field-crop villages. This required a reorientation in 
the economic services of the agricultural sector, since the 
new crops were for the most part bulky and needed local pro-
cessing, unlike the products 01"' mixed farming which could be 
sent directly to the central urban markets. There was con-
sequently a need for processing facilities within the Regions, 
and to this end, the moshavim with their rural centres were 
grouped around regional towns. For Hevel Lachish a new town 
was planned for this purpose: Kiryat Gat. As well as being 
the focus for processing agricultural products , Kiryat Gat 
was also designed to provide the normal functions and services 
of a regional town: large shops, banks, Government offices , 
a hospital, secondary school, etc •• This integrated regional 
pattern of settlement was called the 'composite rural structure' . 
Within Revel Hanegev there was also a reorientation of 
settlement policy, as the diversion of agricultural develop-
ment in the villages towards industrial crops and the general 
problem of services in the moshavim were also operative there . 
In this case a regional town existed, Beersheba, but its 
location was peripheral. Urban development in Hevel Hanegev 
was therefore based upon a number of smaller towns. Two of 
these were planned on the sites of the Settlement Department's 
tractor stations at Imara (Ofakim) and Beit Hagadi (Azzata1) . 
Ofakim, Azzata, and the third new town, Shderot, were all on 
or near the main regional road between Ashkelon and Beersheba, 
and the distances between them were roughly proportional to 
their planned size. 
Specifically in the Lachish plan and more loosely in the 
Negev Region, there thus emerged for the first time an ex-
plicit attempt to create regional entities and to provide the 
physical means for regional integration. Through the change 
( 1) Azzata is also known as Netivot. 
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to industrial crops there came also a measure of regional 
crop differentiation, between the South and the central and 
northern Coastal Plain, since in the latter the emphasis was 
maintained on citrus and mixed farming. This distinction was 
by no means complete, as the kibbutzim, while they expanded 
the cultivation of industrial crops. still retained their 
livestock branches. And at a deeper level it can be argued 
that the spreading of water resources expressed in the diver-
sion of the waters of the Yarkon implied an attempt to equalise 
the difference between the South and the rest of the country, 
so that there was as much change effected in the physical 
resource-pattern as there was adaptation of agricultural plans 
to the inherent conditions of the regions. This is reinforced 
by the policy of water subsidies for the South. 
To sum up, the new direction in agricultural policy was 
the joint result of overdevelopment in mixed farming, relative 
to the domestic market, and of the need to readjust Israeli 
agriculture to the economic realities of her independent 
existence as a self-supporting State. (Perhaps the term 
self-supporting should be qualified, as the financial aid of 
Diaspora Zionists and German reparations has been a key factor 
in the remarkable economic development ·of the State. ) •rhe 
further expansion which took place in the settlement of the 
region, and the changes in irrigated land use, were motivated 
by the traditional estimation of agriculture as inherently 
socially beneficial and by the assumed value of settlement 
as an effective defence measure, as much as by economic factors . For Clawson in 1953, with an access to sources of information which was and is not possible for outside obser-
vers, came to the conclusion that there were no economic grounds whatever for establishing new villages south of the Yarkon from that time until the population of' Israel had 
reached at least 2. 5 million (40) . He estimated that the 
ava il.able water resources of the country, until such time as the Jordan's flow was utilised, would only suffice to complete the allocations of irrigated land for existing settlements. Furthermore, he round. that an economically sound distribution 
of these water resources, i.e. their use as near to the source 
of supply as possible, would provide enough water to irrigate 
all the irrigable land as far south as Beer Tuvia or Ashkelon, but no further . The expansion of settlement in Hevel Lachish 
was therefore contrary to Clawson's advice, and did not re-present the most profitable use, in economic terms, of water 
resources. 
The radical changes in the pattern of moshav farming 
which were called for by the 'meshek hasadeh' became the focus 
of a lengthy public controversy. The chief advocate f or the defence was the Director of the Settlement Department, R. Weitz, and those for the opposition, A.G. Black and ivl . M. Clawson. 
The latter were Joined by some of the veteran moshav set-
tlers, who objected, largely .on social grounds, to the aban-
donment of dairy farming, but their arguments can hardly be 
considered relevant to the realities of the situation. In 
his early articles (44, 45) and in his book (50), WEitz sets 
forth the justification for using the moshav unit in field-
crop production, while Black, in his ~eport (42) made in 
~953 and in a later seminar paper (51), and Clawson, in a 
series of memoranda to the director of the Economic Advisory 
Staff (40, 43, 52, 53, 54, 55) argued a generally objective 
case against the methods of Israeli agricultural planning and 
development in general, and in particular questioned the 
fitness of the moshav unit to carry out the tasks it was giveno 
For a full account of the dispute, the literature, with 
the exception of Glawson's memoranda, is freely available, 
so that a full rehearsal is unnecessary. Some of Black and 
Clawson's fears and recommendations must be given here, how-
ever, since it is against them that the success of the 
'meshek Hasadeh' policy must be judged. The first point at 
issue was wh_ether the field-crop unit was capable of meeting 
the needs, and properly employing the capacities, of the 
moshav farmer. It has already been seen that the livestock 
b~anches of the old moshav formed a key feature of the farm 
organisation and were tailored to the family unit. Could 
field crops be grown on small units and provide an equally 
satisfactory distribution of labour input and income? Could 
industrial field crops be grown economically on small plots, 
and would they provide an adequate annual income to the 
farmer? The new immigrant farmers had no, or very little, 
previous agricultural experience, and there were therefore 
no specifically inhibitory agricultural traditions to overcome, 
as there are in most underdeveloped peasant communities. 
But their lack of experience alone would take years to over-
come. Black was highly critical, and in 1957, long after the 
policy had been put into action, was still calling for radical 
changes: "Size of holdings ••• has been determined by settle-
ment policies growing out of ideological trends conceived 
long before technological progress reached its present level. 
Thus, thousands of immigrants have been allotted smallholdings 
which, because of their size, can most efficiently produce 
products already in surplus [vegetables, dairy produce, eggs, 
etc] ••• It is physically difficult - if not impossible - to 
produce the most needed [industrial] crops with any degree 
of efficiency -0n these small farms; and unless such products 
are produced by the most advanced methods, costs are so high 
as to become prohibitive" (51). There was no doubt that the 
kibbutzim, with their large land units and high - even ex-
cessive - level of mechanization, could meet these require-
ments. In the moshav there was less cer tainty, since the 
15:1 
villagers cultivate with animals and the labour of the 
family rather than With tractors and machinery, and the lar-
gest possible area in a family unit of 35 arable dunams that 
can be devoted to a single crop i~ at. the most 10 or 12 
dunams, and the customary area is 6 dunams. Black recom-
mended that, in view of the social and military desirability 
of settlement in villages, these should be established, but 
that the social and agricultural organisation should be on 
the lines of a 'corporate' farm, with cultivation directed 
, by experienced executives and using the wage-labour of the 
villagers. This, Black thought in 1953, was the only method 
by which the economic necessity of producing industrial 
crops at costs equal to or lower than the world market price 
could be satisfied (42) . 
Clawson's position was somewhat different 1. In his 
examination of the problems of and policy for the area south 
of the Yarkon River, which he noted was "the only area where 
a significant number of additional settlements are possible2", 
he came to the conclusion that there was no point in trying 
to convert _the Israeli authorities to agricultural develop-
ment that included the use of wage-labour. He accepted the 
(1) It is not evident from the literature that Clawson ad-
vocated wage-labour as a practical possibility, as Rubner 
(26, p.109) sws he did. 
(2) One can only imagine Clawson's reactions to the recent 
expansion of 'agricultural' settlement in the hills of 
Galilee, Adullam, and the Jerusalem Corridor! 
broad goals of Israeli agriculture and its social and ideo-
logical basis, limiting himself to recommendations con-
cerning "the timing of specific programs , the means of reaching 
broad goals, and costs in relation to benefits" ( 40). His 
chief proposal - that new settlement south of the Yarkon 
should not be undertaken, and failing that, that only a 
maximum of ten new villages should be established - has been 
mentioned. He agreed with Black that field-crop farms implied 
larger units of cultivation and to this end drew up a scheme 
of moshav farm organisation, based upon what he regarded as 
the key to the economic success of agricultural development 
in the region: the most economical use of water, or "how to 
obtain the cheapest possible water for the Negev, under the 
circumstances as they exist, and how to make the most econo-
mical use of the available and necessaFily costly water" . 
It is noteworthy that Olawson's proposals, which were 
not in general incompatible with Israeli official policy, were 
based firmly upon the water-cost factor, giving it an impor-
tance which it has not been accorded before or since. Clawson 
advocated, in place of the 'meshek hasadeh' of 33-35 irrigated 
dunams, a larger arable unit of 49 dunams with a system of 
cultivation which combined the virtues of greater economies 
in water per dunam and a rotation that would permit pre-
irrigation in the winter off-peak season. 
Little came of the criticisms made by Black and Clawson. But while they had no immediate practical effect, they do provide a criterion for estimating the economic success of the new agricultural policy in this region. 
~urthermore, recent trends in agricultural policy, which will be outlined in the next chapter, do bear evidence of similar lines of thought. 
The Settlement Operation 
The necessary condition for the further expansion of irrigation in the existing settlements and for the establish-ment of new settlements in the region was a large increase in the region's water supplies. This was effected through the Yarkon-Negev Pipeline, which was nearing completion, in its first stage, by 1955. This stage consisted of the construc-tion of the eastern 6611 pipe from the Yarkon, which traversed the Coastal Plain and joined the legev Regional Project in the Gevim area. The annual output of the Yarkon springs was at that time estimated to be 218 million m3 per year, and in 
3 the first stage (1956) some 75 million m were to be pumped southward: a little over half of this was ·earmarked for set-tlements in the Coastal Plain, and the rest (35 million m3 ) for Lachish and the Northern Negev. The additional distri-butory pipes for the Northern Negev, such as the Shoval line, and the enlargement of the main Tekuma-£'1Iagen pipe had been 
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finished by 1955, and in that year construction started on 
the Lachish regional network (3) . 
Between 1955 and 1960 a total of 19 new settlements were 
founded within the region, together with four towns and five 
rural centres . This brought the total number of villages to 
89, made up by 33 kibbutzim, 51 moshavim, 4 moshavim shitufiim, 
and 1 Nahal settlement . The new settlements were composed of 
13 moshavim , 2 kibbutzim, 3 moshavim shitufiim, and 1 Nahal 
settlement . Most of them were in the Lachish Region . (It 
will be remembered that the region defined here includes only 
a part of Hevel Lachish: in ~achish north of the Beit Guvrin-
Ashkelon road another four settlements were established at 
this time, giving Revel Lachish as a whole 53 agricultural 
settlements , some of which were transferred from the former 
area of Mifal Hanegev). New settlement in Revel Lachish 
began in 1955, a large part of the construction work having 
been completed before the settlers arrived. The new moshavim 
were located for the most part in the inland plain south and 
west of the former Arab towns of .b1aluja and Iraq_ el uanshiya. 
The site of the latter was taken for the new regional town of 
the Lachish tlegion, Kiryat Gat . Two groups of moshavim es-
31ablished by Mifal Hanegev already existed in the inland plain. 
To the Uza-Ahuzzam group of falha moshavim were now added 
Noam and Eitan, making a group of five. A r ural centre, ~"'ven 
Shmuel, was established at the centre of this group, at a 
j 
' l •1 • 
. r 
. { 
,,,I '' • J ... ~ 
V 
,"! l. 
L,1 
,.) 
fl 
t 
J 
...J L t., 
I 
• ~ 
i, 
' 
v 
.t.. , 
, ' ' ) ' 
' 
1 · 
SETTLEMENT 1955 - 1961 
• Kibbutz 
• 
Moshav 
Moshav Shitufi 
8 Rural Cent re 
0 M inor Town 
New 
set-t lements 
in red 
D Major Re ional Town 
0 5 10 
kms 
• 
• 
\ . 
. 
' . 
~ahal Oz 
• 
Yesht) Ammioz 
.o 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
cf'tsem 
.Noga~ _Nehora 
Ee 05hahar 
~irHen 
Ozohar • 
• 
cfede Davfd ~Even Shmuel 
EitarP n 
• 
• 
n • '-Or Haner 
• dHDEROT 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• . • • labbui'i • 
Tushiyc1.. Oz,mrat OEshbaJ. 
ltJ r--AZZATA • . • 
QKfar Maimon LJ • 
°shoqeda · 
• 
• 
Ma'agali~· 
••• 
• 
• 
•• 
• • 
• • • • 
DoFAKIM 
• "'Noam 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
d"achish 
l ; 
• 
I 
• l 
• 
. \ 
·, . 
• I 
• I 
. 
I 
i 
. 
I 
. 
\ 
. 
I 
i 
. 
I 
i 
,· 
' --· i. --·-· , . ..-· 
•  
• 
distance of not more than three kilometres from each of its 
satellites. To the west of Kiryat Gata new group was founded 
in 1955, comprising Otsem, Nogah, Zohar, Shahar, and a moshav 
shitufi, Nir Hen. For these villages a rural centre was 
built at Nehora. Thus one of the Mifal Hanegev falha moshav 
groups was integrated into the new rural settlement stnucture; 
the other - Helets, Telamim, and Kokhav - were further apart 
from each other, and together with a new moshav, Sede David, 
presumably formed a group too small and too widely spaced to 
warrant a rural centre. The latter was in principle planned 
to be within easy walking distance of its satellite moshavim: 
in summer, and in winter rain, this is not more than two or 
three kilometres in this region. The last two settlements, 
apart from a new kibbutz at Or Hanner, near Shderot, were 
Lachish and Amatsya, both moshavim shitufiim and both in the 
Shephela. The frontier character of the Shephela, with regard 
to the marginal nature of the land as well as the proximity of 
the Jordanian border, would seem to require the collective 
form of settlement, as was the case with Devira and Lahav to 
the south. When the land is poor in quality and insufficient 
to provide large enough blocks adjacent to the village, the 
moshav system is inadequate. (Only recently have moshavim 
been established in the uplands - in Galilee, Adullam, and 
the Jerusalem Corridor - and these have proved, in all 
respects, the least successful of the settlement projects 
Table IV 
New Settlements Established 1955-1960 
Moshav ill! Kibbutzim 
Eshbol+ March 1955 Nir oz+ Sept. 1955 Otsem May 1955 
Eitan June 1955 Or Hanner Aug. 1957 Shahar June 1955 
Sede David June 1955 
Nogah July 1955 Moshavim Shitufiim Noam Aug. 1955 
Amat sya June 1955 Zohar Feb. 1956 Lachish June 1955 
Nir Hen Sept.1955 Zirnrat+ March 1957 
Yesha+ March 1957 
Ammioz+ May 1957 Nahal Settlement Shoqeda+ July 1957 
Kerern Shalom+ June 1956 Kfar Maimon+ Aug. 1959 
Existing Settlements in the Region in 1960 
Period of. Moshavim Nahal Foundation Moshavim Kibbutzim Shitufiim Setts. 
1941-1948 2 16 
1949-1954 36 15 1 
1955-1960 13 2 3 1 
Total 51 33 4 1 
N.B. Settlements marked with an (+) are in Revel Hanegev; the 
remainder are in Revel Lachish. 
so far.) The moshav shitufi has the same agricultural or-
ganisation as the kibbutz and can be adapted to difficult 
physical and security conditions. By 1955 it had become 
more acceptable as a social system than the kibbutz. 
Settlement within Hevel Hanegev was naturally on a 
smaller scale than in Lachish. Six of the eight new villages 
there were moshavim, with one kibbutz and one Nahal settle-
ment . The latter was set up by a unit of the Nahal army 
Corps, and will eventually form a kibbutz. One more moshav 
- Eshbol - was added to the Shoval group, two were established 
adjacent to fuivtahim (Yesha and Ammioz) , and three were 
founded south and west of Tekuma (Zimrat, Shoqeda, and Kfar 
Maimon). The kibbutz, again on the Gaza Strip frontier, was 
Nir Oz. 
The new villages wer~ almost all on favourable soils, in 
the inland plain of Lachish or in the Gaza- Beersheba Basin. 
Some of the exceptions, such as Lachish, Amatsya, Nir Oz, 
Kerem Shalom, were, as a glance at the map will show, situated 
near the frontier for security reasons. None of these were 
moshavim. Yesha and Amrnioz, founded in 1 957, were designed to 
ease the isolation of moshav ~ivtahim, which by that time 
had suffered the vicissitudes of slow development because of 
the lack of water, difficult conditions of cultivation on 
the sandy soils there, with a considerable loss of settlers 
as a result. By this time it was also clear that the few 
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moshavim in isolated and physically marginal areas - .Jlffi.vtahim, 
Nevatim, Omer - had not been su6cessful, for lack of water 
and other reasons, and in the latter two the majority of 
the inhabitants were employed in Beersheba rather than on 
their· farms. 
In the Negev degion the influence of the new regional 
ideas made itself felt in the establishment of new urban and 
rural centres. As the majority of the moshavim here dated 
from before the formulation of the 'composite rural structure', 
the latter had to be adapted to the existing pattern of set-
tlement. '.l'hree rural centres had been started by 1961: 
Mabbuim in the centre of the Shoval group, Ma'agalim in the 
centre of the Sharsheret-Givolim-Shibbolim-Melilot group, and 
Tushiya, between Zimrat and Shoqeda. It will be noticed that 
Ma'agalim and Tushiya are within walking distance of fewer 
than five moshavim, as compared with the original plan of 
five or six. 
The new urban centres, Shderot, Azzata, and Ofakim have 
already been mentioned. These are not intended to compete 
with the existing major regional centres - Ashkelon, Beer-
sheba, and Kiryat Gat - and their population and functions, 
it is said, are to be restricted. it It is especially important 
that they [the smaller regional towns] should strengthen their 
links with the surrounding villages, and desirable that they 
I 
I, 
I 
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should not, by their size, lose their planned local functions, 
and thus fail to provide for the full development of the 
regional potential. So their populations are not to grow to 
more than 8,000-10,UOO" (56) . While none of the smaller 
urban centres in this region had reached a population of more 
than 5,000 by 1961 , Ashkelon and Beersheba had passed the 
minimum population level of 20,000 specified for the category 
of major regional towns, the first with 23 , 500 and the second 
with 42,500 at the end of 1960. Kiryat Gat's population 
was then about 10 , 000, but the rapid rate of growth that 
characterised the town's first years has since been maintained. 
The composite rural structure thus proved to be insuffi-
ciently flexible, in its original form, to include areas of 
previous :-·ssiitlement. Most of the older moshavim in Revel 
Ranegev, and some of those in the southern half of Revel 
Lachish had to do without a rural centre, or shared the cost 
with a smaller number of villages than was specified. by the 
planners . (Costs here refer to operational costs, since the 
original investments are made by the Settlement Department and 
the relevant Ministries . As With the investments in housing 
and farms, the settler in reality repays no more than a 
token, if that, of the sums involved.) In the Negev Region, 
too, additional urban settlements had to be added, partly to 
make up for the deficiencies of rural services and partly 
because the existing regional town - Beersheba - lies in fact 
I 
I I 
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neither in the settled Northern Negev nor in the Central 
Negev, but between the two o 
Population 
With the addition of 18 1 new agricultural settlements in 
this period , the agricultural population of the region grew once 
more, though at a slower rate than that of the preceding 
five years . Most apparent is the strengthening of the trend 
already noticed: the ratio between moshavim and kibbutzim, in 
numbers of settlements and in total population, increased in 
the favour of the former . This was not simply the result of 
the establishment of more new moshavim than kibbutzim. The 
average population per moshav rose from 278 at the end of 
1954 to 340 at the end of 1959, while the corresponding 
figures for the kibbutzim were 208 and 246 (Table V). In 
terms of population increase per annum, this represents 4.5% 
in the moshavim, 3 . TY~ in the kibbutzim. 
With the creation of four new towns, and the continued 
direction of new immigrants to Beersheba and Ashkelo~, the 
urban population increased even more than the rural. By the 
end of 1959 the three major towns had a total of almost 
70,000 inhabitants, and the population · of the three minor 
towns was, together, probably about 6,000. Thus between 1954 
(1) Kerem Shalom is excluded, as it is administered by the 
Army. No water for irrigation has yet been made available, 
and cultivation has not begun. 
Table V 
Population of the Region, 1954-1959 
,20 • IX. 2bi: 20.IX.,2~ 
Moshavim 10,561 16,656 Kibbutzim 6,548 8,107 Moshavim Sh. 100 358 
Total 17,209 25,121 
Average Population Per Settlement, 1954-1959 
30.IX.54 30.rx.59 No.of Setts Aver.Po:Q. No.of Setts Aver.PoJ2. Moshavim 38 278 49 * 340 Kibbutzim 31 208 33 246 Moshavim Sh. 1 100 4 89 
~: At the end of 1959 two moshavim had no population. Kokhav had been abandoned by its settlers in the pre-ceding year, and no new group had been sent there in the meanwhile. Kfar Maimon had just been established, but settlers did not move in until after September 1959. 
Sources: Records of the Settlement Department and Brit Pikuach. 
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and 1959 the ratio of agric ultural to urban settlers in the 
region had changed from i:2 to 1:3. 
The total population of the moshavim increased by 58% 
in these five years1,, compared to 26% in the kibbutzim. At 
the same time, analysis of the working-age groups in both 
typeSof village reveals that the potential labour- force in 
the moshavim increased by 39°fo. while in the kibbutzim the in-
crease was only 8%. Expres s ed as the average number of adults 
per settlement , there was little change over the five years , 
but the ratio between adults and non- working dependents did 
alter significantly. As in the period up to 1954, so again 
the number of adults declined in relation to the non- working 
population, and in the moshavim each adult, on average, sup-
ported a greater number of dependents than did his counterpart 
in the kibbutzim (Table VI) . 
1 For reasons already stated the working-age groups in 
these settlements cannot be equated with the agriculturally 
or the 'productively' (i.e . in branches other than services) 
employed. A rough estimate of the agricultural and non-
service employment in relation to the total population may 
be attempted however. If the working-age group in the 
kibbutzim, which in these settlements is in fact the labour 
( 1) see p. 90 
Table VI 
Adults of Working-Age (15-60 iears) 
30.IX.54 30.rx.59 
No. of Adults of Average No. of Adults of Average Setts. Working Age Per Sett. Setts. Working Age Per Sett. 
Kibbutzim 31 4,259 137 33 4,593 139 
Moshavim 38 5,035 133 49* 7,001 143 
Mosh. Sh. 1 65 65 4 251 56 
*: See note to Table V. 
Sources: Records of the Settlement Department and Brit Pikuach. 
Adults of Working Age as% of Total Population 
30.IX.54 30.IX.59 
Moshavim 48~i 42% 
Kibbutzim 65 57 
Mosh. Sh. 65% ?Of, 
force, is divided on the basis of 40% in the service branches 
(laundry, offices, kitchen anct· dining-hall, etc.) and 60% in 
the agricultural, industrial and workshop branches, then the 
proportion of the 'productively' employed will be about 37% 
of the total population. This is an estimate which errs on the 
optimistic side. In the moshavim, the ratio between the 
sexes is much more even (in almost every kibbutz there are 
more adult males than females), and it may be judged that 
about half the adults are 'productively' employed, in agri-
culture or in outside work. The ratio between the 'producti-
vely' employed and the total population will therefore be 
about 21:79, according to the 1959 data. In more simple 
terms: for each 'productively' employed settler in the 
kibbutzim, there are, on average, 2.9 non-productively employed 
adults and dependents, while in the moshavim there are 4.75 
non-productively employed adults and dependents. This has 
some significance for the standard of living in each type of 
village. 
The ethnic composition of the new settlers during this 
period was principally oriental, with nine of the thirteen 
new moshavim settled by immigrants from Tunisia and Morocco, 
two by Egyptian immigrants, and one by P·ersians. lviost of the 
other new villages were, settled, at least in part, by 
Israelis, on the strength of the 'Town to Village' policy. 
~ - -
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The latter did little to alter the general picture which was 
of oriental settlers in the moshavim and, in large measure, 
in the towns, with the kibbutzim composed of Israeli-born 
and European settlers. And it is significant that few of the 
Eastern European immigrants of 1956-58 settled in the villageso 
In the agricultural year 1955/6 the region received its 
first deliveries from the Yarkon-Negev pipeline, but they 
were small in relation to its total water consumption in that 
year. Within three years water from this source constituted 
more than half the total. It can be seen from Table VII that 
the Yarkon supply soon exceeded the 35 million m3 scheduled for 
the first stage, and by 1958/9, a year of severe drought, it 
exceeded that scheduled for the intermediate stage: 50 million 
m3. Two years later there were changes in the pattern of 
supply. There had been droughts or partial droughts in f'our 
successive years, 1957/8, 1958/9, 1959/60 and 1960/1, and this 
had markedly cut the flow of the Yarkon springs, so that the 
output in t.he summer or 1960 fell from a nol'mal 13,000 m3 /hr 
to 6,500 m3 (57). In the 1960/1 agricultural year water 
rationing was introduced. The fall in . water output from the 
Yarkon sources was not the result of prolonged drought aloneo 
"The most serious aspect of the Mekorot 'drought summary' is 
the overexploitation of existing sources. Sources were pumped 
faster than they were replenished, with a consequent drop in 
the water table. According to the summary, the water deficit 
~------~~~ 
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during the 1958/9 season was 70 million cu.m., rising to 76 
million this year [1959/60]. This quantity is equivalent to 
35 per cent of the aggregate output of Mekorot's available 
sources'' (57). It is clear that this was very much the case 
in the Northern Negev: the water consumption in 1960/1 was 
increased above the 1958/9 total, in spite of the fall in 
Yarkon output. The increase came entirely from intensified 
pumping from the kurkar and deeper aquifers. 
It is now clear that not only are the national water 
resources of the country much smaller than was formerly thought-
the total exploitable annual supply is now estimated at 1.5 
milliard m3 - but also that the combination of a prolonged 
drought and the need to maintain agricultural development in 
the villages has led to excessive pumping of local water 
resources, in the South and elsewhere. The only solution that 
has been found is the diversion et' the Jordan waters southwards, 
which it is hoped will permit both the full development of 
the irrigated lands of the villages and the recharging of the 
local aquifers of the South, by natural and artificial means. 
Some steps have already been taken in the latter direction. 
A dam was constructed across the wadi of Nahal Shiqma, near 
kibbutz Zikim, in 1960-1. In the winter of 1961 some 5.4 
million m3 of storm runoff were caught in the reservoiro 
4.4 million m3 of this were transferred via pipes and a canal 
to a 300 dunam infiltration area, 3.5 km to the northeast. 
-- --
-~ 
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Table VII 
* Annual Water Supply to the Region 
1955/6 1958/9 1 960/1 
Yarkon & 
m3 m3 m3 Nor thern Wells 3,772,250 59,005,909 49,833,115 
Gvar' am,Nir Am, 
Yad Mordechai 
Wells 37,285,763 33,044,947 40,679,023 
Other Local 
Wells 7,030,511 18,561 ,441 24,538,420 
Total 48,088,524 m3 11 O, 612,297 m3 115;050,558 m3 
*: April to March. 
Source: Data supplied by Mekorot Co. 
3 Half of the remaining 1 million m infiltrated through the 
bed of the reservoir, and the rest was retained for irriga-
tion purposes. It was later estimated that 70% of the water 
spread on the infiltration bed among the sand dunes had reached 
the big aquifer tapped at Yad Mordechai , 20% had reached 
aquiferous beds to the northeast of the filter area, and 10% 
had moved seawards. With these results, it was considered 
possible to enlarge the reservoir to a capacity of 10 million 
m3 per year, or two-thirds of the long-term average winter 
flow of the Nahal Shiqma (58). This and the smai1 dams at 
Shoval and Mishmar Hanegev represent the only use made in the 
region of wadi flow in winter. (Storm runoff water is used, 
on the pattern of the Nabatean irrigation works, at some 
Central Negev settlements, such as Sde Boker and Revivim. 
This is direct application of the water to the fields, and is 
apparently not economically worthwhile, according to another 
report in (58)~ It will be remarked that the use of winter 
flow for recharging the aquifers, and thus for increasing the 
irrigation supply, is an effective solution to the difficul-
ties confronting the direct use of such water ror irrigation. 
It will also be remarked that it was not until 1961 that 
serious efforts were made to exploit this potential, and 
more important, local addition to the water resources. 
when the annual water deliveries are broken down on a 
monthly basis (Table VIII), it is found that only in the 
Table VIII. 
Monthly Water Deliveries to the Region, all Sources 
% 1958/9 
11,051,837 
11,263,075 
11,525,450 
12,151,380 
% 1960/1 
11,148,625 
14,052,555 
14,091,493 
13,259,319 
169 
% 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
1955/6 
4,485,827 
5,430,099 
6,009,804 
5,507,381 
5,968,416 12,725, 1 97 11 • 5 14,254, 540 1 2. 4 
September 6,266,675 13.0 10,609,887 
October 
November 
December 
January 
4,455,341 
2,961,266 
1,245,071 
1 , 339,116 
February 2,047,048 . 
March 2,581,923 
2.6 
9,209,065 
8,673,062 
8,290,098 
8,212,781 
4,862,458 
2, 0 38 , 007 1 • 8 
12,251,350 
11,381,027 
6~752,340 
7,266,319 
6,417,630 
1,667,940 
2,541,220 
Source: Data supplied by Mekorot Co. 
-- -- -
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Table IX 
• 
water ConsUilll)tion in Hevel Hanegev Settlements, 1958/9 (Sample). -
sett lement 
Hatserim (K) 
Shoval (K) 
Tseelim (K) 
Nirim (K) 
Ein Hashelosha (K) Gevulot (K) 
Beit Kama (K) 
Ur im (K) 
Peduyim (M) 
Nevatim (M) 
Annual Total 
1,176,500 m3 
2,140,600 
1,227,100 
1,700,300 
858,400 
2,162,700 
949,700 
1,573,400 
1,308,900 
945,000 
Gevim (K) 1,404,500 Mishmar Hanegev (K) 1,290,700 Rannen (M) 1,104,500 
Beit Hagadi (M) 
Mivtahim (M) 
Nir Yi t shak (K) 
Sharsheret (M) 
Shuva (M) 
Beeri (K) 
Givolim (M) 
Pattish (M) 
Yakini (M) 
Omer (M) 
Berosh (M) 
(MK) : Kibbutz ( ) : Moshav 
* 
1,255,000 
624,900 
1,145,000 
1,065, OOO 
553,300 
874,400 
1,052,900 
1,723,700 
1 , 113,100 
181,400 
693,800 
October to September. 
Peak Month 
October 
November 
November 
December 
December 
December 
January 
January 
April 
May 
June 
June 
June 
July 
July 
July 
August 
August 
August 
September 
September 
September 
September 
September 
Con-
sumption 
166,100 
293,500 
185,500 
206,700 
161,600 
410,900 
117,200 
224,600 
150,300 
107,500 
187,000 
167,000 
117,100 
128,400 
91,700 
128,400 
136,400 
82,000 
110,800 
142,900 
183,900 
153,000 
28,700 
92,600 
Peak Month 
as % of Total 
14.1% 
13. 7 
15 .1 
12. 2 
18.8 
19. O 
12. 3 
14.3 
11 • 5 
11 .4 
13. 3 
12. 9 
10.6 
1 o. 2 
14. 7 
11. 2 
12.8 
14.8 
12. 7 
13. 6 
10.7 
13. 7 
15.8 
13.3 
Source: Rec ords of the Settlement Department 
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second of these three years did the delivery in the peak 
month fall below 12% of the annual total. The peak irrigation 
season lasts for seven months, from April to October inclusive, 
and during this time almost 80% of the annual supply is used. 
A sample of water deliveries to individual settlements in 
1958/9 (it should be borne in mind that this was a severe 
drought year) would indicate, however.that certain settlements, 
all kibbutzim, by the use of cheaper off-peak water managed 
to shift their month of peak use from the summer to the winter. 
These were all kibbutzim with large falha areas, and the water 
was used for auxiliary irrigation, which would be less neces-
sary in a wet year. But it is true to say that the moshavim, 
with their emphasis on irrigated field crops, are unable to 
alter their• pattern of irrigation in the same way (Table IX). 
Irrigation 
The additional water provided by the Yarkon-Negev Project 
and by expanded output from local sources permitted a doubling 
of the size of the irrigated area between 1954 and 1959 in the 
villages. The area of land equipped with pipes for full per-
manent irrigation rose from 48,000 dunams in 1953/4 to almost 
120,000 dunams in 1958/9 in the co-operative settlements. This 
increase, large as it was, was still not enough to provide the 
kibbutzim and moshavim with an average of 38 dunams of irrigated 
arable and fruit land per active unit (Table X). 
172 Table X 
Irrigated Land (Physical) Per Unit, 1958/9 
1 No. Active Unil§. Fully Irrig. Fully I./Unit 
Kibbutzim 33 2,297 41,395 dun. 18.0 dunams 
2 Moshavim 51 3,039 73,272 24.1 
Mosh. Shi tu.f. 4 126 1,830 14. 5 
( 1 ) 
(2) Irrigated gross crop area, and fruit. In the absence of Brit Pikuach data for the moshavim, the irrigated area was calculated from the crop data of the Settlement Department. The net physical irrigated area is likely to be larger, to the extent that it was not fully utilised in this year, and smaller, to the extent that land was double-cropped. 
Including irrigated fruit. 
Sources: For the kibbutzim, and moshavim shitufiim, the Bulletins of the Brit Pikuach ; for the moshavim, crop data of the Settlement Department , Revel Ranegev and Revel Lachish. 
Table XI 
Active Units & Planned Units, 1958/9 
% of Units No. of Below Full Setts. Planned Units Active Units Strength. 
Kibbutzim 33 3,960 2,297 32% 
Moshavim 51 4,070 3,039 25% 
Mosh. Shi tuf. 4 (?) 240 (?) 126 (?) 48% 
Source: Records of the Settlement Department . 
Some adjustment has to be made for the kibbutzim, where the 
area under auxiliary irrigation in this year, 43,791 dunams, 
was greater than the fully irrigated area. If four dunams 
of auxiliary irrigated land are taken as being equal to one 
fully irrigated dunam, then the adjusted total per kibbutz 
unit will be 22.8 dunarns. This major expansion in the area 
of auxiliary irrigation was, of course, made in answer to 
the prolonged drought of this and the preceding year. 
When the number of active units are compared with the 
planned capacity of the villages (Table XI), it is clear that 
the irrigated area falls far short of the amount necessary 
for the completion of settlement in the existing villages. 
The number of active units in all types of settlement stood 
in 1958/9 at 5,462, while the planned capacity of the villages 
is 8,720 units - a shortfall of 2,408 units, or 29% of the 
planned total. 
These figures are averages, and the situation varies 
considerably from village to village. The actual amount of 
irrigated land per unit in some moshavim is as much as 40 du-
nams (e.g. Nir Akiva, Yoshivya), but this is to be ascribed 
not so much to the advanced development of these moshavim as 
to the fact that their population is much below the planned 
strength: the large actual units of irrigated land are the 
result of the availability of vacant holdings. As one would 
expect the villages with small amounts of irrigated land in 
total are chiefly the most recent - Zimrat, Sho~eda, Yesha, 
Arnmioz - but here again the small number of active units 
results in amounts of land per unit little smaller than those 
of older villages . 
In the kibbutzim the variations are greater than in the 
moshavim. The difficult locations of many of these settle-
ments result in high (real) water costs, and although the 
actual water pric e paid by almost every settlement in the 
region is the same, the higher real costs of supply to some 
have induced the Settlement Department not to expand or to 
postpone expanding their water supply facilities . The most 
obvious illustration of this is kibbutz Lahav , in the Upper 
Shephela. The net irrigated area at Lahav in 1958/ 9 was 275 
dunams , or 4. 4 dunams per active unit . The elevation and 
isolation of this kibbutz mean that a branch pipeline, through 
Devira, from the main pipe at Beit Kama is necessary if Lahav 
is to have any irrigated land. The difference in elevation 
between Devira and Lahav is 200 metres, and the water has to I, 
be pumped from a station near the former. Since the kibbutz 
pays some of the cost of pumping - although it receives a 
fuel subsidy from Iviekorot and a loan for labour costs from 
the Settlement Department, which also paid for the pipe - the 
cost of water at the farm gate is double the Mekorot price at 
Devira . The settlement, if it is to develop agriculturally, 
requires a much greater amount or water than can be delivered 
by the present pipe and booster, but the Settlement Department 
is not willing to subsidise Lahav's irrigation any rurther; 
as for Mekorot, Lahav would have no piped water if the Set-
tlement Department's financial aid had not overcome the water 
company's unwillingness to supply any water at all. At Devira 
too , the situation is similar , as the water company considers 
enlargement of the branch pipe from Beit Kama uneconomic . 
Agricultural Develonment and Land Use~ 
Not all the moshavim of the re~iori were reorganised as 
field- crop farms after the policy changes of 1954. While the 
majority of the existing villages , and the new ones in the 
Lachish Region , were so adapted, a few retained their mixed 
farming character. The Imara moshavim, for instance , which 
have a local market at Ofakim and in Beersheba, are planned 
as milk producing farms, together with a coupl e of the older 
Negev moshavim - Tekuma and bharsheret . Here, and in the 
three moshavim near Ashkelon (.rleit Shig_ma, Geia , Iv1ashen), 
the farms are centred on dairy production combined with some 
industrial crops . almost all the other moshavim in the re-
gion are of the field-crop type, with an allocation to each 
holding of 5 dunams of fruit and 33-35 dunams of arable land. 
The official classification of the Settlement Department 
for the kibbutzim was drawn up in a different manner. Two 
versions have been found, but both divide the kibbutzim of the 
region in terms of the degree of irrigation, rather than on 
the basis of production branches, as is the case with the 
moshavim. i Allusion has been made on a previous page to the 
reasons for this. While it must be said that the development 
of the livestock branches, and particularly of the dairy herds, in the Negev kibbutzim had not reached, in ·1954-5, anything 
approaching optimal dimensions, the ideological resistance of kibbutz members and et.hep socj_al factors prevented the planners from recommending that the kibbutzim, as well as the moshavim, 
should specialise in industrial and other field crops. In the first version, all but five of the kibbutzim in Hevel Hanegev were classified as 'extensive irrigation' farm types. This definition referred to the combination in these settle-
ments of irrigated and falha cultivation. Four kibbutzim -Hatserim, Tseelim, Gevulot, and Nir Yitshak - all in the south 
of the Gaza-Beersheba Basin, where local falha cultivation is 
rendered impossible by the low rainfall and sandy soils, were 
classed as 'full irrigation' farms, i.e. cultivation with ir-
rigation without falha branches. At this time kibbutz Lahav's farm type had not been determined. Lahav is the extreme 
example in this region of a kibbutz located, for security 
reasons, on a _site where there are little or no prospects 
of pro:fitable agriculture. There are extensive tr•acts of irrigable land near the kiobutz, as there are not in other 
( i) See P• 138 
moshavim. 1 Allusion has been made on a previous page to the 
reasons for this. While it must be said that the development 
of the livestock branches, and particularly of the dairy herds, 
in the Negev kibbutzim had not reached, in -1954-5, anything 
approaching optimal dimensions, the ideological resistance of 
kibbutz members and other social factors prevented the planners from r ecommending that the kibbutzim, as well as the moshavim, 
should specialise in industrial and other field crops . In 
the first version, all but five of the kibbutzim in Hevel 
Hanegev were classified as 'extensive irrigation' farm types. 
This definition referred to the combination in these settle-
ments of irrigated and falha cultivation. Four kibbutzim -
Hatserim, Tseelim, Gevulot, and Nir Yitshak - all in the south 
of the Gaza-Beersheba Basin, where local falha cultivation is 
rendere d impossible by the low rainfall and sandy soils, were 
classed as 'full irrigation' farms, i.e. cultivation with ir-
rigation without falha branches. At this time kibbutz Lahav's 
farm type had not been determined. Lahav is the extreme 
example in this -reg ion of a kibbutz located, for security 
reasons, on a site where there are little or no prospects 
of prof itable agr iculture. There are extensive tract s of 
irr igable land near the kiobutz., as theI'e are not in <i>ther 
(1) See p.138 
parts of the Upper Shephela, but the cost of water supply is 
prohibitive. It has been suggested that the only prospect 
in this area is extensive beef cattle pasturing, but this 
implies a smaller number of settlers than the Lahav members 
are willing to accept. 
Another version of the classification was found, ihis 
time for 1958 and including the Lachish kibbutzim. According 
to this, the majority of the kibbutzim, including those of the 
south, were to develop as 'extensive irrigation' farms. Zikim 
and Karmiya, in the coastal belt, were placed in the 'full 
ir~igation' category, ~rets and Talmei Yafe, also in the 
coastal belt, in the 'milk/field crop' category; Mishmar 
to Hanegev, Shoval, Beit Kama, Devira and Lahav, allJthe east of 
the region, were classed as 'irrigation/falha' farms. This 
second version is apparently based upon the assumption that a 
limited amount of water is available for all settlemen:ts, and 
the pattern of farming will depend upon the amounts of land 
available. Thus the eastern kibbutzim, where there are very 
large tracts of land that cannot be irrigated in the foresee-
able future, will have large falha branches. Zikim and Karmiya 
do not have large reserves of unirrigated land, as cultivable 
land is limited in the coastal belt, so their development will 
be via the intensive irrigated cultivation of their smaller 
holdings. The same will be the case for Erets and Talmei Yafe. 
The southern settlements will presumably continue to cultivate 
falha land elsewhere in the region. The four mo~havim shitu-
fiim, which are distributed between the four physical divisions 
of the Lachish Region, are classified accordingly. Mavqi'im, 
in the coastal belt, is planned for full irrigation ; Nir Hen , 
in the inland plain, for extensive irrigated cultivation; 
Lachish, in the Lower Shephela, for farming based upon fruit 
production; and Arnatsya, in the Upper Shephela, for unirriga~-
e d 'l)a a .ttf'.['.a.~. •-l'a.rming o 
In the following pages an attempt will be made , after 
describing the general pattern of, and changes in, the agricul-
ture of the co-operative settlements of the region, to deter-
mine the extent to which the pattern of agriculture and land 
use in 1958/9 did in fact conform to the policy desiderata. 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter and to these farm-
type classifications. 
The latest statistics available in 1961 concerning the 
land use of the individual moshavim and kibbutzim, referred 
to the agricultural year 1958/9. It is important to point 
out that the continuo...ty of data for the moshavim was broken 
1 
in 1955/6, when the Brit Pikuach ceased to publish bulletins 
(1) It is believed that a 1960/1 Bulletin for the moshavim 
may be published soon, and that annual publication will 
continue. 
of land use data for these villages. The Settlement Depart-ment, as part of its agricultural planning operations, com-piles data on cultivation plans and actual cropped areas for the moshavim, but the methods are not the same as those of the Brit Pikuach. Therefore when the moshav data for 1958/9 used here are compared with those of the kibbutzim, or with the moshav data used in the previous chapter, a margin of plus or minus 10% should be allowed for. 
The agricultural development between 1952/3 and 1958/9 is indicated in Table XII. The most important trend is of course the increase in the irrigated area, and this was most striking in the moshavim, though the irrigated area had not reached the targets set. The area of unirrigated cultivation rose by about 107'~ in the kibbutzim and fell by 20% in the moshavim. There was not, as might be expected, a net fall in the unirrigated crop area, because the transfer of falha land formerly cultivated by extra-regional settlements to the Negev kibbutzim during this period more than made up for the expansion in irrigation. In the moshavim, on the other hand, the initial land allocations have remained more or less stable, and the progressive expansion of irrigation has steadily decreased the area of unirrigated culti¥ation. 
Trends in the main categories of irrigated cultivation are 
~J-ig!3:t~ated in Table XIII. It is apparent that the moshavim and the kibbutzim, within the limits of the fully irrigated 
Tabl.e XII 
GROSS CROP AI® FRUIT AREAS, 1952/3 AND 1958/9 
KIBBUT'ZIM MOSP;AVIM MOSH. SR. ALL SETTS 1952/3 1958/9 195~/3 1958/9 1952/3 1958/9 1952/3 1958/9 Field Croll . DUNAM S 
Unirrigated 175,085 198,077 69,132 56,288 2,350 18,743 246,567 273,108 Auxil. I rrig . 4,954 43,527 270 
- - 170 5,224 43,697 · Fully I rr i g . 5,986 20,355 1,965 38,259 80 594 8,031 59,208 
TOTAL 186,025 261,959 71,367 94,547 2,430 19,507 259,822 376,013 
Veg. & Potatoes 
Unirrigated 
- -
820 
-
- - 820 Auxil . Irrig. 180 
- 50 
- -
-
230 Full~ U:rrig . 3,160 7,572 5,377 22,166 96 399 8,633 30,137 
TOTAL 3,340 7,572 6, 2L~ 7 22,166 96 399 9,683 30,137 
Fruit 
Unirrigated 4,231 1,365 70 
- 862 
- 5,163 1,365 Irrigated 2,999 1 o, 690 1,265 12,847 
-
620 4,264 24,157 
TOTAL 7,230 12,055 1,335 12, 8L~ 7 862 620 9,427 25,522 
Tota lg 
Un irrigated 179,316 199,l.J.42 70,022 56,288 3,212 18,743 252,550 274,473 Auxil. Irrig. 5,134 43,527 320 
- - 170 5,454 43,697 Fully Irrig . 12,145 38,617 8,607 73,272 176 1,613 20,928 113,502 
Total Gros s 
Crop Area. 196,595 281,586 78,949 129,560 3,388 20,526 278,932 431,672 
~ 
CP Source : Brit Pikuach and Settlement Department records 0 
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area, have developed substantially different patterns of 
production. By 1958/9 the proportion of field crops in the 
Table XIII 
Use of Fully Irrigated Area 
KIBBUTZIM IvI08HAVIM 
1952/3 1958/9 1952/3 .1958/9 
Field Crops 4~6 52% 23% 52% 
Veg . & Pots . 26 20 62 30 
Fruit 25 28 
~5 :18 
Total 100% 100% 1001~ 100f~ 
two types of settlement was the same, but vegetables and po-
tatoes continued to be relatively and absolutely more important 
in the moshavim. The first crop grown on the small plots 
initia].y available to the moshav settler was always vegetables, 
and it was in vegetable production that the new-immigrant 
settler obtained his first experience of farming. This is the 
reason for the dominance of this branch in the moshavim in 195~' 
Six years later the allocations of land were much larger, and 
the relative weight of vegetables droppe~ heavily, as the in-
dustrial crops were introduced. But both vegetables and pota-
toes have the attraction for the moshav farmer of' offering a 
return within three or four months, which is not the case with 
---- -
. . 
---- ............ 
j 
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the other field crops, and, furthermore, vegetables can be 
sold outside the cooperative marketing channels of the 
village. This last is a factor of considerable importanceo 
Village taxes, water dues, and the other payments of the in-
dividual settler are paid from the credits due to him from the 
cooperative sale of his produce. The private, semi-legal 
sale of vegetables in, for instance, Kiryat Gat offers an 
immediate cash return without prior deductions 1. 
The kibbutzim planted in 1958/9 4,889 dunams of potatoes 
and 2,683 of vegetables, a large part of the latter being 
for consumption on the farm. The corresponding figures for the 
moshavim were 11,885 and 10,281 dunams, respectively. Potatoes 
in fact had in the moshavim the largest area for any single 
irrigated crop: the areas of the industrial crops were sugar 
beet, 9,309 dunams, groundnuts, 7,382 dunams, and cotton, 
6,707 dunams. But the area of vegetables was still greater 
than that of any of the industrial crops. When these five 
are combined, they amounted to 45,564 dunams - 75% of the 
fully irrigated area exclusive of fruit. The remaining 25%, 
or 14,861 dunams, being planted to fodder crops. 
The factors influencing the use made of the fully 
(1) This is a common enough feature of the imposition of cooperative organisations on farmers who do not comprehend the purpose of cooperation. Parallels may be drawn with many Asian countries, among which Ceylon provides many instances. 
irrigated area in the kibbutzim are several. The maintenance 
of at least one, and usually more , livestock branches means 
that a considerable part of the irrigated area must be devoted 
to fodder crops. But in the case of the other crop whose 
expansion is not welcomed by the planners, namely vegetables, 
the labour problem in the kibbutzim acts as a sharply restrain-
ing force . What part did the kibbutzim play in the produc-
tion of the 'new' crops in 1958/9 , then? The areas of sugar 
beet, groundnuts, and cotton grown in the kibbutzim were 
1,650 dunams, 1,175 dunams, and 2,683 dunams, respectively, 
making a total of 5,508, compared to 23,398 dunams in the 
moshavim! It must be added that some 3,865 dunams of industri-
al crops, principally sunflowers, were grown without irriga-
tion in the kibbutzim, but this hardly changes the picture. 
The kibbutzim had a smaller absolute area of irrigated in-
dustrial crops, and a smaller area per settlement, on average, 
than the moshavim. 53% of the fully irrigated arable area in 
the kibbutzim was devoted to fodder crops. It is clear that 
no great change in the direction of the industriaJ. crops had 
taken place in the collective settlements. 
The need to maximise agricultural production in the 
early years of the State, and the relattvely slow rate at 
which water supplies could be expanded, made falha cultiva-
tion the major branch of agriculture in the first years of 
post-Independence settlement in this region . As the irrigated 
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irrigated area in the kibbutzim are several. The maintenance 
of at least one, and usually more , livestock branches means 
that a considerable part of the irrigated area must be devoted 
to fodder crops. But in the case of the other crop whose 
expansion is not welcomed by the planners, namely vegetables, 
the labour problem in the kibbutz im acts as a sharply restrain-
ing force. What part did the kibbutzim play in the produc-
tion of the 'new' crops in 1958/9, then? The areas of sugar 
beet, ·groundnuts, and cotton grown in the kibbutzim were 
1,650 dunams, 1,175 dunams, and 2,683 dunams, respectively, 
making a total of 5,508, compared to 23,398 dunams in the 
moshavim! It must be added that some 3,865 dunams of industri-
al crops, principally sunflowers, were grown without irriga-
tion in the kibbutzim, but this hardly changes the picture. 
The kibbutzim had a smaller absolute area of irrigated in-
dustrial crops, and a smaller area per settlement, on average, 
than the moshavim. 53% of the fully irrigated arable area in 
the kibbutzim was devoted to fodder crops. It is clear that 
no great change in the direction of the industriaJ. crops had 
taken place in the collective settlements. 
The need to maximise agricultural production in the 
early years of the State, and the relatively slow rate at 
which w~ter supplies could be expanded, made falha cultiva-
tion the major branch of agriculture in the first years of 
post-Independence settlement in this region . As the irrigated 
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area was extended, so the area of falha cultivation was cut . 
Settlements from outside the region had their temporary leases 
withdrawn as the Negev settlements expanded cultivation. But 
the land resources of the Gaza-Beersheba Basin are so large 
that there has been no fall in the area of falha cultivation 
by the Negev settlements, and it is almost true to say that 
the total area of falha cultivation is still as large as it 
was in 1952/3. 
The delimitation of zones of varying suitability for 
falha was described in eh.apter III. The zones were drawn on 
the basis of the mean rainfall data that were available from 
Gaza, Beersheba, and one or two of the older kibbutzim. Falha 
cultivation was in fact extended well into zone (iii), south 
of the Nirim-Gilat road , where it had been calculated that 
the inadequacy of rainfall would make auxiltary irrigation a 
necessity. The rainfall amounts at Urim between 1950/1 and 
1958/9 indicate the dangers of reliance upon long-term rain-
fall means . Urim lies just within zone (iii). At Mishmar 
Hanegev, in zone (ii) where falha yields were judged uncertain, 
and "the need for auxiliary irrigation likely in some years", 
the position was no better (Table XIV) . 
vVhether the years since Independence have s een a 'dry 
cycle' in the Northern Negev or not, the number of years of 
average or above-aver•age r a infall have not made falha 
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cultivation a very profitable enterprise for the State. The 
occurrence of drought was expected , but not on this scale , 
or in close sequence, as between 1957/8 and 196of61 . The 
kibbutz i m of the region, for lack of other means of develop-
ment , depended heavily upon falha in the early years, and 
still do so to a large extent today. 
Table XIV 
Annual Rainf'all 1950/·1 - 1958/9 and Long-Term 
1'.'ieans at Urim and Mishmar Hanegev 
Long-Term Mean: 
1950/1 
1951/2 
1952/3 
1953/4 
1954/5 
1955/6 
1956/7 
1957/8 
1958/9 
Urim 
209 mm 
136 
200 
121 
176 
122 
278 
304 
147 
169 mm 
Mishmar Hanegev 
232 mm 
148 
323 
188 
229 
185 
259 
370 
149 
200 mm 
The Government undertook, after the drought of 1952/3, 
to pay drought compensation to those settlements whose losses 
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were severe. And payments continued up to 1961 , though not 
without some reluctance on the part of the Ministries con-
cerned: "An emergency meeting of the Negev Settlements [in 
September 1961] unanimously adopted a resolution calling on 
members of all Negev kibbutzim and moshavim to stage a sit-
down strike at the Ministries of Agriculture and l!'inance •••• 
in a week's time. The strike will be called if the settlers 
do not receive first payments on last season's drought da-
mages by then 9 The settlers claim that last season's drought, 
the fourth in succession, resulted in the complete failure 
of one-third of the 330,000 dunam grain crop in the Negev, 
with the remainder producing below-average yields" (59) . 
Since the authorities have not been able to provide other 
means of subsistence, i . e. irrigation, in sufficient amount, 
and since a criterion of settlement policy is the provision of 
an adequate standard of living for the farmer, there was 
little alternative to drought compensation, at least until 
the present. 
Since 1960-1 there has been a distinct hardening in the 
attitude of the Ministries of Finance and Agriculture (not 
unconnected, in the latter, with the app6intment of ex-General 
~liOShe Dayan as l\ltinister), to the payment of subsidies and 
compensation to the agricultural sector. This will be 
discussed at a later stage: what is pertinent here is that in 
1960/1 the zones of falha suitability were redrawn in the 
light of the experience of the preceding years. The criterion 
may be described as the limitation of falha by subsidy. South 
of a line between Nir Am and Mishmar Hanegev drought compen-
sation will not in future be paid for falha crops. This 
corresponds to the 250 mm isohyet, in a rough fashion, and, 
more importantly, it marks, more or less, the division 
between the zone vhere an adequate rainfall f'or unirrigated 
grains (250 mm minimum) is at least as likely as less than 
that amount - to the north - and. the zone where the probabi-
lity is less than even - to the south. 
This measure is only feasible , given that farmer's in-
comes must be maintained, if the settlements to the south of 
the line are g;ven more irrigated land, or falha land to the 
north of the line is leased to them. Since the area of land 
that has not been absorbed by local settlements to the north 
of the line is small, and since the prospects for increased 
water supplies depend upon the completion of the Jordan-Negev 
pipeline, the withdrawal of compensation from southern set-
tlements would not seem to be practicable within the next 
few years. 
Analysis of land use has so far been restricted to sta-
tistical comparisons between moshavim and kibbutzim. The 
land use data, in particular with reference to falha, do not 
reflect the areal pattern of land use in the reg ion very 
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accurately, as many settlements cultivate land that is not 
adjacent to the villages, and no distinction is made in the 
statistics. Nor ii it possible to determine the amount of 
cultivation by extra-regional settlements, for the same 
reason. 
The impossibility of using aerial photographic material 1 
prevents one from making an accurate survey of the changes in 
land use in the region fr•om the incept ion of P"ewish colonisa-
tion to the present . However, Ben Ari eh found (13) that in 
the Lachish Region cultivation by Arabs during the latter years 
of the Mandate was more extensive, and supported a larger 
rural population than it does at present, in the coastal belt, 
in the northern part of the inland plain (north of the Ash-
kelon-Beit Guvrin road), in the Lower and Upper Shephela. In 
the southern half of the inllnd plain, Jewish colonisation 
has given an increase in the density of population, and this 
is probably also tae case for the Gaza-Beersheba .Basin. On 
the other hand, there is little doubt that Arab and Beduin 
cultivation in the Basin covered at least as large an area 
as it does t~day, although the whole area was not cropped 
every year. In the southern Shephela, as in the Basin , there 
was little permanent settlement before ~949, but here too 
the cultivated area has probably declined considerably since 
then. 
(1) ~ee Preface 
I , 
~hroughout the region Jewish colonisation has effected 
a major change in land use: the development of the intensive 
irrigated cultivation of field crops, vegetables , and fruit . 
Before the State, irrigation was in effect limited to the 
coastal belt of the northwest, with a few patches elsewhere 
in the new Jewish settlements. 
The evidence for changes in the areal pattern of land 
use since Independence rests on a l and use map for the whole 
1 
region in 1960/i (Map 17 ), which has been compiled from maps 
of the cultivated area of each settlement, and upon a map, of 
less informative nature, of land leases in the mifal Hanegev 
area in 1956/7. (Map 18 ) . There also exist two smaller-scale 
maps of the irrigated blocks in 1950-1 and 1955, both publish-
ed by the water Department or' the Ministry of Agriculture (Maps 
19, 20 ) • 
The growth and distribution of irrigated land may be com-
pared in the 951, 1955, and 1961 maps . In the first the 
highest relative density of irrigated land was in the coastal 
belt, where water was to be found locally and could be ex-
ploited easily. For the rest of the region, blocks of irrigated 
land were small and scattered about the arms of the horseshoe-
shaped regional water system, with the ~xception of those of 
the Imara moshavirn. The ·1955 map shows major development, 
with the infilling of the Shoval moshavim and the central area 
( 1) In end-pocket. 
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on the main pipeline from Nir Am to Beersheba, formed by the 
moshavim between Gevim and the rJ; ishmar Hanegev crossi•oads. 
Again, the more isolated kibbutzim formed a chain of irrigated 
blocks around the periphery of the Basin. At this time there 
was no irrigated land in the Shephela and very little in the 
inland plain of Lachish, development awaiting the Lachish 
regional pipelines in the latter and the Beit Kama-Lahav pipe 
in the former. 
By 1961 the coastal belt still had tne highest ralative 
density of ir·eigation. After that, the adjacent blocks of the 
moshav groups in Lachish and in the Gaza-Beersheba Basin strike 
the eye. The general expansion of irrigation was share d by 
the kibbutzim. but not by the four Shephela villages - Lachish, 
Amatsya, Devira, and Lahav - nor by the moshavim east of 
Beersheba, Omer and Nevatirn. In all these cases consideration 
of the real cost of water supply, as much as the limited 
amounts of irrigable land available (Lachish, and Amatsya), 
restricted the area of irrigated land. At all these settle-
ments it i s physically possible to irrigate more land, in 
particular for fruit plantations. 
The general picture presented by the.1960/1 map is of 
relatively intensruve irrigated cultivation in Lachish, while 
in the Basin falha still occupies a much larger irea, espe-
cially in the east, south and southwest. Uncultivated and 
waste land in the lowlands is restricted to the wadis, to 
parts of the kurkar ridges and the coastal dunes in the north-
west , and to the greater part of the Ruhama-Dorot sandhillso 
In the Shephela, Jewish agriculture has made hardly a per-
ceptible mark. 
Comparison 01, the 19·61 and 1956/7 maps gives some indi-
cation of the extent of falha cultivation in those years. 
The earlier map represents the land leases of that year, and 
it may be taken that all areas leased by extra-Negev settle-
ments . and individuals were in falha cultivation. It would 
appear that in spite of the intervening drought years, little 
change has occurred. ~alha cultivation did not recede from 
the more arid margins . The reason for this must surely have 
been the continued payment of drought compensation. 
A significant feature of land use, and of the changes 
since Independence, concerns fruit, and espec ially citrus. 
It is clear from the 1960/1 ma~ that the coastal belt is in 
large measure a zone of citrus growing, and it is noticeable that 
the citrus plantations, many of which are in private or com-
mercial company ownership, are concentrated on the three 
kurkar ridges . Here the lighter soils are an important factor, 
and indeed for other purposes than fPuit these soils are un-
suitable, so that fruit plantations is the main, if not the 
only, use to which they can be put. In the inland plain and 
. . . . 
~ 
Young citrus plantation (109/111) near Yad Mordechai. W kurkar i->idge in backgroundo 
Nahal ShiQma (110/108), near Erets. 
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the Basin the overall pattern of fruit distribution ia linked 
to that of the settlements: each settlement has its own 
block, and this is almost always adjacent to the village. In 
the last three or four years there has been a considerable 
expansion of citrus in the Basin, in contrast to its former 
restriction to the coastal belt, which has been characteristic 
of citrus plantations th~oughout Israel. The new citrus plan-
tations in the inland plain and in the Gaza-Beersheba Basin 
are the work of the Settlement Department, on behalf of the 
cooperative settlements. The Department is responsible for 
planting ana cultivation until the trees bear fruit, which 
will be in the next coupie of years . Then the plantations 
will be handed over to the settlements. After the early ex-
periments with citrus, referred to in Chapter III, further 
research indicated that citrus production was possible at 
greater distances from the coast than had been thought possible. 
The importance of citrus in the agricultural economy, and 
indeed in the national economy, in which it is a primary source 
of foreign exchange, has steaaily grown since Independence, 
in spite of early fears that the export market could not be 
expanded. In consequence the national area~.of citrus planta-
tion has had to be increased, and for the settlements of the 
Negev and Lachish citrus has the attraction of profitability 
at a time when opportunities in other branches are few. By 
1960/1 the new citrus plantations extended as far south as 
Mivt.ahim and as far east as the Shoval group of moshavim. 
Kerem Shalom (082/069), a Nahal settlement at the Send or the Gaza Strip. 
-
\ 
Agave plantation (086/070) between Kerem Sha1om 
nd Nir Yitahak. 
. . 
. . -· . 
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~ 
.193 
Mention should also be made at this point of the plan-
tations of the agave plant, one near the Mishmar Hanegev cross-
roads and one between Nir Yitshak and Kerem Shalom in the 
extreme southwest of the region . The project was initiated 
by a Mexican Zionist, with experience of fibre production 
from the agave in his own country, where it is known as 
henequen . The plantations are in the control of' the Jewish 
National ~und, and a factory for the production of sisal from 
the agavot is to be built at Gilat . The agave is ideally 
suited to the region , as it needs little more than 100 m3/dunam 
of water per year , compared to the 700- 800 m3/dunam required by 
most other crops . Unfortunately it is an extensive crop that 
does not require a great input of labour, so that it is hard 
to see how it could be made the basis of close agricultural 
settlement. 
Turning towards the future, it can be said that the 
proportion of unirrigated land will decline, since the comple-
tion of irrigation water allocations to the settlements is not 
likely to b e accompanied by any extension of the area of 
falha cultivation. Unless new settlements are founded, this 
will not, however, alter greatly the present pattern of dis-
tribution of irrigated land. hluch of the land separating the 
moshavim in the centre of the Basin and in the inland plain, 
land which has already been allocated to the villages but 
which is at present dry-farmed by the regional tractor stations 
on their behalf , this will be irr igated eventually. There wi ll 
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be a corresponding increase in the irrigated land of the 
lowland kibbutzim, but not en ough for the form~tion of con-
tinuous s"trips . Por the rest - the large falha areas to the 
north of.' Beit Kama, to the west of .::ihoval and J'..'.tishmar Hanegev, 
and on both banks of the Hahal Hesor in the southwest of the 
Basin - this will not be irrigated unless new settlement is 
undertaken. In fact the last of these areas, around the 
Uahal rlesor, has been earmarked for a new regional settlement 
project, Hevel Beser. The implications of the Beser project 
will be discussed in the next chapter, but it can be said here 
that a very large additional volume of water will be necessary 
to fulfil the planned allocations for existing settlements, 
let alone for a new regional settlement area . 
To what extent have the dictates of the planners and the 
effects of such equalising factors as the uniform regional 
water price produced a uniformity of farm organisation within 
the region? Much of the technique of planning in Israel and 
of settlement policy would appear to counteract the effects 
of physical factors, such as distance and elevation ( the 
price of water), different degrees of aridity (the supply of 
water to isolated settlements, rather• than the establishment 
of settlements where water is more readily available), and so 
forth. In some degree, however, planning does take notice of 
variations in conditions within the region, as in the case of 
the 'fuil irrigation' kibbutzim in the coastal belt, and the 
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villages which have been designated as 'fruit' moshavim 
(Mivtahim, Yesha, Ammioz, Helets and 'l'elamim). (In the§e 
moshavim the soil conditions - in the first three it is a 
question of very sandy soils, and in the last two of thin 
kurkar soils and erosion by wadis - do not permit concentra-
tion on industrial crops.) Of course the problem may be 
phrased in different ways for the moshav and the kibbutz. In 
the latter there is a relatively wide choice of branches which 
may be .developed, and the existence of the livestock branches 
commits a certain proportion of the irrigated area in advance. 
In the moshavim the range of c:h:>ice is less, and the planning 
officers of the Settlement Department have some measure of 
control, through water allocations, cash advances for planting 
and so forth, over the crop plans of the farmer. This is not 
always very effective, the literature (68,64) and experience 
indicate. It is therefore of interest to determine the extent 
to which cropping follows the model 'meshek hasadeh'. For the 
kibbutzim, with the aid of the Brit Pikuach Bulletin for 
1958/9, it is also possible to determine the extent to which 
the kibbutzim of the region differ from those in the rest of 
the country. 
Comparative Land Use (a) The Kibbutzim 
As would be expected in this region, the kibbutzim have 
much larger land holdings than those elsewhere, and when this 
is translated into te r ms of land holdings per kibbuts worker, 
. I 
. - . 
. . . 
. ~_..__--___.._~-... 
-~ . 
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the difference is even greater. With a little over 12,000 
dunams per kibbutz in the Negev,. the potential cultivated 
area is double that of kibbutzim elsewhere (6,500 d) . But 
the bigger holding of the Negev kibbutz is largely expressed 
in the area of falha land: the average fully irrigated area 
of the Negev kibbutz is smaller - 1,250 din the Negev, 
1,500 din the other kibbutzim. On a per worker basis, tue 
Negev kibbutz member has more than three times as much unir-
rigated land, more than nine times as much auxiliary irrigated 
land, and one and a quarter times as much fully irrigated land 
at his disposal than his counterpart elsewhere . 
The size of the land holdings and the cultivated area 
vary considerably among the region's kibbutzim, but even the 
smallest holding (Talmei Yafe, 5,040 d) is not much smaller 
than the average for the non-Negev kibbutzim, and. the largest 
(Shoval, 23,000 d) is the largest in the country. Part of 
the falha lands of the Negev kibbutzim are officially held 
on temporary leases, but 'semi-permanent' would be a more 
realistic description. The smaller holdings in the region are 
to be found in the coastal belt and the south. The reasons 
for the lack of' extensive areas of cultivable land in the 
coastal belt have been mentioned bef'ore, and it must also be 
said that the local availability of water has induced a rela-
tively high density o:f settlement there . In the south the 
difficulties of' falha cult ivat ion restrict the cultivated area 
.197 
virtually to the area which can be irrigated. 
The pattern of use of the gross cultivated area in 13 
sample settlements is illustrated in Table XV. It is clear 
that there is a distinct differentiation within the region. 
The proportion of fruit - generally irrigated - declines to 
the south and east, relative to the increased area of falha 
cultivation by kibbutzim in those areas (not necessarily 
adjacent to the settlement). The relative deQrease in fruit 
is accompanied by an increase in the weight of the .:rallow 
S>-- . 
area. In this, kibbutz Tseelim is a special case, as little 
falha is cultivated and most of the holdine is irrigated. 
In the main categories of field crops (Table XVI) fodder 
is less prominent as a fraction of the field crop area in the 
Negev than elsewhere, but the larger cultivated areas of Negev 
kibbutzim mean that the size of the fodder crop area is much 
larger on average. similarly, th·e Negev kibbutzim have a 
larger average area under industrial crops (280 dunams, as 
opposed to 215 dunams elsewhere). The distribution within the 
region is illustrated in Table XVI 9 The proportion of cereals 
in the field crop area increases to the south and east. It 
seems that grains are less important relatiyely in the south, 
as is true of' fodder. Industrial crops appear to have an 
almost random distribution, except in the settlements where 
they are not grown, for lack of water (Devira, Lahav) or of 
land (Ruhama). In Tab le AvlJ.. i will be seen that those 
-~-~ ~,· -... ~ -1--
.:JIIII& 
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Table XV 
Gross Cultivated Area: Sample of 13 Negev Kibbutzim, 1958/9 
Field Veg. & Green 
* 
Fruit Crops Potats. Manure Fallow Total I 
Gvar 'am 9% 7~ 2% I 10% 100% Gevim 5 73 6 4% 12 100 Dorot 5 72 4 15 4 100 Beeri 5 83 12 100 Reim 3 77 3 9 8 100 Ruhama 2 81 8 9 100 Shoval 2 78 1 2 17 100 Devira 1 65 1 1 23 100 Lahav 1 81 18 100 Kissufim 3 46 1 16 34 100 Urim 2 53 2 43 100 Gevulot 2 70 1 2 26 100 Tseelim 6 L~B 16 30 100 
Table XVI 
Main Cate ories of Field Cro s:·33 Ne ev Kibbutzim and Other Kibbutzim in 19 9. 
% of Total Field Crop Area Cereals Grains Pedder · Ind. Crops Others Total 
33 Negev 50% 21% 24% 4% 1% 100% 193 Others 42 18 32 5 3 100% 
Average Area per Kibbutz (Dunams) 
33 Negev 4,000 1,690 1,950 280 30 7,950 dunams. 193 Others 1,730 730 1,340 220 30 4,050 
* Includes deep ploughing . 
S~urce: Brit Pikuach 
kibbutzim which do produce industrial crops favour sugar 
beet and cotton: groundnut s are less popular. 
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\t~i th regard to livestock, the main branches - dairy and 
beef cattle - are to be found in almost all the Negev kibbut-
zim , though there are some differences in scale. Only one 
kibbutz in the region had no dairy cattle in 1958/9, and 17 
1 
of the remaining 31 had between 51 and 100 milking cows. 
The beef cattle branch similarly was only absent in one case, 
20 kibbutzim had from one to 50 head, and eight h.ad more than 
100 head. This reflects the relative profitability of beef 
production, which has been much higher than that of milk in 
the past . The larger beef herds are to be found in the coastal 
belt, where a higher rainfall makes up for restricted pasture, 
and in the east of the region and at Ruhama , where enormous 
tracts of poor quality pasture are available in the Shephela 
and in the .Dorot-iluhama sandhills. Sheep, which are kept for 
milk, are less widespread as the profitability of milk pro-
duction is low. ~ifteen kibbutzim had no sheep, and the re-
mainder, covering the whole region, had large flocks of 
between 300 and. 800 head. Only two settlements had no laying 
hens, and the remainder all had less than 10,000 each. Poul-
try production is not encouraged to expand in lowland Israel -
(1) No data is available for livestock at kibbutz l(armiya. 
Table XVII 
Main Categories of Field Cro12s: Areas and i of' Total 
Area of Field Cro:2s in 1,2 Negev Kibbutzim in 1 ~28Z9. 
Q'ereals r& Grains % Fodder % Ind. % Other % Crops 
Gvar'am 1,350 d 33% 940d 23% 1,680d 42% 100d 2% Gevim 3,400 51 1,240 19 1,490 22 550 8 15 Dorot 3,225 37 1,300 25 2,890 33 1,140 13 185 2 Beeri 5,655 63 1,200 14 1,950 22 128 1 Reim 6,100 62 1,980 20 1,520 16 220 2 
Ruhama 5,350 44 2,912 24 3,828 31 80 1 Shoval 8,530 53 4,270 27 2,670 17 310 2 110 1 Devira 5,880 59 1,340 13 2,556 26 150 2 Lahav 8,020 65 900 7 ,,330 27 170 1 Ki ssuf im 3,220 47 1,900 28 1,545 22 140 2 80 1 Urim ' 4,480 69 1,646 25 400 6 Gevulot 5,440 67 1,080 13 1,250 15 400 5 Tseelim 430 29 940 62 140 9 
Source: Statistical Bulletin for Kibbutzim, 1958/9. Brit Pikuach 
Table XVIII 
Use of Gross Irrigated Ar ea in 9 Moshavim2 1 928i9. 
Ind. Potatoes Vegetables Other Total % Total 
Cro:2s Dunams Geia 1% 7% 92% 100% 1 ,486d Uza 51 ~~ 14 18 17 100 1 , 181 
Zahar 84 5 9 2 100 1,103 
Beit Hagadi 48 26 10 16 100 1,464 Nir Akiva 47 24 11 18 100 1,007 
Pattish 29 22 5 ·44 100 1,703 Givolim 50 38 9 3 100 1,182 
Mivtahim 47 15 34 4 100 1,503 Omer 16 65 19 100 180 
Source: Settlement Department records. 
by allocation of egg production quotas to which subsidisation 
is restricted. Quotas do not aff~ct the production of chicks 
or meat poultry yet, and some Negev settlements have turned 
to these branches. 
Thus while it is true that the Negev kibbutzim continue 
to maintain a mixed pattern of agricultural production, there 
is in some of the crop branches a measure of differentiation 
among them which can be ascribed to the effects of physical 
factors. But these differences are small, and refer principal-
ly to the variations in the availability of falha land, rather 
than to specialisation in certain branches of production. 
Co~para:tive Land Use (b) The Moshavim 
The sample of nine moshavim (Table XVIII) is of conside-
rable interest . . It will be remembered that Geia and Pattish 
are both classed as milk producing moshavim, but clearly in-
dustrial crops are relatively important at Pattish, and this is 
also the case at the other Imara moshavim. Geia's land use 
is entirely centred on fodder crops. Among the other moshavim, 
Omer is a speci~l case. The lack of develpment here, which 
stems from lack of water and the settlers' low degree of par-
ticipation in farming, is expressed in the. fact that only 
180 dunams are irrigated. The latest version of the 'meshek 
hasadeh' farm type (60) specifies, on an arable unit of 36 
dunams, 8 dunams (22%) of vegetables and potatoes and 13 
dunams (36~1a ) of indust r ial crops. Now it will be seen in the 
. . . . . ·. . . 
-
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sample that several villages devoted more than 45%, and one 
as much as 84% of the irrigated arable area, to industrial 
crops. But while the plan specifies 7 dunams each of fodder 
and grains (39%), these moshavim have larger proportions of 
potatoes and vegetables and smaller proportions of fodder and 
grains. Apart from this element, these moshavim would appear 
to conform, more or less, with the 'meshek hasadeh' farm 
type. If the figures for the five moshavim that are of the 
field-crop type - Uza, Zohar, Beit Hagadi, Nir Akiva, and 
Givolim - are compared, it is evident that with the exception 
of Zahar (where the difference is hardly in the wrong direction!) 
there is a great measure of uniformity in land use. 
The position of livestock in the moshavim, the plans and 
the actual situation, have yet to be considered. It has al-
ready been mentioned that livestock perform an important 
function for the moshav farmer, by providing both a small but 
regular income and the possibility of realising livestock assets 
at short notice in time of need. The planners came to the 
conclusion that the problem could be overcome in some instances 
by providing moshavim with beef cattle or sheep, which would 
use natural pasture, and could be kept most of the time toge-
ther in the herd or flock. The livestock position in the 
moshavim is given in Table XIX. The distribution among the 
villages was not regular. Sixteen moshavim had no dairy cattle 
Table XIX 
Livestock in the Moshavim, 1958/9 
Dairy Cows 
Beef cattle 
Sheep 
Laying Hens 
1,954 
1,307 
6,017 
82,972 
at all and 17 had less than 25 headr,1 or much less than an 
average of one cow per farm. Obviously many of the field 
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crop moshav units had unplanned dairy cattle, even though milk 
production for the market is made very difficult by the ab-
sence of a village dairy, and in spite of the fact that the 
optimal size of a dairy herd for a moshav unit is between five 
and 'Bight cows ( 6:1). By the sa:me token several of the Imara 
moshavim had less than an average of three cows per unit, al-
though these are milk farms. The reason for this is mainly 
the unwillingness of nhe Settlement Department to invest 
further in a branch which is heavily subsidised and produces 
surpluses in Israel every year. Much of the agricultural debate 
in the Knesset in 1961 took place around the fact that although 
these new moshavim are not capable of competing in the milk 
market, reductions have be.en enforced in the highly competi-
tive so-called 'urban' dairy herds around Tel Aviv in order 
to protect new moshav settlers, for whom milk receipts are an 
important and indispensable source of income (62)o 
None of the Negev moshavim have more than an average of 
300 laying hens per unit, which leaves little for sale when 
farm needs have been met. As in the kibbutzim, egg production 
is not encouraged. The numbers of dairy cattle and poultry to 
be found in moshavim not planned to have them have been bought 
privately by the farmers. Beef cattle, however, are supplied 
by the Settlement Department, and are to be found principally 
in the Shoval moshav group, where pasture is available to the 
north. Sheep too are to be found in the moshavim, but rarely 
in large and economic flocks. With sheep, as with all other 
livestock branches, the moshavim in 1958/9 had smaller numbers 
than the kibbutzim; in general it is true to say that livestock 
in the moshavim are at present raised in numbers that do not 
permit profitable development, and they are kept very often 
for reasons other than long-term profitability. 
Economic and Social DeveloEment 
One measure of success in the programmes of agricultural 
settlement in this region is the rate at which settlers have 
left the villages. The situation in the kibbutzim, in the 
absence of data, it is only possible to estimate subjectively. 
There is also the rather startling evidence of Darin-Drabkin 
(63, p.280) that in a sgrvey of Kibbutz Artzi settlements, it 
was found that 31 % of members and candidates leave after two 
years in a kibbutz, 23% leave within two to five years, and 
37% leave within f ive t o s even years of entering the kibbutz! 
11 
This is startling~ - because it is generally held that the 
Artzi kibbutzim, with their strona Marxi~t ideology, have the 
stron~est degree of social cohesion. If only 9% remain in 
these kibbutzim, the proportion is likely to be leis in those 
of other movements. Certainly it is obvious to the observer 
in the Negev, that the older and bigger kibbutzim, such as Yad 
Mordechai, Ruhama, Dorat, have a more stable population than 
the younger settlements. It is also observable that the 
stability of population differs among the younger settlements • 
.Examples of poor population stability that are often mentioned 
are, for instance Hatserim (where saline soils and lack of 
development in the early years had a strong effect on the 
morale of the settlers), and Kissufim, where the rate of loss 
of settlers has beeri very high. These factors will be consi-
dered again further on, in conjunction with economic indices 
of success in the kibbutzim. 
Data for t .he moshavim is given in Table XX. It will be 
remembered that the population of the moshavim increased 
between 1954 and 1959, by some 58%, but at the same time, the 
number of families in the villages rose until the end of 1957, 
and then fell in the last two years, so that the total number 
of families at the end of 1959 was less th~n the number at 
the end of 19560 This was produced not by an absolute in-
crease in the number of families leaving, but rath~r by a 
steady decline in the number of families entering agricultural 
Table XX 
Total No. 
of Families 
1. x. 5J+ 
2,221 
1 .x. 55 
2,875 
-
!.!_X. 56 
3,165 
1. x. 57 
3,273 
--
1. x. 58 
3,142 
Movement of Families in the Moshavim, 1954-59 
Families 
Added 
905 
578 
381 
123 
122 
Source: 
Families Net Gain Total No . Families Leaving as % Leaving or Loss of Families of Total at End of Year 
31.IX.55 
251 +654 2,875 8. 7% 
31.IX.56 
288 +290 3,165 9.1% 
31.IX. 57 __ ...._.__ 
273 +108 3,273 8. 3% 
31 . IX. 58 
-
254 -131 3,142 8.1% 
31 . rx.59 
245 ... 123 3,019 8.1% 
Settlement Department records 
I\) 
0 
CJ\ 
settlement in this region. In 1954/5 and 1955/6 immigration 
from non-European areas was considerable, so that the esta-
blishment of new villages in Lachish and the Negev enabled the 
Settlement Department to add nearly 1,500 families in those 
two years. After that the decline in immigration from non-
European areas, and the resultant decline in the supply of 
potential settlers, together with the expansion of new set-
tlement in other regions of the country - the Ta'anach and Hill 
Regions - produced a net loss of families, as the new arrivals 
in the region were too few in number to make up for the depar-
ture rate of just over 8% of the families per year. A further 
factor · in this situation was undoubtedly the Settlement De-
partment's policy of not mixing groups of different ethnic 
origins in a single village. This makes it all the more dif-
ficult to fill in the gaps left by departing families. The 
apparently stable rate of departures of between 8 and 9% should 
be compared with the rates of 15 and 14% in 1952/3 and 1953/4. 
Professor Halperin, writing on the basis of data for ·1 952/3 
noted that the rate for Negev moshavim "where conditions are 
1 
natural.ly harder" was about -15% , while for "more favourable 
districts •••• such as the central area of Israel, the propor-
tion of settlers leaving has never exceeded 7.5% of the total11 
(49, p. 117). One would presume that the rate for more fa-
vourable areas has declined meanwhile, so that the rate for 
(1) It is not stated, but this is presumably the annual rate. 
the Negev is probably still higher than elsewhere, except 
perhaps in the new moshavim of the Hill Regions. 
An annual loss of 8% of the agricultuval families would not 
be cause for concern in most underdeveloped areas, if it 
meant that rural underemployment were being cut. But in the 
Northern Negev it is the express purpose of tije authorities 
to maintain a 'healthy' rural population, for social and 
security reasons, inter alia. So long as the supply of new 
settlers exceeded the rate of wastage, it could be said that 
the policy of populating the region was be ing fulfilled, 
although the continual introduction of new settlers would 
have been a brake upon economic development. However by 1957 
even this could not be claimed, and the net loss of families 
represented not only a loss of manpower in agriculture .but 
also a failure to meet the needs of settlement policy. This 
must give cause for concern, especially in the light of the 
fact that the moshav population, and that of the kibbutzim 
remain well below the size planned, and below the housing 
capacity of the villages. 
When considering the economic development of the region, 
one first turns naturally to settlers' incomes, for it is a 
prime element in Israeli settlement policy that the farmer 
should be able to reach an income equal to that of his urban 
counterpart, and that as a corollary of this, the gap between 
urban and rural incomes found in most developed countries 
should not be allowed to appear in Israel. 
In the absence of comprehensive information about in-
comes in the moshavim of the region, one must steer a course, 
with the help of the little data that is available, between 
the optimism of those who regard the situation as satisfac-
tory and the pessimism of those who allege that the new 
family farms of this region not only fail to provide adequate 
incomes, but are incapable of so doing. Reference was made 
in the previous chapter to income data for five moshavim in 
the Negev in 1952/3 and 1953/4, A little additional material 
for- later years is available in the form of some agro-econornic 
surveys of individual villages in the Negev and Lachish 
Regions (61, 64, 65). This is set out in Figure 6 and 
Table XXI, where will be found income data for older moshavim 
in other regions, together with some for building workers, 
to provide a measure of comparison. 
The 'established' - pre-Independence - moshavim in the 
Coastal Plain that were sampled in the Falk Foundation's 
research project (66) had annual net incomes per family in 
1956/7 of more than I£8,ooo. Since then it is probable that 
they have not greatly increased. On the fortieth anniversary 
of the foundation of one of the oldest moshavim, Nahalal in the 
Emek, it was said that the average net annual income per 
holding was about I£9,000. Though here there were often two 
families, and perhaps four or more workers, per holding (67). 
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In two of the agro-economic surveys of moshavim in the 
region it is expressly stated that the villages examined were 
thought to be enjoying above-average incomes for the area 
(61, 64). In spite of this it is clear that no moshav in the 
region for which data is available has achieved anything near 
the net incbin.~s received by 'established' moshav settlers, 
even though the difference in the ages of the villages may be 
not more than five or six years. In the five Lachish moshavim 
for which data is available in 1959/60 - these are not above-
average villages - the gap is very wide indeed. Even with a 
generous margin for error, it would seem that none of the 
region's moshavirn are likely to have received average family 
net incomes of more than I£5,000 a year to date, and the 
majority probably had no more than I£3,000. 
During the five years between 1953/4 and 1959/60 the in-
dications are that the importance of outside work in the 
settler's income fell consideramly, even in the more recent 
Lachish villages: this was as it should have been, bearing 
in mind the increased availability of irrigated land. 
Subjective impressions of moshavim in the region indicate, 
however, that in this and other aspects of development there 
was a wide range of variation from village ~o village. The 
cases of Nevatim and Omer have been cited: most of the 
villagers are employed in Beersheba, and agriculture is limited 
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Table XXI 
Farm and Non-Farm A.nnual Net Income in Moshavim of the Region 1 I223lu - 1222260 2 Average in I£ £er Famil~ 
1952/3 Income Income from Total Farm Income from Farm Outside Work Income as % -of Total 
Bitha 614 880 1,494 41% Mivt ahim 221 1,221 1,441 15 Peduyim 480 386 866 55 Pattish 500 380 880 57 Maslul lJQ 500 1 z 2,20 2.2% 509 673 1,172 43 
1953/4 
Bitha 1,681 929 2,610 64 Mivtahim 176 1,489 1,665 1 1 Peduyim 1,023 691 1,714 60 Pattish 571 1,092 1,663 34 Maslul h12 200 1 z ,22,2 ~ 915 880 1,795 51 
1956/7 
Maslul 1 , 511 876 2,580 73% 
1957/8 
Nogah 1,796 388 2,185 82% 
1958/9 
I I Nogah 3,382 258 3,640 93% I Tidhar 2,665 485 3,150 85 
1959/60 
Noam 1,701 1,000 2,702 63% Ahuzzam 1,821 615 2,436 75% Eitan 1,703 333 2,036 84 Uza 1,637 300 1,937 85% Shalva 1 1 450 L~OO 12820 l]Jlo 
Av.1,662 530 2,192 76 
Sources: 1952/3 and 1953/4 - Mi fal Hanegev Reports ; Maslul 1956/7 ~ (61); Tidhar - (64); Nogah - (65); 1959/60 -Revel Lachish records. 
I 1 
to very small plots of vegeta~les. Some measure of the 
extent 'to which settlers in individual villages have succes-
sf'ully adjusted to agriculture and to moshav lif'.e may be 
obtained f'rom the number of departing families - Yoshivya, 
Beit Shiqma, Noam - do not have 'objectively'- difficult physi-
cal conditions for f'arming. At the same time several villages 
which do have physical obstacles to agricultural development -
Mivtahim, Yesha, Ammioz, Nevatim and Omer - also had above-
average losses of population. There is, it must be said, no 
simple correlation to be made between the estimated difficulty 
of agricultural development in the villages and the· stability 
of population, though a correlation can be made in a few 
cases. A typical, and extreme, example of this is Kokhav, 
which was abandoned in "1958/9. Several reasons are offered 
for this failure. Among them are: the dissection of the 1 
settler's holdings by gullies; the large number of families 
which, because of poor health or other f'actors, did not con-
tribute to village income, with the result that the burden 
of village expenses fell on a small group; the slow rate of 
investment by the Settlement Department in the villageo 
] 1urthermore, the stability of population in a ~oshav is not a 
s~fe index of the rate of agricultural development or the 
successful adaptation of the settlers. It is worth quoting 
(1) The gullies have been filled with the aid of a bulldozer, and some of the land cultivated urider the auspices of the Settlement Department by outsiders. 
~.. . .. ' . - :--.. - : . . - : ... -
~ 
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at some length from a sociological analysis (68) of one of 
l the most intractable villages of Hevel Hanegev: mosbav Berosh. 
"Almost from the fj_rst year of its existence Shikma 
[=Berosb] has been a 'problem moshav' •••• tbe moshav has gone 
from crisis to crisis, either internally or in its relations 
with the land settlement institutions •••• Farming generally is 
inefficient ••• marketing is often in a state of anarchy, debts 
are not returned, the moshav's internal bodies are weak, and 
rela tions generally with the Jewish Agency are bad. On the 
higher level of Hevel [Hevel Hanegev] officials the concensus 
of opinion is that the lack of leadership is responsible •••• 
On the lower level of Hevel workers the general opinion is that 
the "human material" in Shikma is rotten and corrupt and that 
the only way to deal with them is by coercion. Physically 
Shikma approximates a typical moshav in the northern Negev. 
The conditions can best be described as average - neither very 
good nor very bad for agricultural settlement." 
The villagers, 48 families in all, are from Morocco, but 
there is a sharp division between those from rural areas, 
mainly Marrakesh and the Atlas Mts., and those from urban areas-
Casablanca, Fez, and Rabat. 24 families are from rural areas 
and an equal number from Moroccan towns. Of the 19 families 
who do not work their farms (these therefore work outside the 
village, for wages) 17 are urbanites. "Nearly all the vil-
lagers complain that they are unable to make a living from 
(1) The name of the moshav . has been changed, in the published report, as is customary in Israel. 
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their field crops only •••• The general state of health is poor ••• 
eleven of the members suffer from some chronic complaint, and 
whether minor, such as poor eyesight, or more immediately 
serious, such as epilepsy or blindness, all to a greater or 
lesser extent result in incapacity to wor~' 
"About 10 of the settlers completely exploit the land 
at their disposal and a few of these 10 even cultivate more 1 land tak.en from non-cultivated plots • " 
Mrs. Nevo came to the conclusion that there were 11 theore-
tically ••• radical alternative solutions to the problem of Shikrn~ 1) All the land could be taken over by the Jewish Agency and 
the settlers would work as paid employees. 
2) Th~ land could be divided among the successful farmers 
who would then employ the non~farmers as workers. 
3) The whole of the unadaptable element among the settlers 
could be removed from the moshav. 
These are all patently impracticable", Mrs. Nevo conclu-
ded. ''The first because of general Jewish Agency policy ••• 
the second - again b~cause of general policy (including ideo-
logical and Zionist) and also because 6f the vicious internal 
political blackmail to which this would lead. The third 
(1) This pattern is characteristic of most moshavim, accord-ing to the agro-economic surveys made in recent years. Some settlers manage to cultivate much larger areas of l and than the official land allocation (61, 64)0 
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because it is doubtful whether all this element could or 
would leave the moshav without far more financial help than 
is given in such cases and also because, from the point of 
view of the State's policy, it is more economic to keep them 
in a moshav than in a city." 
In effect the Jewish Agency was compelled to recognise 
the existence of the two, conflicting, groups in the village, 
and to guide the successful to independence while attempting 
to elevate the depressed settlers to successful farmers, 
instead of applying the same policy and attitude to both groups. 
Berosh is acknowledged to be an extreme case. But it is 
true to say that its problems are shared, generally in lesser 
degree, by all the moshavim of the region. The hands of the 
Jewish Agency are to a very large extent tied: radical solu-
tions to the problems of settlers unwilling to enter fully 
into the life of the village, of low levels of health and 
physical energy, of internal d iscords within villages, are 
not possible. Only with a great deal of patience and expertise, 
neither of which does the Settlement Department lack, can they 
be solved. To the non-Israeli observer it sometimes seems 
that the situation is disastrous, when moshav settlers resort 
to threats of dissolving their villages or to sit-down strikes 
at the gates of the Settlement Department's offices in Beer-
sheba or in Jerusalem, as they frequently do. But such 
measures are not uncharacteristic of other sectors of Israeli 
-
. 
. . . 
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(or, for that matter, most underdeveloped areas) life and 
the 'demonstration-effect' is more important than the element 
of blackmail. 
For reasons already stated, no attempt will be made to 
assess precisely the net income levels of the kibbutzim. 
Nevertheless it needs no great powers of perception to notice 
that the standard of living in the kibbutzim is much higher 
than in the moshavim of the region. It is also generally true 
to say that the standard of living of Negev kibbutz members 
is not much lower than, if not equal to, that of kibbutz 
settlers in the rest of the country. This is not to say that 
the Negev kibbutzim have achieved the same level of profita-
bility, or even that the settlements are, in a strict econo-
mic sense, profitable at all. Darin-Drabkin's conclusions for 
all the kibbutzim are very largely true for ~hose of this 
region: "The standard of living of the kibbutzim has risen 
significantly, and has caught up with the general standard of 
living in the country. In some fields it even surpasses the 
level of urban,. werlters:, ·sas .. th:e :1dbbutzi:m.,.prc:rv1a.e~:·b:ett~.r food, 
education and social security than in the towns" (63, p. 267). 
The financial position of the kibbutzim is notoriously 
difficult to determine, and it is often said that these settle-
ments are in the habit of employing that well-known techni~ue, 
duplicate book-keeping. There is much evidence (69, 36) that 
the financial position of a kibbutz depends very largely on 
factors, such as debts and interest rates on black market loans, 
about which it i s impossible to obtain accurate information. 
. 
. 
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In a sample made of 15 kibbutzim in the region, therefore, 
details of gross receipts were chosen for the purposes of 
comparison in preference to the, perhaps fictitious, profits j 1 
or l osses. The sample (Table XXII) indicates that it is, 
as one would expect, the older settlements - Ruhama, Yad Mor-
dechai, Nir Am, Nirim - that have the greatest volume of pro-
duction. But this is by no means general. Gvar'am, the second 
oldest in the region, Gevulot ~nd Hatserim, are in the lower 
half of the table. Among the younger kibbutzim, Beit Kama, 
Beror Hayil, and Lahav may be singled out as having done rather 
better than their contemporaries. The reasons for these 
variations may be grouped under three heads: the objective 
physical difficultiBs of develppment for certain kibbutzim, 
the social factor of a high turnover of population, and the 
soeial factor of a lack of managerial or entrepreneurial abili-
ty among the members. It is less easy to assign distinct 
roles to each factor, because the first factor may induce 
losses of members, as may the third, and it is rare that a 
poorly developed kibbutz does not show the effects of all three. 
It is often said , however , that the agricultural development 
of a kibbutz is not necessarily impaired by a high turnover 
among the members: this was said of Kfar Azza in the third 
report of Mifal Hanegev. The reason advanced alleges that 
provided a nucleus of trained an d experienced f arm branch . I 
Table XXII 
Gross Receipts in 15 Kibbutzim, 1958/9, (I£) 
Kibbutz From Ag . Total Year of 1l of Total 
Production Recei12ts Foundation from Agric • 
Yad Mordechai • 2,433,567 6()/t 1,466,140 1943 
Ruhama 1,375,752 1,595,811 1944 86 
Nir Am 1,024,000 1,220,000 1943 84 
Nirim 993,086 1,042,848 1946 95 
Beit Kama 893,882 1,028,312 1949 87 
Beeri 835,704 992,590 1946 84 
Mishmar Hanegev 864,147 930,784 1946 93 
Gevulot 817,175 883,154 1943 93 
Beror Hayil 787,867 882,214 1948 89 
Ein Hashelosha 750,284 783,148 1950 96 
Lahav 715,000 747,000 1952 96 
Hatserim 617,136 715,515 1946 86 
Nir Yitshak 592,620 699,933 1949 85 
Kissufim 524,279 573,714 1951 91 
Gvar'am (1957/8) 573,783 726,038 1942 79% 
Gross Receipts Per Unit, & Kibbutz Movement. 
~-~ Gross Receipts 
Kibbutz Movement No. of Units Per Unit. 
Yad Mordechai K.Artzi 125 I.£19,500 1943 
Lahav K • .Artzi 42 17,800 1952 
Gevulot K.Artzi 55 16,100 1943 
Beit Kama: : K.Artzi 65 15,800 1949 
Ruhama K.Artzi 116 13,800 1944 
Hatserim Ichud. 53 13,500 1946 
Nirim K.Artzi 80 13,000 1946 
Mishmar Hanegev K.Hameuchad 81 12,300 1946 
Beeri K.Hameuchad 82 11,400 1946 
Nir Yitshak K. Artzi 62 11,300 1949 
Nir Am I chud 110 11 , 100 1943 
Kissufim K. Hameuchad 55 10,400 1951 
Ein Hashelosha Ichud 77 1 o, 200 1950 
Beror Hayil Ichud 120 7,400 1948 
Gvar'am K.Hameuchad 100 7,300 1942 
Source: Kiblhut z balance-sheets. 
JE For Yad Mordechai, the value of the agricultural receipts in 
1958/9 was not known; the total receipts have therefore been 
divided in the same ratio as occurred in 1957/8. 
managers remains, changes in the labour force will not affect 
the rate of development. While this may be true in the short 
run, it is doubtful whether this state of affairs can be 
maintained over a period of more than a few years: ultimately 
the managerial nucleus is almost certain to be affected by 
the social instability of the settlement. The case of Gvar'am 
is relevant here. This kibbutz, adjacent io Yad Mordechai, the 
most developed settlement in the reg ion,hasa relatively small 
volume of production, compared to its neighbour and to much 
younger settlements. The evidence of Gvar'am settlers is that 
the kibbutz performed a pioneer role in agriculture in this 
region, and its experiences permitted the relatively smooth 
development of others. But Gvar'am was "never able to profit 
-J 
from its own experiments"• The reason for this was said to 
be "lack of capital, and we were not willing to take loans at 
high rates of interest". Now the problem of capital, espe-
cially for short-term needs, is notoriously difficult for the 
older settlements which are not provided for from the budgets 
of the Settlement ·Department . But Yad Mordechai, and many 
others in Israel, were still able to develop under the same 
conditions. It would hardly be just to condemn them for fool-
hardiness in accepting interest rates of up to 20% per annum, 
--------
(,) The words of the k ibbut z secretary. 
since they were fulfilling the functions of settlement and 
agricultural development assigned to them by the Government, 
and, as it proved, could ultimately rely on State aid when 
the burden of debt proved intolerable. One must conclude that 
entrepreneurial initiative was lacking at Gvar'am. The history 
of the kibbutz has been one of severe losses of population, 
and this is admitted to have been a result of slow develop-
ment. One may also judge that the loss of members also helped 
to impede the emergence of experienced managers. 
Elsewhere it is possible to detect the direct effects of 
difficult physical conditions. At Gevulot and Hatserim, the 
problems of cultivating sandy soils, soil conservation, and 
of sandstorms at the first, of saline soils at the second, and 
the higher aridity of the southern fringe of the Basin, were not 
solved for some time, and to this day the amount of irrigable 
land available to these settlements is limited. Similar 
factors are responsible for the relatively poor showing of Nir 
itshak. Kissufi!3'J is another, and striking, case of the social 
factors - a high rate 9f loss of members, a resultant acute 
shortage of labour and managerial skills - which have retarded 
development. 
It is po,pularly held that it is the s~gth or weakness 
of the ideology of a kibbutz which is the main factor in · 
social stability and economic development. Thus it is said 
that the Kibbutz Artzi movement (affiliated to the Marxist 
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Mapam Party) has the strongest social cohesion and the greatest 
economic dynamic. After the Artzi kibbutzim come the (right-
wing Labour) Ichud Hakibbutzim Vehakvutzot, and lastly, among 
the main kibbutz movements, the smaller (centre Labour) Kibbti:iz 
Hameuchad. What evidence is there for this state of affairs 
in the regionj The evidence of the gross production data 
would seem to confirm the theory, at least as regards economic 
development. Four of the first five in the sample - Yad Mor-
dechai, Ruhama, Nirim, Beit Kama - are Kibbutz Artzi settle-
ments. The two laggards - Gvar'am and Kissufim - are Kibbutz 
Hameuchad members. Ranked by gross receipts per unit, six of 
the first seven in the sample belong to the Artzi movement. 
The figures in Table XXII may be compared with data on 
gross agricultural receipts in the moshavim, such as exist. It 
should be remembered that not all the population units in a 
kibbutz are engaged in agricultural production: a small pro-
portion are employed in workshops and industrial undertakings, 
while 30-40% are, on average, employed in the communal services. 
So the average gross production per kibbutz unit, i.e. two 
adults, which is here about I£11, 000 should be corrected to the 
estimated agricultural labour force. Some deduction should 
also be made for hired labour, since this is t ,oday a common 
feature in the kibbutzim. A corrected estimate, for the 
fourteen kibbutzim included in the sample in 1958/9, of the 
gross agricultural receipts per agricultural labour unit will 
consequently be in the region of I£18,000 per year. This can 
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be compared with Darin-Drabkin's calculation for all kibbutz-
im in 1956/7, of an average ~er worker in pre-Independence 
kibbutzim of I£8,100 and in pmst-Independence kibbutzim of 
I£7,100. (63, p.262). 
In the moshavim for which data are available, Tidhar and 
Nogah, the average gross receipts per family farm were I£5,661 
and I£5,3~0, respectively. While strict comparison is impos-
sible, because of the limited evidence, and because of the or-
ganizational differences between kibbutz and moshav, it cannot 
be doubted that the kibbutz worker generates a higher, probably 
twice as high, volume of production by value. This reflects 
the extensive use of machinery in the kibbutz, and its absence 
from the moshav farmer's cultivation, which in turn is the 
effect of a number of factors, not least of which is the ethnic 
difference between moshav and kibbutz settler. One would con-
clude with Darin-Drabkin that "the average [net] income per 
family unit in both new and old kibbutzim is only a few per cent 
lower than that of the older [pre-Independence] moshavim" (63, 
p. 257). The difference between the 'established' moshavim and 
those of this region, with reference to income, has already been 
1 described • 
Mention should be made here of the development of manufac-
turing and processing industries in the kibbutzim, since this 
( 1 ) See p. 2.C9-2 io 
is closely linked with agricultural settlement, and is likely 
to increase in significance in the future. The idea that 
kibbutzim should engage in industrial production is an old one, 
and may be traced back almost to the roots of the kibbutz 
movement. In this region there was little development in this direction before 1948, nor was there much success, except in 
a couple of cases, in the efforts that were made immediately 
thereafter. A number of kibbutzim started manufacturing, on a 
workshop- rather than a factory-scale, but development was 
restricted by the labour shortage due to the expansion et' cul-
tivation , and to the shortages of raw materials. The second 
factor evoked strong comment in the Reports of Mifal Hanegev, 
since it was felt that some undertakings were being throttled by this. A diamond cutting and polishing workshop at Gevulot, 
the manufacture of rulers at Nir Yitshak were halted :for this 
reason and were eventually closed down. Many settlements made furniture, but the expansion of urban workshops after 1949 
made production for internal use all that could be attempted. 
The exceptions at this time were the older kibbutzim. Dorot 
developed a large and successful foundry for the manufacture 
of irrigation taps and similar eQuipment. Ruhama had a 
medium-sized brush factory, and Yad Mordechai entered the field 
of fruit and vegetable canning. Gvar'am has a small soap 
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factory. Towards the end of the period the majority of the 
kibbutzim of the region began to turn towards industrial de-
velopment, and it is likely that a pattern of agriculture com-
bined with rural industry will develop. The reasons for this 
are: the declining prof'itability of most farm branches, the 
rather distant prospects of increased irrigation (the Yordan-
Negev pipeline is scheduled to operate in 1963-4), and the 
need that is felt for working capital and a more steady and 
reliable income than that of the farm branches. In the words 
of a kibbutz member and ex-Director General of the Ministry of 
Agriculture: "The area of land and the volume of water at the 
disposal of a kibbutz determine the limits of its development. 
Some kibbutzim are already utilizing both to the full, others 
are approaching that point. Hence any large-scale plans for 
development and the absorption of additional population must 
be based mainly on the establishment of suitable factories 
and workshops" (70). In this region the critical limiting 
factor is water; a secondary factor is the shortage of labour, 
and this has important implications for kibbutz industry there. 
(One kibbutz secretary said that the members of his kibbutz 
were on the lookout for a fully automated factory, because they 
needed an industrial branch but had no labour to spare!) 
Among the developments made so far may be mentioned a large 
factory for fruit and vegetable dehydration at Beror Hayil, set 
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up with the aid of Swiss interests, a printing press at Beeri, 
the manufacture of office furniture at Beit Kama, of toys at 
Mefalsim, of spray equipment at Gevulot, and of cutlery and 
tableware at Nir Am and Urim. An answer to the shortage of 
labour has been found by the kibbutzim around Shderot: The 
establishment of enterprises in or near the town, whence is 
drawn the labour for them. The kibbutzim in cooperation have 
established, or are planning, a cotton gin, an agricultural 
machinery contracting company, a lucerne drying plant, a garage, 
and a laundry. Generally speaking the kibbutzim provide the 
capital and the management, while the labour is supplied by 
the new immigrants from Shderot. The factory at Beror Hayil 
also obtains its labour from there. Unfortunately, the majority 
of the region's kibbutzim are not so favourably located, and 
unless more new towns are built they will not be able to make 
use of this device. 
Conclusions 
The success of the 'com,JrO?-Si te rural structure' has so 
far been mixed. The most dynamic element in the settlement 
of the region - the kibbutzim - are excluded from it, except 
in the rather limited role they play at Shderot, so that it is 
no cause for surprise that the social impetus which the struc-
ture was meant to provide has been slow to develop. The mo-
. shavim, culturally speaking, are villages not unlike those of 
the underdeveloped areas of North Africa or Asia: this is 
well illustrated by the description of Berosh. Even within 
the more stimulating cultural fnamework of Israeli society it is not to be expected that the settlers will be able to make 
a sudden and spectacular leap forward from their traditional 
social and economic culture to share that of the veteran Israeli population. Indeed it can be said of the Negev moshavim that 
the settlers have adapted the moshav village system to their 
needs and traditions, rather than conformed to the original 
democratic and 'Western' cooperative system. As a general rule 
the Settlement Department finds that the more successful set-
tlers, in agriculture and social adaptation, are the younger 
ones, who, in the traditional social structure of the villages, 
are not the accepted leaders. For obvious reasons, the policy 
of the Department has been to work wherever possible through 
the leaders of the villages, which is the easier but not always 
the most productive course. The social interchange and the 
cooperative functions of the rural centres which were postu-lated in the plan have not been induced to any great extent. 
One must conclude, as do som~ of the Settlement Department 
officials, that satisfactory development and adaptation are 
more likely to come from the second or third generation of 
settlers than the first, and that it is useless to expect 
too much from the latter. 
The regional towns have varied in their development. The · 
most outstanding success has been Kiryat Gat, with a present 
population of more than ten thousand, and a much faster rate 
of growth than the planners had foreseen. This is partly 
explained by the direction of new immigrants str~ight from 
the port to the town, and partly by the development, as planned, 
of processing industries for the agricultural products of 
Lachish and the Negev. A cotton gin and textile mills have been 
in operation for some time, as has a sugar refinery. Kiryat 
Gat has the advantage of being located in a zone of moshav 
settlement, and a common featgre of the town is the number of 
moshav settlers to be seen in the streets. The development 
of industry in Kiryat Gat is the result of determined official 
efforts and official enterprise. The industrial development 
of the other towns (Beersheba and Ashkelon are excluded here, 
as their development falls outside the scope of agricultural 
settlement) has not been quite the sa~e. That of Ofakim has 
been relatively successful, but in this case there is again a 
hinterland of moshavim - the Imara group - and capital for 
industry has largely_ come from outside Israel. At Shderot, of 
which something has been said already, there are several pro-
blems. Here there are few moshavim, and the kibbutzim in the 
neighbourhood, like their counterparts elsewhere, are self-
providing in amenities. Thus there is little or no social 
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and cultural interchange between the town and its rural hinter-
land. The economic development of the town, on the other hand, 
is largely left in the hands of the kibbutzim. This situation 
in another area of the country (Kiryat Shmoneh in Northeast 
Galilee) has already produced a great deal of friction and 
strife. The last town, Azzata, has been a pparently neglected 
by the authorities. Little development has taken place - a 
textile mill is being built and there are a few workshops -
since there are no kibbutzim nearby and the authorities have 
done little to fill the gap. 
Little has been said in the foregoing pages about the 
physical volume of production in the region. The reason is 
quite simple. In Israel, and particularly in the kibbutzim, 
increases in yields from year to year, increases of striking 
proportions in many cases, ar•e normal and accepted, c3:.t least 
as regards irrigated crops. This is so much the case that 
Israel to a large extent shares the predicament of the United 
States: production has to be limited if the farmers are to be 
guaranteed an income of reasonable size. By 1960 nearly the 
whole of the agricultural sector was controlled, witfu an 
enormous battery of subsidies, quotas, export premiums, and 
so forth. Marketing Boards, upon which the farmers and the 
relevant Government Ministries and settlement authorities are 
represented, attempt to control the production of dairy produce, 
poultry produce, and vegetables. Restrictions on fruit 
11 
production are being proposed at the present. The prospects 
of increased home consumption or exports for some of these were 
described recently by the Director of the Joint Planning Centre: 
"Israel already leads the world in the consumption of eggs •••• 
We're prepared to sell abroad at any price, but Holland and 
Germany are very sensitive about such sales. We eat chickens 
for meat. And still we're overproducing. Israelis also lead 
the world in their average consumption of' fruit and vegetables" 
( 71). 
In the Northern Negev and Lachish the economic aituation 
for the farmers is equally serious. Real costs are higher than 
elsewhere, and although water subsidies enable Negev kibbutzim 
to compete, the level of productivity is not as high as it 
should be. In the moshavim the new farmers have, quite under-
standably, not come within reach of the desirable level of 
productivity. By 1961 cotton prices were falling, as the 
volume or production neared the country's needs for domestic 
manufacturing. Sugar beet prices were low, and while farmers 
in other areas of' the country were cutting their production of 
beets, the Negev farmers, who were more willing to accept low 
profits, were unable to expand sugar beet cultivation because 
of' restrictions on water deliveries. Worst of' all, the third 1 
main crop of the Negev farms, potatoes, suffered a cut in the 
(1 ) The other industrial crop, groundnuts, is the only one 
that has not been successfully developed in the region. 
. . 
........ ~ 
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guaranteed price by 19% - a price which had remained fixed for 
ten years! (72) 
The implications of this situation, for the farmers of the 
region and for the several elements in agricultural and settle-
ment policy, together with an overall assessment of the present 
stage of development and the prospects of the r egion in the 
future, are considered in the next, and final chapter. 
Oil well (116/109) on Israel's first, but small, 
oil field near Beror Hayil (Bureir). 
Sheep flock of Goldberg Farm ( 114/103). 
Kibbutz Beror Hayil (116/108), farm buildings; moshav Helets in distance. 
The new town of Shderot (112/103), from SW. New factories at centre and left. 
Israel-Argentine cotton mill under construction at Ofakim (114/081). 
'Shopping centre' at Azzata (112/092). farmer's horse and cart. Moshav 
Storage dam (126/091) on Beduin land near Shoval. 
Beduin tents in background. Photograph taken in 
March 1962: arter a poor winter ror rainra11, 
the reservoir is nowhere near ru11. 
------- --
Beduin land (125/090) between Shoval and Mishrnar 
Hanegev. Upper Shephela · on horizon. Note soil 
wash in roreground and major gully. 
Moshav Nevatim (138/070) 
L---
Moshav Nevatim. 
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
In order to make an assessment of the success of settle-
ment and agricultural development in the Northern Negev dur-ing the last two decades it is necessary to review briefly the several elements in the Jewish and Israeli policies towards the region: it is in the light of these policies 
alone tha t success can be fairly judged. The preceding pages have shown that settlement and agricultural development in this region have served a wide variety of ends, not all of 
which remained constant throughout the years. While it is 
essential to the purpose at hand to separate the different 
elements of policy, it should not be forgotten that in the final analysis success is in fact dependent upon the degree to which all requirements have been met - strategic, social, 
and economic. 
The purpose of settlement during the Mandate was poli-tical, and the instruments used to further that policy were 
chosen in the light of Jewish experience in the rest of Pales-tine. Agriculture played an entirely secondary role in this: it provided the means, and a justif'ication, for the esta-blishment of Jewish villages in an area of Arab and Beduin 
occupation. That this policy was successful is not in doubt, 
Not only the Northern Negev, but the southern Coastal Plain, 
the Central and Southern Negev were also included in the new 
State. One may also note that the experience of agriculture 
gained before 1948 formed a useful basis for planned develop-
ment in the following ~ears. 
Af'ter Independence there was a change of scale, but 
little or no change in agricultural or settlement policy. 
The same instruments that had been used before - the moshav 
and the kibbutz - were used again, though the relative weight 
given to the moshav increased greatly. The purposes of settle-
ment were now threefold: to secure the region for the State, 
to settle some of the many immigrants, and to create the 
desired balance, in numbers and in a-A:'eal distribution, be-
tween the ur~an and rural population of Israel. None of these 
three elements differed from pre-1948 settlement policy in the 
Yishuv. There too settlement had been designed to absorb 
immigrants, to create a 'healthy' society, to establish the 
territorial base for a Jewish State, and to present a firm 
front to the Arab community and the British authorities. 
The planned nature of agriculture in the region stemmed not 
from the economic advantages and disadvantages of different 
patterns of production, nor from an analysis of the function 
of agriculture within the national economy, but was accepted 
as a direct corollary of settlement policy. In simple terms: 
kibbutzim and moshavim, ergo mixed farming based on irriga-
tion. There is nothing to be said in favour of livestock 
farming in this region, from the economic point of view. 
The fodder crops require more water per dunam than all other 
crops, and the value added to the water input is similarly 
the lowest. It is a constant source of astonishment that 
kibbutzim in the Northern Negev are awarded prizes almost 
every year for having record milk yields per cow, when such 
production must be the least economic in the country, in a 
branch which is heavily subsidised! (It should be added 
here that the value added to water by industrial crops com-
pares unfavourably with many others, such as vegetables, 
citrus, and other varieties of fruit.) But the importance 
of the agricultural component did increase relative to the 
settlement function after 1949 . Production had to be 
expanded to meet the needs of a population which doubled 
in size within the space of a few years. But in general 
terms agriculture was still overshadowed by social and 
strategic goals. 
The period from 1949 to 1954 saw the realisation of 
many of the social and strategic aims of settlement in the 
Northern Negev. The frontiers were apparently guarded 
suf'ficiently strongly to deter Israel's neighbours from 
open mili t ary attack. Infil t ration was a constant problem 
thr oughout t he s e fi ve year s , but thi s was a relat iv ely 
small price to pay for the real gains in immigrant absor-
ption, employment, agricultural production, and in security. 
The achievement of the settlement programme of Mifal Hanegev 
should not be underestimated . The responsibilities of the 
settlement authority were heavy, and the rate of develop-
ment had to be rapid . That so many villages were built, 
that water and electricity were supplied to them, that 
instructors and the many different sorts of planner and pro-
fessional worker were found, all these were adequate grounds 
for satisfaction . The success of the physical planning dur-
ing this period may be judged by the fact that among the 
moshavim, for which there was a certain measure of choice 
as regards location, only two or three have proved to have 
been unwisely located - Omer and Nevatim, and possibly Kokhav. 
The third period, from 1954 until the present, saw a 
change in agricultural policy, but very little in the estima-
tion and methods of agricultural settlement. A reappraisal, 
for economic reasons, of agricultural policy was essential. 
From an emphasis on the general expansion of production, 
which had until then consisted of the products of mixed 
farming, there came a more selective emphasis on the produc-
tion of crops that were most needed in the prevailing econo-
mic conditions. In a certain sense this was a shift in the 
direction of autarky. 
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The separate assessment of the success achieved in 
agriculture and in settlement may be justified in this 
period by the fact that after 1954 agriculture acquired an 
importance of its ovm . It was no longer of indirect value, 
no longer merel y an adjunct of settl ement , it now had to 
fulfil a well-defined function within the national economy. 
All the same, it must be said that the organisation of farm 
production was still tailored to the social organisation of 
the villages, and not vice versa . Little adjustment was 
necessary in the kibbutzim, and these in any case still had 
a heavy burden of non-agricultural tasks, such as frontier 
patrols, to fulfil . But in the moshavim the production of 
industrial crops was fitted to the social structure of the 
villages, and the possibility of alternative methods of 
production was not considered seriously . 
The change in the direction of autarky did noi create 
conditions in which agricultural production could take place 
in an economic vacuum. The new crops were designed to reduce 
the burden of foreign _currency payments - it was never 
thought that Israel could dispense with imports, as indeed 
she cannot. Consequently, although it may have been possible 
and necessary to i gnore some economic criteria in the short 
run, the agricultural sector had the responsibility of 
achieving production costs at least near to those of' the 
world market. This sector also had the further responsibility 
. 
. 
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of diminishing as far as it could the invaluable but costly 
social and strategic functions of agricultural settlement. 
The significance of the Northern Negev in this is that the 
physical conditions of the region, in particular its aridity 
and its distance from the sources of irrigation water, to-
gether with the assumed necessity of settlement for non-
agricultural reasons, make it a test-case in Israeli agri-
cultural policy. 
The success of settlement, and of its attendant func-
tion of spreading the population over the country, is unden-
iable. The large rural population in the Northern Negev 
today, itself in some measure responsible for the existence 
of an even greater urban population, is more than adequate 
proof. Most of the oriental immigrants, whose weight both 
in the villages and the towns of the region is now greater 
than that of the Europeans and Israelis, would, if they had 
not been directed to agricultural settlement, have created 
a considerable social and economic problem if they had been 
allowed to continue their traditional occupations as merchants 
and petty artisans on the fringes of the major cities of the 
country. Their present standard of living and their pros-
pects for the future may not yet be those of rural Europe, 
but they are much better than those of the communities from 
which they came. In the kibbutzim and the moshavirn there is 
some evidence of a drain of population from the villages to 
. 
. 
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the towns, but this is not of serious proportions, and, in the moshavim at least, such a development is not necessarily undesirable, for reasons that will be developed a few pages further on. 
On strategic grounds too, the Israeli claim to be able to use this land productively has been made. Whether it was settlement that in fact reduced the incidence of infiltra-tion is a moot point. Attacks and damage by infiltrators continued until the 1956 Sinai Campaign, and the quieter conditions that have existed in the region since then are to be attributed rather to the force of Israel's show of strength in battle than to the presence of the kibbutzim along the frontiers. But it is possible that these have helped, by their presence, to discourage a renewal of infil-tration. 
The development of agriculture, at the level of the ability to obtain satisfactory yields and to conserve the soil, has also been strikingly successful. Here again much of the credit must go to the efficiency of Israeli agricul-tural research, to the scientists at Rehovot and at the Research Station at Gilat. The pioneering role of the kibbutzim was maintained after 1949, with many of the new crops receiving their first large-scale tests in these settlements. Mention must also be made of the work of the Jewish National Fund , which undertook soil conservation 
Gully forming on falha land 
(110/102) sown to winter 
fodder at Nir Am. 
measures in the new settlements, planting windbreaks in the 
south, lining the roads withtrees, terracing the slopes of 
the Ruhama-Dorot area and the kurkar, and planting several 
small forests. The exception was falha: modern methods of 
cultivation have increased yields far above those obtained 
by the Beduin, but the dependence upon the vagaries of rain-
fall is still as great today. The scale of falha cultiva-
tion and the consequent risk of heavy financial losses in 
years of drought have been called in question by the low 
rainfall received in recent years. In addition, there are 
indications in some areas that soil erosion on falha land 
(upon which more expensive conservation measures than contour 
ploughing are not considered worthwhile) could be a serious 
problem within some years. The high quality of Jewish con-
servation and cultivation methods may be judged by compari-
son with the lands of the el Huzaiyl Beduin opposite kibbutz 
Shoval. There are no grounds for dispute on this score. 
The considerable authority of Marion Clawson lies behind 
the charge that further settlement in the area south of the 
Yarkon was, by 1953, unnecessary and disadvantageous in 
economic terms. But there is little point in debating today 
the wisdom of the expansion of settlement which did subse-
quently take place in Revel Lachish and Revel Hanegev. One 
is entitled to ask, however, the question: to what extent 
has agriculture in the region fulfilled its t asks (a) of 
producing the necessary products at acceptable prices, and 
(b) of offsetting the burden of settlement for non-economic 
purposes? One may also ask whether the present organisation 
of agricultural settlement is compatible with contemporary 
economic and strategic policies. 
The Northern Negev represents the extreme case - the 
Hill Regions are not included here - of high-cost agricul-
tural production in a country where production costs, not 
only in agriculture, are known and accepted as being higher 
t han those of most other countries . In agriculture this is 
to a major extent due to the high cost of irrigation water, 
and that is not likely to fall, given present technological 
conditions. The Northern Negev, so long as its agriculture 
is based upon irrigation, and there is no acceptable alterna-
tive, for social and security reasons, to this state of 
affairs, therefore sets out with a major economic disadvan-
tage. Its significance may be juaged from the fact that 
average real water prices in Israel are estimated to be 
about five times higher than the maximum level that would 
be accepted by farmers in the U.S.A. (52). Furthermore, 
it should not be forgotten that the transfer of water from 
the north, in the Yarkon-Negev and the Jordan-Negev Projects, 
may well be a real charge to the nation, since it is prob-
able that it could be used to irrigate land nearer to its 
sources. 
The industrial crops which are inte~
ded to form the 
basis of agricultural production in 
the Northern Negev can 
be and are grown elsewhere in the co
untry . They are grown 
in the Emek, in the Huleh Valley (where wate
r does not have 
to be pumped under pressure to the f
ields), and to a small 
extent in the Coastal Plain . Now if
 the nation desires 
settlement in the Northern Negev fo
r reasons that are not 
' 
connected with agriculture, then it 
is reasonable that it 
should be prepared to shoulder some 
of the cost . One way in 
which the farmers of the region may
 be subsidised by the 
nation, and it is the method that h
as been used since the 
start of J ewi sh settlement, is a re
duced charge for water 
- near to the national average pric
e - which should give, 
in theory, the Negev producer an adv
antage equal to that of 
a farmer in the rest of the country
. This is all the more 
necessary when it is considered tha
t this region has a nar-
rower range of opportunities than i
ts competitors. The 
success of the agricultural policy 
for the Northern Negev 
may therefore be judged with the aid of a furt
her question: 
are its production costs equal to th
ose of other regions, 
given that a water subsidy is neces
sary for reasons of 
settlement policy? 
In March 1952 the following item of 
pertinent informa-
tion appeared in the national press:
 "The council of Negev 
settlements, representing 62 kibbutz
im and moshavim ••• 
demanded I£56 per ton of sugar beets, compared to the 
I£50 which they received in former years. The Union of 
Sugar Beet Growers and the Agricultural Centre did not 
consult at all with the N~gev producers, and in their meet-
ing with the Minister of Industry and Commerce ••• agreed to 
allow them an increase of only I£1.5 per ton" (73). In 
December 1961 the potato growers of the Negev and Lachish 
Regions placed their crop of autumn potatoes in cold stor-
age, rather than accept the price offered by the Vegetable 
Marketing Board, which they alleged failed to meet their 
production costs (74). The significance of this is that 
not only the moshavim, where low levels of productivity, 
and therefore higher costs, are to be expected, but also 
the kibbutzim of the region were claiming that their produc-
tion costs were higher than those of producers elsewhere. 
The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, the Negev 
farmer generally has a burden of falha drought losses which 
are not covered by compensation. If water is not forthcom-
ing to ensure the suQcess of falha (and obviously it is 
not) and the settlements have no alternative but to under-
take ihe risk of drought every year, then part of these 
costs must be spread over the irrigated crops. Secondly, 
the mere equalisation of water costs cannot effect an 
equalisation of production costs. The official water input 
and yield norms for the region clearly show (Table I) that 
- -
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Table I 
Some Norms for Irrigated Crop·Yields and Water Inputs 
Region Yields per Dunam 
Groundnuts Cotton Sugar Beet Lucerne (fibre) 
Huleh 350 kg 110 kg 4,000 kg 7.0 tons 
Coast 400 110 4,000 7.5 
Lachish 350 110 4,000 7.0 
w. Gaza-Beer-
sheba Basin 400 110 5,000 8.5 
E. Gaza-Beer-
sheba Basin 350 110 4,500 8.5 
Water Input per Dunam 
Huleh 650 m3 700 m3 500 m3 1,200 m3 
Coast 600 600 450 1, OOO 
Lachish 650 700 500 1,100 
W.Gaza-Beer-
sheba Basin 800 800 750 1,350 
E.Gaza-Beer-
I sheba Basin 900 900 800 1,500 1. 
Source: Norms for .Agricul tural Planning ( 81 ) • 
Xields Per m3 (Derived2 
Huleh 0.54 kg . 0.16 kg 8.0 kg 0.0058 tons 
Coast 0.67 0.18 8.9 0.0075 
Lachish 0.54 0.16 8.0 0.0064 
W.Basin 0.50 0.14 6.7 0.0063 
E.Basin 0.39 0 .12 5.6 0.0057 
more than the equalisation of water prices is necessary to 
overcome the climatic disadvantage of the region . The idea 
that emerged before 1948 that the soils of the Northern 
Negev, particularly the loess, would need only 500 m3/dunam 
on average to produce the same output as that produced else-
where was far from the truth. The norms given in Table I 
demonstrate very clearly that even though higher yields 
are possible on the soils of the Northern Negev, the input 
of water per unit of yield must be greater there than in 
practically all the rest of Israel's major agricultural 
regions. Thus if the physical disadvantages of the region 
are to be nullified, full compensation for falha losses must 
be paid, and water must be subsidised until it costs the 
Negev farmer considerably less than his competitor elsewhere 
in the country. 
The foregoing represents an inconsistency in the appli-
cation of policy, not a failure to meet policy goals. The 
latter must be judged by the comparison of average Israeli 
prices and the price of imported agricultural products. If 
production of industrial crops elsewhere than in the Northern 
Negev is possible at costs nearer the world market level, 
then the inevitably higher costs of the region might be 
justified. 
At the end of 1961 . the Minister of Industry and Com-
merce stated that the Government paid in 1960 the sum of 
- . --
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I£587 for each ton of locally produced sugar, while the 
c.i.f. price of imported sugar was ~91, or I£164 at the 
current rate of exchange1(75). In 1960 it was said that 
locally-grown cotton was 56% more expensive than the 
imported variety (76). When the Negev and Lachish settle-
ments refused to accept the price of I£180 per ton of 
autumn potatoes in 1961/2, it was said that in the previous 
years, when the price offered had been I£230 per ton, 
Israeli potatoes sold abroad had fetched a price of only 
I£90 per ton! 
On this evidence it may safely be assumed that the 
production of the industrial crops emphasised in the North-
ern Negev - cotton, sugar beet, and potatoes - costs the 
nation at least double the world market price, with cotton 
a not very satisfactory exception. The criterion which 
A.G.Black had underlined - the production of the neces-
sary industrial erops at prices near to those of the world 
market - has not been fulfilled. On the other hand, 
employment, industrial - development (the cotton textile 
industry has played a major part in the development of the 
new towns in this and other regions), and a saving in foreign 
(1) The official exchange rate was then t1=I$1 .80. Even after the devaluation to ~1=1£3.0 in February 1962, the Israel price was more than twice as high. 
.,.~ ..... ~ -
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currency are among the gains resulting from the development 
of industrial crops. But there must be real doubt as to 
whether these gains were bought at a price which the nation 
can afford to pay. 
The purpose of industrial crop production was initially 
a short-term aim: it was hoped that the expansion of exports 
and of domestic production in other sectors would also help 
to reduce the export-import imbalance, so that the need to 
produce crops which are admittedly cheap on the world mar-
ket would decline. This end has not yet been met, and least 
of all in the Northern Negev; but are there prospects for 
industrial crop production in the long run? That there 
definitely are is implied in the Five Year Plan for agricul-
ture produced by the Joint Planning Council in 1959/60. In 
the five years to 1964/5, the Plan "projects for the first 
time a radical change in the traditional pattern of Israel's 
farming. Thus whereas the area under fruit and vegetables 
will decline slightly from 218,000 to 215,000 dunams ••• the 
area under cotton will rise from 83,000 to 202,000 dunams. 
Corrected figures since the time when the plan was draf'ted 
giv@ an area of 230,000-240,000 dunams under cotton by 
1965-66 •.•• The area under peanut s will be doubled, the area 
under sugar beets trebled, , .• Farms will be increasingly 
linked with big industry, operating f'or export. Most of the 
cotton will go to feed the spinning and weaving mills that 
..-.iii.. 
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must soon sell abroad three-quarters of their output. 
Over a third of the country's future peanut crop is billed 
for foreign markets. Sugar beets must replace imported 
sugar cane without raising food prices. Even in horticul-
ture nearly all the expansion planned is intended for export 
- 10,000 tons of potatoes by the end of the five-year period, 
10,000 tons of vegetables, 8,000 tons of bananas, 6,000 tons 
of grapes for the table •..• and - of co~rse - all the addi-
tional citrus fruit that will be grown" (77). 
This is the national policy for the next five years , 
and in general outline it is the policy for the Northern 
Negev, because it is from there that the increases in pro-
duction of industrial crops and some of the other items will 
have to come. It has been seen that the farms of the North-
ern Negev are by no means fully developed . The additional 
water that will be available when the Jordan-Negev Project 
is completed will give the region a much greater productive 
capacity than i't has today. The emphasis on export crops 
that is apparent in the Five Year Plan is the key to most 
of the developments which are now taking pJace in the North-
ern Negev and which will occur in the next few years. But 
before considering the present situation and the possibili-
ties of the future, a word should be said about one of the 
criteria of agricultural settlement policy that has so far 
not been mentioned in this chapter: the income of the farmer. 
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Estimates of the net incomes of moshav and kibbutz 
farmers were made in the preceding chapter. It does not 
appear that moshav incomes are at all comparable with those 
gained in the kibbutzim, in the old and established moshavim 
elsewhere, or in the towns. This is not unexpected, for the 
moshav farmers are inexperienced and they have not yet 
received the full production resources due to them. Another 
important factor in this is probably the larger size of 
moshav families. It must be said, however, that were it not 
for the fact that the moshav farmers effectively pay no 
rent, little or no interest or amortisation payments, and 
are subsidised by the Settlement Department in a multitude 
of ways, they would not have the incomes which they do enjoy, 
and these are at least above the subsistence level. In these 
terms, with a settlement authority and a government prepared 
in effect to guarantee a minimum income, the criterion of an 
earned income equal to that of a skilled worker in the towns 
can hardly be applied, at least not in the sense that income 
is the difference between costs incurred and prices obtained. 
All that can be said, then, is that kibbutz incomes are 
higher than moshav incomes, but neither can be an,effective 
gauge of the success of agricultural policy until the full 
development of irrigation is achieved. 
The general expansion of industrial crops in the Five 
Year Plan may be compared with a speech made by the rl'Iinister 
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of Agriculture when he opened the Knesset agricultural 
debate in 1960: 1 "Unfortunately we are not in a position 
to tell the farmers •.• you can expand cotton and sugar beet 
production without limit •.• We are already producing 1,000 
tons more cotton a year than we need for local consumption. 
The Minister recommended that the present guaranteed price 
••• be reduced next year •••• Sugar beet production should be 
expanded to the point where the country's three main factor-
ies were operating to capacity ... but after this •.• further ex-
pansion would have to stop" (78). 
The position is simple enough, and resembles in some 
ways the situation in 1953-4. Israel's production of the 
industrial crops, with the exception of groundnuts, has al-
ready exceeded the capacity of the home market, in some cases 
( cotton) the physical capacity, and in others ( sugar beet) 
the capacity to pay the production cos ts . The problem of 
the dairy branches, of vegetables, and of fruit, where 
production is restricted but where the :planners cannot -
for obvious and natur•al reasons - achieve perfect :p3.ri ty 
between supply and demand, could also be the problem of the 
industrial crops. Further expansion in production for the 
home market is likely to be unnecessary or impossible at 
(1) One must presume that this was before the Five Year 
Plan was published. 
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current prices. There are three possibilities. The first, 
and it cannot be considered practicable, is to write off a 
large part of the productive capacity of the farming sec-
tor and to cut production to a scale more compatible with 
the size and needs of Israel's population. The second is to 
cut the costs of production. The third, and this can hardly 
be divorced from the second, is to divert the excess and 
future additions to productive capacity to production for 
export, It is the third possibility, combined, one would 
hope, with the second, which has determined the nature of 
the Five Year Plan. 
Production for export implies one, or both, of two 
things: that a country has production costs equal to or lower 
than those of her competitors, or that she is able to of'fset 
her high production costs by selling, for high prices, in a 
specialised market . The future of the agricultural develop-
ment of the Northern Negev, it is already apparent, is plan-
ned to be shared between these two possibilities. The ques-
tions for the t\iture :are, therefore, how can the production 
costs of the planned export crops be cut, and how can the 
region develop a high cost/high price production? 
That the Ministries concerned are trying to reduce the 
fixed prices for industrial crops is already apparent. The 
prices of potatoes, cotton and sugar have been reduced in the 
last two years . This, incidentally, is the main reason why 
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the -kibbutzim of the region participate so relatively little 
in industrial crop production. Many kibbutz secretaries 
have stated privately that if prices are reduced further the 
industrial crops will not be grown in the kibbutzim at all. 
The kibbutzim are able to adopt such an attitude by reason 
of their alternative production branches. The moshavim are 
not. The efforts of the Ministry of Finance to cut drought 
compensation have already been referred to. Other examples 
were the attempt to reduce the price of potatoes by 20% in 
1961/2, and the attempt, believed to have been inspired by 
the Ministry of Finance, to charge certain settlements to 
the south and east of Beersheba a realistic water price. 
In August 1961 moshav Nevatim paid less than 5 agorot 
per m3: in the following month ¥'ekorot sent the settlement 
a bill equivalent to 12.4 agorot per m3. (This was of course 
fiercely protested against by the settlers, the Settlement 
Department, the Moshav Movement,et al.) Clearly the Govern-
ment is intent upon forcing down the costs of production. 
The continual rise in the value of subsidies paid to the 
farming sector makESthis easy enough to understand. Agri-
cultural subsidies, in direct form, rose from I£16.9 million 
in 1955/6 to I£72 million in 1959/60 (79). Of the 1959/60 
total, I£24 million was paid in drought compensation, a 
large part of it to the farmers of the Negev. rt has been 
calculated that if citrus production is excluded, subsidies 
accounted for over 10% of the value of national agricultural 
production in that year (80). 
What are the prospects for improved productivity in the 
Northern Negev? There is obviously much scope in the mosh-
avim. Land allocations have been partially irrigated so far, 
the farmers have bad at the very most only ten years' experi-
ence of farming, and most of them have had considerably less. 
What is perhaps in the long run even more important is the 
evidence that the old rigidity of attitude towards the social 
organisation of farming in the rnoshavim is weakening . The 
original attempt to induce a heterogeneous, inexperienced, 
oriental immigrant population to devote themselves to farming 
on stric-t lines of European soc.ialist principles seems to 
be giving way to a more realistic and pragmatic approach. 
It is apparent to anyone travelling in the region that there 
are many moshav settlers who work, for wages, on the land of 
other settlers, in other villages as well as in their own, 
and also in the neighbouring kibbutzim. This state of 
affairs is confirmed_ in a Report of the Bank of Israel (79). 
The moshav settlers are not attached to the principle of 
self-labour, and one would judge that many of·~hem are not 
attached to agriculture. The latter opinion is confirmed by 
Mrs Nevo's analysis of social attitudes in moshav Berosh. 
It is theref'ore possible that the settlement authorities 
will admit the existence and the benefits of using hired 
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labour in the moshavim . Hired labour has been used for many 
years by the kibbutzim, and most kibbutz members have long 
since overcome their ideological objections to this . The 
use of hired labour, or its frank consideration as a pos-
sible factor in the development of the region's agriculture 
is likely to be important. The reasons for this, and its 
likelihood, bring the argument back to the criticisms of 
Black and Clawson of the ' meshek hasadeh'. 
The cultivation of field crops in the moshavim is al-
ready being carried out with the help, at certain point~ of 
machinery. Fields are ploughed by tractors from the local 
tractor station . Rec ently some small tractors have been 
introduced as part of the village investment in a few moshavim. 
Agricultural instructors have been trying to obtain a uni-
formity of cropping plans among the villagers, in order that 
crop spraying (serious damage to cotton crops has occurred 
recently, due to the boll-weevil) may be carried out by 
aeroplanes. These are all tacit admissions of the advan-
tages of large units of cultivation . Another common fea-
ture, which stems from the fact that in many villages the 
number of farmers is much less than the number of plots of 
land which have irrigation facilities, is that the more pro-
gressive farmers are permitted to cultivate vacant plots. 
(It is also said that some resident tenants lease all or 
part of their holdings to others, but there is understandably 
11 11 
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little evidence available for this.) From these facts, 
and it should be emphasised that they are fact
s and not 
opinion, it is clear (a) that the majority of moshav set-
tl.ers care little for the supposed benefits of
 the moshav 
system, and (b) that progressive farmers, and agricultur
al 
instructors, are aware that the concept of th
e family farm 
is not well adapted to the demands of the indu
strial crops. 
The solution to the problem, on one level, is 
easy enough: 
the vacant plots in the villages should be red
istributed 
among the resident tenants. On another level 
the expan-
sion of industrial crop production, without an
 expansion 
in the number of farmers, implies the need for
 hired labour 
at certain seasons. It has already been said 
that the pres-
ent situation would not appear to warrant furt
her strict 
adherence to the principle of self-labour, but
 even if this 
is accepted, where will the labour come from a
t, for instance, 
the cotton picking season? It is unlikely th
at moshav 
tenants, even after the redistribution of vaca
nt plots, 
would have areas of cotton large enough to wa
rrant cotton 
picking machines, though it might be feasible 
for settlers 
to cooperate between themselves, or with kibbu
tzim, in the 
purchase of such machines . It is more likely
 that human 
labour will be required. There is evidence th
at a solution 
to this and to another problem is being consid
ered by the 
authorities. This second problem is that of m
oshav residents 
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who are not fully engaged in farming. It has been seen at 
Berosh that non-farming residents cannot in practice be 
evicted by the ~ettlement Department,. partly for political 
reasons, and partly because the evicted settlers would 
demand some 'compensation' in o_rder to establish themselves 
elsewhere. Such people are a potential source of hired labour. 
They would however need some more regular employment, and 
it is doubtful whether they alone could suffice to meet the 
needs of moshav units of possibly 50-60 dunams. The solu-
tion to this problem was suggested, but not directly, by 
the Head of the Planning Department of the Ministry of 
Labour's Housing Division in 1958: "Certain ideas are now 
being exainined •.•• the idea of adding small industries to the 
economic functions of the Rural Community Centre. This may 
help to strengthen its relation with the villages and to 
create new sources of income for the sons and daughters of 
the farmers" (48). Since this was said the Settlement Depart-
ment in the Lachish Region has turned with increasing favour 
to the idea of adding small industries to areas of moshav 
settlement. Y/ishful thinking is not required in order to 
see that the transformation of the rural centres from units 
containing a handful of professional workers into large 
villages based on agricultural industries, would at the s rune 
time provide moshav farmers with labour at peak periods 
and woul d provide an al terna ti ve income for those of whom 
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it was recently said "it is • • • harsh and inconsiderate 
to impose a farming career on the minority of settlers who 
cannot do it well and do not enjoy it" (77) . No one would 
suffer any loss from such a development, and there would be 
considerable gain, both psychological and economic. 
Of the prospects for increased productivity and lower 
production costs from the kibbutzim, there is not much that 
can be said . Any advances that can be made in the technical 
and agronomic fields will without doubt be made . Little 
advance is possible in the field of organisation, unless 
it is the removal of the labour shortage in the kibbutzim, 
either by an increase in the supply of hired labour or, and 
this is much less likely, by the arrival of a large body of 
new kibbutz settlers. It must also be remembered that many 
of the kibbutzim have built-in diseconomies of location . 
Whatever the outcome of such potential developments 
towards reducing the costs of industrial c~op production, 
it must remain doubtful whether the resul ti.ng economies will 
be sufficient to compensate for the high cost of water in 
Israel. The importance of' this factor may be judged from 
the example of groundnuts. In 1955/6 it was said that the 
proportion of water costs in the total production costs 
of mechanically harvested groundnuts was 25-34~ (69, p.255). 
Now if it is accepted that water costs are about five times 
as much in Israel as in another country producing groundnuts 
for export, on the assillllption that water inputs are equal 
in country Band in Israel, and that all other production 
costs are equal, then a given unit of groundnuts will cost 
70x (other costs)+ 30x (water costs) in Israel, and 
70x + 6x in country B. To achieve parity, therefore, the 
Israeli producer must reduce all other production costs 
other than water to 46x - a reduction of 34%! This example 
is perhaps extreme, as the cost of the water input is smal-
ler as a proportion of total costs for most of the other 
crops. But even for cotton and sugar beet water costs are 
not less than 18% of the total. 
There is not much comfort to be obtained from the future 
either. The remaining resources of water that are to be 
developed in the period up to 1970 are going to require a 
higher investment per volilllle of water obtained than has been 
the case up to the present. Much of this more costly water 
- supplied via the Jordan-Negev pipeline - is to be the 
basis of further agricultural development in the Northern 
Negev. The farmers of that region will be at a crippling 
disadvantage unless and until it is fully realised that the 
physical conditions of the region necessitate, with the 
present and planned future production p~ttern, a fully com-
pensatory subsidy to offset the inevitably higher costs. 
All thing s considered, the planned expansion in the 
Northern Negev of industrial crops for export appear s t o 
I I 
offer little more than an additional, and unnecessary
, 
charge to the riation. 
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The other possible avenue of development is one that 
suggests itself almost automatically. A pattern of 
produc-
tion should be developed in the Northern Negev with t
he pur-
pose of offsetting the disadvantages of the region an
d con-
centrating on its advantages. In a word, specialisat
ion 
would seem to be the only answer to the economic prob
lems 
of agriculture in this region. The tradition of Jew
ish 
agricultural settlement has been consistently opposed
 to 
the adoption of such a principle. The original mixed
 farm-
ing villages were specifically designed to be closed 
units 
that could be located almost regardless of physical c
ondi-
tions. Even today this is most evident in the attemp
ts to 
cut poultry production in the established villages of
 the 
lowlands and to allocate a large share of the produc
tion 
quotas to the struggling moshavim of the Hill Region
s. The 
latter will not be the most efficient producers, but 
they 
have no other possibilities, so poultry houses are el
iminated 
elsewhere. Industrial crops produced in the Northern
 Negev 
do not constitute economic specialisation: they ~ere 
al lot-
ted to the new villages because their production was 
neces-
sary at the time, and because established farms elsew
here 
could not be replanned. The Northern Negev has no ad
van-
tages of least-cost production in this branch. 
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In Chapter IV it was remarked
 that there was some 
degree of specialisation in t
he kibbutzim. This may take 
several forms, not the least 
being the present diversion 
of attention to industrial un
dertakings. The kibbutzim 
are approaching, within the l
imits of the available water,
 
their full development. Many
 are seeking to introduce 
specialisation to offset the 
declining profitability of th
e 
standard production branches.
 Thus kibbutz Eretz has 
entered the field of bee-keep
ing and honey production on 
a major scale. A considerable enterp
rise is developing 
around the processing of hone
y and its many by-products. 
Kibbutz Beeri has a large com
mercial flower nursery. The 
only profitable branch at Lah
av is said to be pig-raising,
 
which, for obvious reasons, i
s a specialised line in Israe
l. 
But while all these examples 
indicate that the kibbutzim 
are well aware of the implic
ations of regional conditions
 
for agriculture, these are n
ot adequate prospects for the
 
future development of the reg
ion, and they hardly justify 
the maintenance of livestock 
branches, especially dairy 
cattle. 
One possibility, that has alr
eady been translated 
into action, is the expansion
 of citrus in the Northern 
Negev. This is a proved and 
profitable export line. But 
one's doubts are raised by th
e fact that when the planta-
tions now in the care of' the 
Settlement Department are 
, I 
handed over to the moshavim, they will be divided into 
plots of' f'i ve dunarns f'or each f'amily. Greater economies 
would be possible if the plantations continued to be run 
as large blocks. But citrus, with the present pattern of 
settlement, cannot be developed as a monoculture. Nor can 
another possibility - agave - be adapted to the existing 
villages. · niat other crops can be developed in the region, 
with a prospect of successful exportation? 
This question, and the possibility of economic speciali-
sation, is dealt with in two recent publications of the 
Settlement Department. The first, which refers to Israeli 
agriculture in general, is a pamphlet by the Director of 
the Settlement Dep~trnent, with the significant title 
"Towards Specialised Farming". One quotation suffices to 
show that Weitz, at least, has grasped the importance of 
economic specialisation: "In our opinion, the criterion 
for economic-agricultural development should be, not the 
supply of the needs of the internal market alone, but also 
the possibility of expl-oi ting the special conditions of the 
country; hence the criterion for the relative profitability 
of the various production possibilities is the level of 
world prices." (60) 
What are the potential advantages of the Northern 
Negev that could offset the appreciably higher costs of 
production in this region? Compared to other regions of 
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the country, there is one principal advantage alone: the 
climate, and especially the higher temperatures in winter 
which are combined with greater amounts of sunshine. But 
this appearance is deceptive. It will be remembered that 
away from the coast the diurnal range of temperature 
increases, so thEt in winter months the occurrence of night 
frost is common for much of the region. There is only one 
limited area in which the climate represents a real advan-
tage, and that is in the southwest, on the banks of the 
Nahal Besor where the occurrence of frost is rare. This 
advantage does not exist for production for the home market. 
The experience of kibbutz Gevulot, which lies in the Besor 
area, has been that the initial advantage that the kibbutz 
once had with fruit and vegetables that ripened earlier than 
in the rest of the country, and therefore fetched higher 
prices, has been eliminated by the development elsewhere 
of fruit and vegetable strains that ripened equally early. 
The kibbutz once had an open market for plTu~s, for example; 
for a period of two weeks there was no competition from 
other producers or other types of fruit, but now there are 
other types of fruit and even plwns on the market at the 
same time. Furthermore, the real climatic advantage for 
fruit and vegetables for the domestic market (which is not 
very large for high-priced produce) now lies with the 
settlements of the Arava, such as Ein Gedi and Yotvata. 
. 
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But the Beser area does have an advantage in production 
for European markets, and it is on this basis that future 
development is proposed. 
The Besor area is unfortunately the least densely set-
tled part of the region. There are a few moshavim and some 
kibbutzim. In the eyes of the authorities t here is only one 
solution, and that is to undertake further settlement. To 
this end a preliminary plan for the settlement of Revel Besor 
has been drawn up (82). The Besor Region is to include that 
part of Revel Ranegev which lies to the south and west of the 
Gaza-Beersheba road, and will be limited in the south by the 
present line of kibbutzim (Kerem Shalom-Nir Yitshak-Gevulot-
Tseelim), and in the southeast by a line between Ts.eelim and 
the Mishmar Ranegev crossroads near Tifrah (Map 21 ) • This 
is a preliminary plan, and it must be admitted that there are 
many who doubt its feasibility. Therefore it will be examined 
only in its salient points. 
Revel Besor is to be based upon water obtained from the 
Jordan-Negev pipeline; in a memorandum included in the Plan, 
Tahal estimated that 130 million m3 would be available, after 
the needs of existing settlement has been met. A total of 
some 24,000 families would be settled in the region, of which 
existing villages now contain 2,050 families; thr e e towns 
are included in the Beser Reg ion, two of which - Azzata 
and Ofakim - already exist and have now a population of 
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1,750 families. The nwnber of additional families planned 
is therefore, 15,000 in Besor Town, Azzata and Ofakim, 4,500 
in new villages, and 800 to be added to the existing villages. 
It is intended that this population should be drawn .from the 
Israeli population, and especially from the sons and daugh-
ters of moshav farmers in other areas, and not from immigrants. 
There are three · main doubts acknowledged by officials 
of the Settlement Department. The first is whether suffi-
cient capital can be found; the second is whether sufficient 
numbers of settlers will be forthcoming; and the third is 
whether the necessary amounts of water will be available. 
The first two problems are serious but not insuperable. 
The third is vital. Since the Besor Plan was drawn up, 
Tahal's forecast estimate for the urban and industrial con-
sumption of water in 1970 has risen from 400 million m3 
(Besor Plan) to 460 million m3 ("Outline of the Water 
Development .Plan 1962-70," Tahal, reviewed in (28)). This 
increase of 60 million m3 is almost half the amount which 
is supposed to be available for Besor in 1970. The whole 
water programme itself is based upon an estimate of 1 .5 
milliard m3, but "it must be added that this potential •.. 
is not all exploitable, and some experts estimate that it 
is possible to exploit only 1,300-1,400 million rn3 a year" 
(28). It is very likely that existing settlements are capa-
ble of absorbing nearly all the water exploited in the future 
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and that urban and industrial consumption will increase 
more than is expected; it must be borne in mind also that 
some 230 million rn 3 a year of the planned 700 million m3 
increase will have t o be used to recharge the overp~nped 
aquifers of the Coastal Plain for at least the next four 
or five years . 
There are five significant details in the Besor Plan, 
details which will complete this survey of changes and 
developments in the policies and methods adopted for the 
settlement and agricultural development of the Northern 
Negev. The first is the preface by the Minister of Finance, 
Mr Eehkol, who has in the past couple of years been making 
serious efforts to cut the economic burden of costly agri-
culture in this region. In the preface he repeats the 
familiar phrases of Zionist settlement ideology: "The 
settlement of Hevel Besor is an answer in part to all the 
following needs: it will offer a new horizon to the young 
generation; it will be an answer for the rnoshav sons who 
seek their future in agriculture; it will ensure an addi-
tional sinew in the economic strength of our nation; it 
will strengthen security in the southern part of our country, 
and above all - it will represent a further step, in the ful-
filment of' our social mission of effecting our national 
consolidation." The social tasks of settlement in the 
Besor Region are to be as heavy as elsewhere; on the 
II 
evidence presented here, there would not se
em to be much 
hope of the successful economic developmen
t of agriculture 
in the Besor Region unless its future farm
ers are absolved 
of this ideological burden. 
The second point is that the settlement pa
ttern of 
Besor is planned to differ from that of La
chish. Large com-
pound agricultural and service villages ar
e to be built, 
six in all, each with some 350-500 agricult
ural families 
and some 100 or so families engaged in the 
services. Thus 
the rural centre is included in the moshav
im, which are them-
selves grouped together. This is planned 
as a solution to 
the needs of the Beser settlers: these are 
to be Israelis, 
who will demand a larger community, and a 
wider and more 
developed range of services and amenities 
than did the Lachish 
settlers. 
The third point is that the holdings allot
ted to the 
new settlers, who are to grow vegetables a
nd fruit for 
export and industrial crops, are to be muc
h larger than 
the original 'meshelt h_asadeh', with 50-55 dunam
s of irri-
gated land, including citrus. 
The fourth point is that a considerable ele
ment of 
flexibility in the development of cultivat
ion is allowed for. 
Although the Region is destined to be sett
led by kibbutzim 
and moshavim ( "no proportions f'or the share of kibbu
tzim 
and rnoshavim have been fixed as yet, but th
ere is no doubt 
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that both will have their place"), it is ad.mi tted that 
11 there is a strong possibility that until the settlers
 
arrive agricultural development will go forward in th
e shape 
of large farms like that of the Huleh Development Au
thority, 
or the farms of Yitsur Ufituach
11
• The Huleh Development 
Authority, set up on the drained lands of Lake Huleh 
in 
Northern Galilee (83), used hired labour for several years, 
until the lands were divided among local settlements.
 Yit-
sur Ufituach is a company set up by one of the kibbut
z move-
ments to use vacant land and hired labour for the pur
poses 
of agricultural development. The company's farms are
 ulti-
mately planned to be converted into cooperative settl
ements, 
but there is no specific time limit in which this is 
to occur. 
The fifth point is that the planners contemplate the
 
construction of a storage reservoir on the Nahal Bes
or, near 
kibbutz Reim, on·the same pattern as the Nahal Shiqma
 pro-
ject. The floodwaters of both the Nahal Besor and the Nahal 
Gerar would be· caught here, and on theavailable hydro
logi cal 
evidence it is estimated that 10-20 million m3 C(;)uld be 
trapped and returned to the local Pleistocene aquifer
. But 
this amount of water is not nearly enough to generat
e 
development by itself- that depends almost entirely o
n the 
Jordan-Negev Project. The significance of utilising tbe 
Nahal Besor winter flow is that it is only now that 
plans 
are being put forward for the development of local w
ater 
resources. 
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To sum up, the Israeli authorities 
have at last come 
round to the agricultural policy fo
r the region which has 
some prospects of offering an econo
mic return which could 
offset the cost of the other functi
ons of agricultural settle-
ment. It will be remarked. that Jea
n Gottmann ' s proposals, 
cited in the second chapter, were v
ery percipient: he 
recommended a form of production th
at would offer export 
prospects and offset the economic d
isadvantages of the region. 
He thought that cheap water might b
e found: in that the 
Israeli authorities have been disap
pointed . 
Unfortunately it is clear today tha
t the limit on 
agricultural development in Israel 
is water: the general 
expansion of settlement that has ta
ken place in the rest 
of the Northern Negev, and in the c
ountry as a whole, may 
in all probability have prejudiced the feasib
ility of the 
Besor scheme. Water has to be foun
d for the existing settle-
ments that have not yet received th
eir full quotas of irri-
gated land. It is a fact that the 
only villages in the 
Northern Negev which are today not 
included in the budget 
of the Settlement Department are th
ose which became inde-
pendent in 1949 - Yad Mordechai, Doro
t, Ruhama, and Gvar'am • 
.All the rest, including the older k
ibbut2im such as Gevulot 
and Nir Am, are still dependent upon 
the Settlement Depart-
ment for capital investment and loa
ns. On this basis it is 
hard to justify ( a) the planned di version of c
apital res-
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ources to a new settlement project, and (b) the use of 
Jordan water in Besor when there is everythin
g to be said 
for giving all additional water to existing s
ettlements. 
And, if ten or twelve towns are to be built i
n the Central 
Negev, 1 as the Prime Minister has frequently 
annou..nced, 
it might be doubted whether there will be eno
ugh water for 
anyone~ 
As regards existing settlement in the Norther
n Negev, 
it is clear that the high cost of present and
 future agri-
cultural :production cannot be met by the farm
ers themselves. 
If economic efficiency is to be achieved, and
 it is today 
equally essential that Israel should achieve 
economic inde-
pendence, then the agricultural settlements c
ould well be 
relieved of some of their non-agricultural fun
ctions. It is 
no longer true that additional villages will 
help to defend 
the country in the event of a war, nor is it 
likely that 
existing villages will be more than a liabilit
y. One feels 
that settlement planners are still fighting t
he War of Inde-
pendence, when warfare was remarkably primitiv
e by modern 
standards. The next war, which one fervently 
hopes will 
never occur, will be fought with missiles, ae
roplanes, 
(1) Construction at Besor Town has already started. Arad 
is being built now, and other towns in the Ce
ntral Negev 
(Dimona, Kfan Yeroharn) are b eing expanded. 
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tanks, and artillery, not with rifles and mortars . 
Furthermore, the analysis of the problems of the moshavim 
that has been made here serves to indicate that the social 
principles on which the moshav system was originally devel-
oped are not in accordance with the demands now put upon it. 
The conclusions about the moshavim which can be drawn are 
not without signific~nce for other countries, since there 
woulQ seem to be a current misconception about farm unit 
planning and 'social justice ' . 
The idea that family labour should be employed, to the 111 
exclusion of hired labour, is a principle not often found 
outside Israel . Even within Israel it is evident that it 
does not accord with the wishes and heeds of the oriental 
field-crop moshav settlers. It is no more likely to accord 
with the wishes and needs of non-European farmers in other 
countries, unless and until they reach the sophisticated 
levels of the original Zionist moshav settler. The latter 
was a volunteer: the oriental immigrant is not, and it is 
unjust to saddle him .with responsibilities which he may not 
want, and certainly finds difficult to bear. 
A second important conclusion is that the principle of 
equal units of land for each settler is not necessarily 
equitable in the case of cultivation that is not centred 
around mixed farming_. Evidence in support of this conten-
t ion has been provided within Israel. In an examination of 
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produc tion elasticity in established, 
i . e . livestock, 
moshavim, it was :found that "marginal
 increases in the land 
holdings of the :farms would not have 
resulted in any signi-
ficant change in the overall value of
 their outputs . This 
stands in contradiction to our intuiti
ve feeling that land 
in these farms of' small holdings shou
ld constitute a rare 
resource and should therefore be earn
ing a definite share of 
the value of output" (89) . Under Israeli price
 conditions 
at the moment, then, it is true to sa
y that the income of 
the ' mixed' farmer is not dependent u
pon the amount of land 
he has - he can use his initiative to
 increase his income by 
adding to the livestock branches, whi
ch incurs no ' social' 
objection. The principle of equal units does no
t survive 
the transfer from the livestock farm 
to the field crop farm. 
The individual :farmer cannot increase
 his income, in the event 
of falling commodity prices and risin
g input costs, without 
either (a) improving his productivity or (b) i
ncreasing his 
land unit to the point where it appro
ximates more nearly 
to the optimal size. (It is not claimed in Is
rael that a 
40 dunam unit is the optimal size for fie
ld crop pr oduction, 
only that it 9....@11 provide an adequate i
ncome.) Equal units 
therefore provide an equal opportunity
 for the pro gressive 
and for t he backward livestock farmer
. The pro gressive 
farmer c an meet changes in prices wit
h a certain alteration 
in his resources. In the field-crop 
:farm, the progressive 
I I 
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farmer , to acquire a measure of flexibility u
nder changing 
con.di tions, must be able to change the size o
f his holding . 
For these purposes it is true elsewhere in Is
rael that 
there is insufficient provision for changes i
n the size of 
moshav holdings . Close settlement has led to
 a situation 
where the sons of farmers in fully developed 
villages have 
to move great distances before they can find 
a vacant holding , 
generally in a new village . Such a situation
 has not yet 
been met with on a serious scale in the North
ern Negev, but 
ii provides one more justification for making a realistic 
appraisal of the need to fill the villages . 
There is every-
thing to be sa i ci at the present time for leavi
ng vacant 
holdings empty, and of eventually allowing tho
se farmers who 
are suffic iently qualified to expand their ho
ldings. 
In conclusion, it is worth comparing, briefly
, the 
problems of Israel ' s settlement and agricultu
ral develop-
ment in the Northern Negev with si1.1ilar progr
ammes that 
have been undertaken in other parts of the wo
rld . In what 
way is Israel unique in this respect, if she 
is unique at 
all? In the light of the interest show.a in I
srael by many 
Asian and Af'rican countries, what lessons can
 be learnt 
for application elsewhere? 
In individual facets of the process of agricu
ltural 
development and settlement, the Northern Nege
v has many 
parallels in other lands. For instance, the 
structure of 
rural settlement planned f'or Lachish, is very similar to 
proposals made f'or the Indian Community Development Pro-
jects: "The programme visualised groups of' 15 to 25 villages 
grouped around a ' mandi ' centre, with market, cottage indus-
tries, health centre, schools, and a service station for 
mechanized agricultural implements. Four or f'ive mandi 
centres, together with their satellite villages, are grouped 
around small country towns or industri al centres." (84). 
There is a very strong parallel between the Northern Negev 
and the Thal Development Project in Pakistan, where "the 
problem •.• was twofold: first, to provide a previously 
undeveloped region with facilities that would make permanent 
occupance possible, and second, to resettle thousands of' 
families in the area • ••• Five new towns have been established 
primarily to act as market centres f'or the region~ In each 
it is planned to have at least one sizeable factory which 
will utilize both town and surplus rural labow and local 
raw materials, such as raw cotton, wool and sugar cane. 
Facilities such as schools, hospitals and post offices are 
provided in each town." ( 85) 
In all this there is the recognition that "agriculture 
and industry are partners for successful development, and 
neither may be advanced on its own without the danger of 
11 
serious repercussions on the other. ( 86) This need for 
the integration of agriculture, industry, and services within 
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a regional framework is not always recognised: "In the 
Gezira scheme. in the Sudan, a specialized branch of agri-
culture was brought to a higher production level. As this 
was not accompanied by other rural and urban developments, 
the Gezira peasants remain at the mercy of one type of crop 
and the world market, and have little protection should 
either fail."(86) 
In a hundred other ways, so many that they cannot all 
be mentioned Israel ' s problems are those of other countries. 
One would cite especially the problem of inducing the adop-
tion of ' Western ' methods of cooperation and cultivation 
among non-We stern peoples. It has been seen that this is as 
much a problem in Israel in the moshavim as elsewhere. One 
could also mention the fact that it has not been possible 
in Israel to select carefully the people to whom newly 
developed land holdings are given. Each moshav in Israel 
usua1ly has its quota of the poor in health, the outright 
"social cases", the unqualified, and the unenthusiastic. 
Studies of settlement schemes in Ceylon and in Nigeria, to 
name but two cases, have shown the same situation there 
(87,88). 
Where Israel differs most strikingly is in her deter-
mination, combined with practically all the necessary tech-
nical expertise and capital. It is in her strong de term in.a-
tion to reach certain clearly defined goals in agricultural 
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settlement that Israel stands out from the rest. This 
should be viewed in the proper perspective of time, for 
the fact is that Israel ' s experience, from at least 1910-
1920, and to a certain extent from the early pioneering 
efforts of the 1880's, is a much longer one than that of 
Asian and African countries. Israel made few gross mis-
calculations about the agricultural resources of the land, 
such as were made in the East African Groundnut Scheme, 
or in the Niger Agricultural Project. The pioneering works 
of the kibbutzim were effectively pilot projects which paved 
the way for future development. By 1954 the planners in 
Israel had at their disposal an accurate inventory of the 
physical resources of the country, though it could be said 
that this was often interpreted too optimistically. Indeed, 
it is ironic that the problems which now beset the Northern 
Negev, in agriculture and settlement, may be traced back in 
a direct line to the force of social ideology. The frontier 
of agricultural settlement is no longer a direct product of 
physical conditions, it is now the factor of economic pro-
fitability. Admittedly this is in a certain measure an 
expression of physical conditions, but it is also a product 
of a multitude of forces unconnected with the agricultural 
sector. In the perceptive words of Professor Norton Gins-
burg, "most planning is oriented towards economic develop-
ment and the solving of such problems as seem to interfere 
j 
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with or defer that development. I
t would be foolhard.;v to 
suggest that in reality these ends
 are pursued in a completely 
rational manner. States plan for 
their development within 
systems of values, among which na
tionalism, together with 
its sister, autarchy [sic] is particular
ly evident, which 
bias the course of development in 
unnatural directions." (85). 
The Northern Negev offers a fine e
xample of rapid, large-
scale, agricultural colonisation a
nd of a well-designed appa-
ratus for integrating backward imm
igrants into a Western social 
and economic framework. What is m
ost clear, however, _. is that 
the determination which made this 
possible has at the same 
time provided such rigidity that t
he flexibility needed for 
adaptation to changing conditions 
is wanting. Israel has 
much to teach in the fields of phy
sical planning : and social 
development, but her agricultural 
settlement programmes 
demonstrate the pitfalls of allowi
ng economic policy to take 
second place to social policies. 
Social policy so far has 
dominated agriculture and agricult
ural organisation in the 
Northern Negev, in defiance of the
 region's physical conditions. 
Today Israel is compelled to conce
ntrate upon development 
towards national economic independ
ence. Unless the required 
element of flexibility is introduc
ed, agricultural settlement 
in the Northern Negev may not only
 fail to contribute, but 
may effectively hinder such develo
pment. 
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Beit Jibrin (Beit Guvrin) 
Beit Jimal 
Bir Abu Jeber 
Bir Sheneg_ 
Bureir 
Dankur 
El Faluja 
El rmara 
El Majdal (Migdal Ashkelon) 
El Muhurraka 
Huj 
Huleig_at 
Kaufakha 
Kastina 
Rabiye 
Ruweibe 
Shokat Es Zofi 
Sumara 
140/113 
148/126 
128/105 
105/070 
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104/081 
111/.120 , 
113/097 
114/.102 
117/112 
118/098 
126/128 
092/072 
101/073 
081/072 
117/083 
APPENDIX MOVEMENT OF FAMILIES IN MOSHAVIM 
30.ix.53 + - 30.ix:.54 + - 30.ix-55 + - 30.ix.56 + - 30.ix.57 + - 30.ix.58 + - 30.ix.59 Total Families leaving 30.ix.54-30.ix.59 
Nevatim 29 83 29 83 5 4 84 16 16 84 7 · 77 2 79 1 80 27 Omer 27 14 14 27 8 19 28 12 35 3 7 31 3 12 22 1 23 39 Gilat 81 4 4 81 26 13 94 20 114 2 7 109 1 14 96 2 11 87 45 Geia (a) (a) (a) 61 24 12 7;; 6 13 66 29 6 89 5 7 87 6 8 85 46 
Tekuma 62 4 4 62 11 9 64 2 62 6 68 6 3 71 71 14 
Tifram 65 1 15 51 36 6 81 1 10 72 20 4 88 3 4 87 1 5 83 29 
Maslul 86 4 15 75 13 4 84 2 4 82 1 1 82 - 10 72 2 2 72 21 Mashen (a) (a)(a) 79 5 2 82 1 81 3 84 2 2 84 84 5 Beit Shiqma (a) (a)(a) 75 24 32 67 22 6 83 8 7 84 3 9 78 2 2 78 56 
Bitha 89 3 6 86 7 4 89 6 83 3 1 85 2 5 82 5 6 81 22 
Pattish 92 7 3 · 96 4 8 92 3 2 93 8 5 96 2 22 76 1 7 70 44 Rannen 42 32 5 69 11 3 77 11 18 70 9 12 67 1 66 5 61 39 Yoshivya 77 4 12 69 19 2 86 5 91 - 32 59 - 20 39 8 31 62 
Yakini 74 7 12 69 2 67 2 69 9 78 78 78 2 
Shuva 64 8 56 37 4 89 4 93 - 17 76 2 74 4 6 ' 72 29 
Peduyim 73 - 21 52 27 9 70 2 4 68 5 2 71 5 6 70 70 21 
Sharsheret 62 5 6 61 2 1 62 1 1 62 1 1 62 62 1 1 62 4 Beit Hagadi 44 45 2 87 5 1 91 5 3 93 5 5 93 2 91 7 3 95 14 
Mivtahim 58 45 16 87 1 38 50 25 30 45 22 1 66 3 3 66 3 2 67 74 Kokhav 41 16 1 56 12 9 59 8 5 62 7 55 55 - 55 76 Helets 76 - 24 52 6 58 12 2 68 8 76 9 3 82 2 1 83 6 
Ahuzzam 72 20 22 70 15 8 77 7 5 79 - 18 61 4 1 64 1 63 33 Uza 72 1 73 3 76 76 76 76 8 84 
Telamim 57 19 1 75 2 1 76 76 4 4 76 5 71 7 64 17 
Givolim 42 9 15 36 20 2 54 8 9 53 6 7 52 2 1 53 5 11 47 30 
Shalva 39 20 4 55 10 65 2 1 66 2 1 67 2 65 1 3 63 7 Shibbolim 58 58 2 1 59 2 .61 61 61 61 1 
Berosh 25 25 1 49 4 5 48 10 4 54 4 1 57 1 1 57 6 51 17 
Melilot 34 15 5 44 15 1 58 5 5 58 4 2 60 1 59 3 56 12 
Nir Akiva - 35 4 1 38 10 10 38 32 15 55 1 20 36 20 8 48 8 40 61 
Nir Moshe 29 17 5 41 2 7 36 17 53 6 59 - 10 49 6 43 23 
Paamei Tashaz 50 4 12 42 24 11 55 1 2 54 4 1 57 8 49 2 51 22 
Teashur 20 s 10 18 19 5 32 12 15 29 14 1 42 10 11 41 3 2 42 34 
Tidhar (a) ' (a) (a) (a) (44) 3 41 11 1 51 3 54 3 57 57 4 
Zenia 32 27 10 49 7 1 55 3 4 54 7 3 58 1 57 2 55 11 
Sede Tsvi 41 31 15 57 6 23 40 17 13 44 15 4 55 5 8 52 1 1 52 49 
Talmei Bilu 47 8 39 16 55 3 8 50 1 51 3 48 48 11 Qelahim 43 43 12 2 53 2 8 47 4 14 37 4 33 · 6 4 35 32 
Eitan 61 61 8 69 2 1 70 1 6 65 1 66 7 Noam 64 64 23 14 73 25 19 79 10 8 81 2 13 70 54 
Nogah 45 45 31 2 74 - 10 64 6 70 3 2 71 14 
Otsem 87 87 19 26 80 2 1 81 1 80 2 82 28 
Sede Jja v:i.d 74 74 25 15 84 23 23 84 3 8 79 2 6 75 52 
Shaha 70 70 3 5 68 12 4 76 3 8 71 3 3 71 20 Sohar 18 18 36 1 53 15 1 67 5 8 64 2 8 58 18 
Eshbol 53 53 5 1 57 1 58 2 60 1 
Yesha 14 14 39 9 44 - 12 32 "J 25 28 Ammioz 16 16 5 11 7 4 38 30 12 42 
Shoqeda I JNl'r' ',ITV I 32 32 1 31 1 32 32 1 Zimrat LI y 13 13 41 54 2 7 49 3 52 7 (a) no data '1"1t;, I 'GE 
N.B. The six-monthly population returns in the records of the Settlement Department show many inconsistencies, especially in the early years. Numbers of families added and 
leaving in any one year have therefore been corrected, where necessary, to obtain confonnity with the total number of fami.lies resident at the beginning and end of the year. 
Source: Population records of the Settle:rrent Department. 
